French Algeria

1830–1962

A Case Study in the Patterns of Power

Thomas J. Bryan

with Claude (Anthropic)

Held as tested, not revealed

Preface

This volume is a case study in the *Patterns of Power* series. It reads a single historical order — French Algeria, from the landing at Sidi Ferruch in June 1830 to independence in July 1962 — through the framework the series builds, applying that framework module by module and letting each module contribute a revision back to it rather than merely illustrate it. The framework is Thomas J. Bryan's; the research, verification, and composition are Claude's (Anthropic). The collaboration is the series' throughout: a fixed analytical method held in one hand, and the archive worked, quoted, and assembled by the other.

The method is structural, not polemical. It reconstructs how an order held its people — the floor of organised force, the settlement of wealth, the robe of legitimating belief, the formation that installs that belief across generations, the cost column that prices defection, the extraction that draws the surplus, the seam that controls what may be known, the coordination of the elite, the presence or foreclosure of any counterweight, the collapse, and the final accounting — and reads the case, at the last, against the wider corpus. Suffering is held with gravity; both flattery and demonisation are refused. Legibility is not pardon: to explain an order's logic is not to excuse it.

One discipline governs the quoting, and it is the heart of the work. Public-domain primary sources — laws, decrees, treaties, parliamentary speeches, ministerial statements and official despatches, the memoirs and letters of the men who ran the order, and the period press — are quoted exactly, in the original language with translation, because in a study of information asymmetry the words are themselves the evidence. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited. Nothing is fabricated or reconstructed from memory; where a figure is contested it is given as a range, and where a quotation could not be verified against a source reproducing the primary text it has been left out and said so. The aim throughout is to set the exact public words spoken at the metropole beside the exact private words and acts on the ground, and to leave the reader to close the distance between them.

Outline

The study comprises a landscape opening and twelve modules.

- **Landscape — The Regency and the Restoration.** The two societies on the eve of 1830: the Turkish deylik of Algiers and the France of the Restoration.
- **Module 1 — The Three Weeks and the Seventeen Years.** The floor of force: a conquest announced as finished in three weeks and a floor laid over seventeen years of war and famine.
- **Module 2 — The Book of Personal Law.** The settlement: the machine of law that converted the conquest into title, and the caste line drawn at Islamic personal status.
- **Module 3 — Without Terrible Poetry.** The robe, reversed: a legitimating story cut not for the conquered but for the metropole and the army.
- **Module 4 — I Visited the Cemeteries.** Formation lavished on the citizen and settler,

withheld from the conquered, and the rival formation that made a nation.

- **Module 5 — The Permit to Leave.** The cost column: the surveillance-penal code and the three walls that made the order a trap rather than a contract.
- **Module 6 — The Fifth.** Extraction at the bone: the sharecropper's fifth, the tax on being Muslim, and the surplus drained outward.
- **Module 7 — Written and Corrected in Algiers.** Information and suppression: the double seam, kept from meeting, that this whole study circles.
- **Module 8 — The Emperor of the Arabs.** Elite coordination: the seam inside the colonial elite, and the settler victory that set the order's shape.
- **Module 9 — Twenty-Four Thousand Votes.** Plurality or foreclosure: a free order for one caste that was the instrument of the other's foreclosure.
- **Module 10 — A Handful of Retired Generals.** Change and collapse: an order that won the military war and fell from an elite fracture.
- **Module 11 — The Roads and the Razzia.** The grim accounting: the cost and the works, held at equal weight in the same ledger.
- **Module 12 — The Door Rome Opened.** Convergence and divergence: the case read against the corpus, and the one door a conquest must open to endure.

THE REGENCY AND THE RESTORATION

The ground before the landing — the Deylik of Algiers and Bourbon France on the eve of 1830, and the colonial bend in the framework: a robe cut not for the conquered but for the conqueror's own people

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Why a colonial case is read from two landscapes at once

Every study in this collection begins by reconstructing the ground a conquest fell on: who held the floor of force, how the wealth was settled, and what story the population had been formed to believe was rightful, so that the conquest can be read as an act performed *against* a real prior order rather than upon empty scenery. A colonial conquest doubles that requirement, and the doubling is the whole reason these cases are harder than the others in the corpus. Two landscapes have to be reconstructed, not one — the land invaded and the land that invaded it — because a colonial conqueror is a man who answers to an audience the conquered will never see.

This is the specific bend the colonial case puts in the framework, and it is worth stating plainly at the outset because everything downstream depends on it. In an ordinary order, the floor and the robe sit over the same population: force holds the ground and a believed story is laid over that same ground to make the holding cheap. In a colony they come apart geographically. The floor operates in the colony; the robe is cut for the metropole. The colonial governor does not need the conquered to believe he is rightful — their belief buys him nothing his rifles do not already secure, and *force never pays for what it does not need.* What he needs is the continued belief of the people back home: the taxpayers who fund the expedition, the deputies who vote its credits, and above all the formed citizen who fills the army and follows the order to embark. That citizen's conviction that the conquest is lawful, glorious, or civilising is the actual foundation the whole colonial enterprise rests on, and it is a foundation laid in Paris, not in Algiers. The conquered are handled on the cost side of the ledger — by the floor, as the ruled-who-are-contained. The metropole is the ruled-who-must-believe.

Two consequences follow, and they organise the entire study. First, where a co-optable native hierarchy already exists, the conqueror will try to get behind it — to *redirect* the trust the population already places in its own chiefs and holy men and point that earned trust at himself, because it is far cheaper to capture a working channel of authority than to build one. Where no such hierarchy exists, or where it will not be turned, there is nothing to redirect, and the colony reverts to the pure floor: warlordism in the exact sense, force without a robe, holding ground by inflicting cost. Second — and this is the seam the study will pry at hardest — because the

colony's floor operates raw, in ways the metropole's own formed conscience would recoil from if it saw them plainly, the colonial power carries a permanent interpretive problem: it must manage what the home audience is allowed to see. The real work of the colonial robe is not done in the colony at all. It is done in the metropolitan press, the ministerial despatch, the legal fiction filed at home, the news arriving from a coast most citizens will never visit and cannot check. The asymmetry between what the floor did on the ground and what the robe said about it at home is not an incidental hypocrisy. It is the structural centre of a colonial order, and it is what these studies are built to expose.

The rhyme the corpus already holds for this is Caesar in Gaul. There the same man was two men: a warlord in the province, massacring the Usipetes and enslaving nations while paying, in the coin of legitimacy toward the conquered, essentially nothing — and a careful maintainer of a robe back in Rome, where the only audience whose recognition he needed sat, and where Cato could rise in the Senate and propose he be handed over as a war criminal for the very acts the province never punished. The floor was in Gaul; the fight over the story was in Rome. French Algeria runs the identical split across the Mediterranean, and to see it we first have to stand on each shore in turn and ask what was actually there.

Landscape I — The Deylik of Algiers

The floor: a foreign garrison-republic

The order the French fleet sailed against in 1830 was itself a conquest state, and a strikingly pure specimen of one. The Regency of Algiers had been founded around 1516, when the notables of a city menaced by Spanish expansion called in an Ottoman corsair, Aruj Barbarossa, and his brother Hayreddin — who took the city, drove out the Spanish and the last local dynasts, and placed the territory under the protection of the Ottoman sultan. Selim I sent some two thousand janissaries and several thousand volunteers, drawn mainly from Anatolia, to garrison the new province of the Maghreb. Three centuries later the descendants of that arrangement still ruled, and they still ruled as what they had always been: a foreign military caste sitting on top of an Arab and Berber population it neither sprang from nor sought to join.

The structure had drifted steadily away from Istanbul across those centuries. Nominal governors sent from the Porte — beylerbeys, then triennial pashas — gave way, through a janissary seizure of the treasury in the 1620s and open coups in 1659 and 1671, to a self-governing military republic in which real power lay with the *Odjak*, the janissary corps, and the corporate body of corsair captains, the *ta'ifa of rais*. From 1671 the head of state was the **dey**, and from 1718 he was elected by the *diwan*, the janissary council. A contemporary observer, the priest Pierre Dan, had caught the shape of it as early as the seventeenth century: the state had only the name of a kingdom, for in effect they had made it a republic. The Ottoman sultan remained the symbolic head — his suzerainty acknowledged, his name a distant sanction — but Algiers set its own foreign policy, minted its own money, made its own war and peace, and by the eighteenth century was independent of Istanbul in everything but form. The last dey, Hussein, had held the office

since 1818.

What makes the Regency's floor so clean a specimen is the deliberate foreignness of the caste that held it, which the corpus would classify at once as a case of the **Prevent** family — the solution to the open problem that refuses to let a rival native elite form at all. The Odjak did not recruit locally. Its ranks were filled by volunteers fetched from Anatolia and the Aegean through a standing network of recruiting officers; local Arab enlistment was almost unheard of. The Turkish soldiers called one another *yoldaş*, comrades, and called the sons they fathered on local women *kouloughlis* — and the kouloughlis, though wealthy and connected, were kept out of the highest offices precisely so that a hereditary, locally rooted power could not congeal beneath the pure-Turkish elite. This is the same structural instinct the Ottoman *devshirme* embodied at the imperial centre, run here at the provincial scale by ethnic recruitment rather than levy: keep the men who hold the swords rootless, foreign, and unable to found dynasties, so that the capacity they supply can never be turned into a claim. The price of the solution was chronic instability at the top — the record of the deylik is a record of assassinations and depositions, deys ousted the moment they lost the corps or the corsairs — but the floor as a whole held for three hundred years, and it held the way a foreign garrison holds: by force and by remaining apart.

The settlement: the makhzen apparatus, and the hierarchy France would inherit

Beneath the capital, the territory was governed less than it was overawed. The Regency divided into the *Dar al-Sultan*, the hinterland of Algiers under the agha, and three provinces or *beyliks* — Constantine in the east, centred on the ancient Numidian capital; Titteri in the centre, seated at Medea in the Atlas; and the west, its capital moving from Mazouna to Mascara, with Oran retaken from Spain in 1791. Each bey was charged with keeping order and, above all, raising taxes, and no bey could do that from a city. The instrument that reached into the countryside is the single most important feature of this landscape for what came after, because the French would spend decades trying to seize it.

That instrument was the distinction between **makhzen** and **raya** tribes. The word *makhzen* means, literally, treasury or government; the makhzen tribes were auxiliary groups who furnished cavalry to the beylik and helped it collect taxes, and who in exchange were themselves exempt from tax and granted standing and privilege. The *raya* — the word means the flock, the subjects — were the tribes from whom the taxes were actually raised. Between the distant Turkish state and the mass of the population stood this layer of co-opted native intermediaries: aghas, qa'ids and shaykhs who kept local order, represented local interests upward, and delivered the surplus. It is a textbook apparatus of indirect rule, and it is exactly the sort of working hierarchy a conqueror covets, because the trust and obedience it commands were earned locally, over generations, by someone other than the conqueror — which is precisely what makes them worth capturing. When the French arrived they saw this at once. The colonial administration would, in its own historians' phrase, reconstitute an "Arab" makhzen of its own, laying a hierarchy of native command — aghas, khalifas, caïds — over the conquered as the cheapest available means of ruling them. The Regency handed France not only a territory but a template

for holding it.

Two things about this settlement matter for reading the conquest honestly. The extraction it ran was, by the standards of the age, comparatively light: taxes were not crushing, and unlike Mehmed Ali's Egypt the Regency imposed no corvée conscription of forced labour on its subjects. And its reach was uneven to the point of fiction in places — the beys governed the plains and the tax-roads, mounted periodic punitive columns, the *mahalla*, to collect from tribes that had withheld, and simply did not control large uplands at all. Kabylia, the Berber mountain country, was never subdued; it paid when it chose and fought when it did not. This was a tributary overlordship with a hard floor and a long reach along the coast and the corridors, thinning to almost nothing in the mountains — not a modern state saturating its territory with administration. The men who would later describe their conquest as bringing order to anarchy were describing, in part, an order that had been functioning, in its own register, for three hundred years.

The economy that funded all this had been, at its height, the economy of the corsair: state-sponsored raiding of Christian shipping, the ransom and sale of captives, and the protection tribute European and American powers paid to be left alone — the wealth over which the janissaries and the captains had fought their coups. But by 1830 that engine was failing. The Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers in 1816 had forced the mass release of Christian captives and broken the corsair trade's back; the Napoleonic wars had already disrupted the Mediterranean commerce it preyed on; European naval superiority had made the old predation suicidal. The Regency in 1830 was a corsair state whose corsairing had largely ended, living increasingly on its agriculture and its caravan trade and its dwindling reserves — though its treasury still held some forty-eight million francs when the French seized it, a sum that tells you the extraction had not stopped even as the raiding had.

The robe: a thin state legitimacy over a deep religious formation

Here is the feature of this landscape that decides how the conquest could be run, and it is the mirror-image of the colonial bend described above. The Turkish state's own robe — its claim to be rightfully obeyed by the Arab-Berber population — was thin. The Odjak was ethnically and linguistically alien: Turkish-speaking, following the Hanafi rite among a population that was Maliki, a garrison that kept itself apart by design. Its legitimacy toward its subjects rested on two borrowed supports and little else. The first was the sultan's distant sanction — the Regency ruled, however nominally, in the name of the Ottoman caliph, and that association placed it inside the house of Islam and on the right side of the war against Christendom. The second was the corsair jihad itself: the Turks were the sword of Islam against the Spanish and the Christian sea, protectors of a Muslim coast, and that role did real legitimating work while the raiding lasted and decayed as an asset as the raiding died.

What the Turkish state did *not* hold was the thing that actually formed the population's sense of the rightful and the sacred. That ran through Islam, and specifically through the marabouts and the Sufi brotherhoods — and it ran largely outside the state's hands. The countryside's

real institutions of formation were the **zawiyas**, the lodges of the Sufi orders, which taught the Quran, sheltered travellers, mediated disputes, fed the poor, and commanded a devotion the tax-collector never could. The great orders — the Qadiriyya; the Rahmaniyya, founded around 1774 by the Kabyle scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Rahman and so rooted in the mountains it would later be called the national church of Kabylia; the Tijaniyya; the Darqawa — were the true holders of the trusted-information leg among the tribes. The cult of holy men, the veneration of saints and their tombs, the shaykh whose blessing carried more weight than the bey's decree: this was the seam through which the rural population understood the world, and the Turkish regime had been shrewd about it from the beginning, patronising shaykhs and retiring to zawiyas and investing its political agenda in the language of Sufism — a *redirect* of exactly the kind the framework names. But it was never a capture. The maraboutic world remained substantially its own, and some of it, the Darqawa especially, was frankly hostile to the Turks.

This is the finding that governs the whole conquest to come, so it is worth fixing precisely. The population France was about to invade had been *formed* — deeply, across centuries — but not by the state France was about to defeat. A subject of the Regency in 1830 believed in God and His Prophet, in the saints and their baraka, in the shaykh of his order and the sanctity of his zawiya, in the obligation of jihad against the Christian who came by sea; he did not, in any deep sense, believe in the dey. When the Turkish floor cracked under French guns, the legitimacy that mattered to the tribes did not crack with it, because it had never lived in the Turkish state. It lived in the mosques and the lodges — which is why the resistance that met the French was not, in the end, a defence of the deylik at all, but a religious mobilisation under men like Ahmed Bey at Constantine and, above all, Abd al-Qadir, whose authority flowed from his father's Qadiriyya zawiya and who would raise the tribes in the name of jihad, not of a dey nobody mourned. The Turks had held the floor; Islam had done the forming; and France would discover that defeating the first did nothing to touch the second.

Landscape II — Bourbon France under the Restoration

A throne restored, and two currencies that would not reconcile

Now cross the sea to the power that sent the fleet, and the first thing to establish is that the France of 1830 was an order running two incompatible currencies of legitimacy at once, and quietly coming apart along the seam between them. This is the fact that made a foreign conquest useful, and it cannot be understood from the colony at all — only from Paris.

The Bourbon monarchy had been restored in 1814 and again, after the Hundred Days, in 1815 — brought back, its enemies never tired of saying, in the baggage-train of the allied armies that had beaten Napoleon. That origin was the wound the whole Restoration could not close. The dynasty's legitimacy in its own eyes was the old one, the deepest and most traditional coin in Europe: **throne and altar**, the king rightful because anointed, ordained by God and consecrated by the Church, his authority descending from above and owing nothing to the consent of those below. Charles X, who succeeded his moderate brother Louis XVIII in 1824, believed in this

currency without reservation; he had led the ultra-royalists, the faction that held for absolute monarchy by divine right, and on his accession he spent heavily to restore the coin to circulation. He had himself crowned and anointed at Reims in 1825 in the last true *sacre* of a French king, revived the death penalty for sacrilege in a church, and indemnified the émigré nobles for the lands the Revolution had stripped from them. Every one of these acts was an attempt to re-establish, in a France that had executed his brother, that the rightful order was the one the altar sanctified.

But the France he ruled had been formed, for a generation and more, in a different currency entirely — the currency minted by the Revolution and hard-circulated by the Empire: the nation as the source of legitimate power, equality before the law, the career open to talent, sovereignty rising from below rather than descending from above. This coin could not be withdrawn. The Restoration's own founding instrument conceded as much, and conceded it in the most revealing possible way. The **Charter of 1814** granted the French a constitutional monarchy — a bicameral parliament, civil equality, religious toleration, freedom of the press within limits — and thereby wrote the revolutionary settlement into the fabric of the restored kingdom. Yet it was styled *la Charte octroyée*, the Charter *granted*: a document by which the king bestowed these liberties as a free gift of the crown, precisely so that the nation could not claim them as rights it held of itself. The name is the whole tension of the Restoration compressed into a word. The liberties were real and were the revolutionary currency; the fiction of their granting was the traditional currency insisting, against the evidence, that legitimacy still flowed downward. The Charter tried to pay in both coins at once and satisfied neither the ultras, who thought it conceded too much, nor the liberals, who understood that a right presented as a gift can be withdrawn as one.

The formed Frenchman, and the one coin both sides still honoured

Who, then, was the formed citizen whose belief the July expedition would ultimately be aimed at? The answer is that there was no single one, and the split ran through the whole society. The devout peasant of the west, the returned noble, the provincial clergy still largely held the old coin: the king was rightful because he was the anointed king, and the Church said so. The Parisian bourgeois, the liberal deputy, the lawyer, the journalist, and — crucially — the veteran and the son of the veteran held the new one: legitimacy rose from the nation, the gains of 1789 were not the crown's to grant or rescind, and a king who ruled against the country's expressed will was a king in breach. The franchise itself encoded the division and its narrowness: the vote belonged only to men paying at least three hundred francs a year in direct taxes, an electorate of perhaps ninety thousand in a nation of thirty-odd million, so that the formal political nation was a sliver of property-holders while the currency of national sovereignty circulated far below the line of anyone entitled to cast a ballot. And a new interpreter class was rising fast to carry that currency: the liberal press of Paris, which by the late 1820s outsold the government's own papers and was becoming the channel through which the political nation understood its own affairs — a rival seam the crown did not control, and would, at the last, try to gag.

But across the seam, honoured on both sides of it, ran a third coin that neither the altar nor the tribune could quite claim and both desperately wanted: **gloire**. National glory, the memory of the Revolution's armies and the Empire's victories, the sense of France as the great nation whose arms had once dictated to Europe — this the Restoration could not supply, and its inability was a standing reproach. The Bourbons had come back through defeat; the Congress of Vienna had penned France back inside her old frontiers; the dynasty was associated in the formed national memory not with Austerlitz but with capitulation. For a regime starved of the martial currency, and increasingly bankrupt in both the others, a foreign victory was almost the only coin it could still hope to strike — a triumph that might, for a season, make the tricolour's heirs cheer a Bourbon fleur-de-lis.

The tottering throne and the search for a diversion

By 1830 the regime was in open crisis, and every element of that crisis was domestic. Bad harvests from 1828 had driven up food prices; industrial slack had thrown artisans out of work; the liberal bloc in the Chamber of Deputies had grown from a handful in 1824 to a hostile majority. In August 1829 Charles X had answered this rising liberal tide not by conciliation but by appointing the most reactionary ministry available to him, headed by the ultra Prince de Polignac — a choice read across France as a declaration that the king intended to rule against the country. Polignac shared his master's conviction that a military triumph could restore the monarchy's standing, and he had first sought it in Europe: a grandiose scheme to redraw the continental map and win France her "natural frontiers" on the Rhine. That fantasy collapsed when the Treaty of Adrianople ended the Russo-Turkish war in September 1829 and slammed shut the window of European upheaval it depended on. Expansion in Europe was foreclosed by the very Vienna order the Restoration had been erected to uphold. The ambition, denied its European outlet, turned across the Mediterranean.

This is the hinge on which the two landscapes lock together, and it is the purest possible vindication of the colonial bend. The decision to invade Algiers, taken at the start of 1830, was in its essential motive a decision about *French domestic opinion*. The expedition was conceived as the diversionary triumph the regime needed — a stroke of *gloire* to stir a wave of national feeling, rally the army, sway the coming elections, and shore up a throne visibly slipping. Contemporaries close to the government understood this perfectly; the campaign was timed with the elections in view, meant to win the soldiers' favour, buy the voters, and secure Polignac's mandate — and the government took care to conceal these domestic calculations behind loftier public reasons. The Regency itself, its people, its government, its belief, were very nearly irrelevant to the decision. What was being managed was the mood of France.

For a public reason the ministry reached for a genuine grievance and inflated it into an affront to national honour. Three decades earlier, in the 1790s, two Jewish merchant houses of Algiers, Bacri and Busnach, had supplied grain to feed French armies, and France had never fully paid the resulting debt — a tangled affair of some tens of millions of francs in which the dey himself held a stake, since the merchants owed him money they could not collect while France withheld

theirs. France's reluctance to settle a debt it did not wish to pay was the real irritant. But the incident that furnished the *casus belli* was a matter of honour, not money. In the spring of 1827, pressed by the dey Hussein at an audience over the unpaid debt and answered with what the dey took as insolence, the French consul Pierre Deval was struck by the dey with his fly-whisk — the *coup d'éventail*, the blow of the fan. Here was the legal fiction the metropole required: not a sordid debt France declined to honour, but an insult to the king's representative and, through him, to the flag of France. Charles X seized it, demanded satisfaction, and imposed a naval blockade of Algiers that ran for three years and injured French merchants more than Algerian corsairs. When a peace overture in 1829 ended with an Algerian gun fired at a blockading ship, the pretext for force was complete.

The expedition sailed in the early summer of 1830. Some six hundred ships left Toulon carrying an army of roughly thirty-seven thousand men, guided by an invasion plan an engineer named Boutin had drawn up secretly for Napoleon back in 1808. The troops landed at Sidi Ferruch, west of Algiers, on 14 June; the dey's forces, defeated in the field, gave way; and on 5 July 1830 the French entered Algiers, took its surrender, sent Hussein into exile, and carried off the treasury. The floor of the three-hundred-year Regency had cracked in three weeks.

And then the metropolitan landscape delivered its verdict, in the cruellest form the framework could ask for. The conquest had been undertaken to save the throne. The news of the fall of Algiers had barely reached Paris when Charles X, having issued the July Ordinances that gagged the press and overrode the Charter by decree, was swept off that throne by the Three Glorious Days of revolution and into permanent exile. The triumph meant to rescue the Bourbon monarchy outlived it by a matter of days. The point could not be sharper: the audience the conquest was staged for was French domestic opinion, and that audience deposed the impresario while the curtain was still up. Yet the conquest itself survived the regime that fathered it — the incoming liberal government of Louis-Philippe, the men who had *opposed* the expedition, kept Algiers anyway, because the victory was too popular to give back. That is the colonial bend proven twice over in a single fortnight. The conquest's whole value was as a message to the metropole; the message worked so well that even the enemies of the king who sent it could not afford to disown it, and the belief of the actual Algerians — who had lost a Turkish overlord most of them never loved and were about to acquire a Christian one they would fight for forty years — entered into the French calculation at no point at all.

The seam the study will pry at

Set the two landscapes side by side and the shape of the whole study is already visible. On the southern shore: a foreign garrison-state, its floor held for three centuries by a rootless Turkish caste, its interior governed through a co-optable makhzen hierarchy, its population formed not by that state but by an Islam the state could patronise but never own — a robe that lived in the zawiya, not the palace. On the northern shore: a restored monarchy formed of two currencies it could not reconcile, its traditional coin discredited and its national coin held by people it would

not enfranchise, reaching across the sea for the one coin, *gloire*, that might keep it on its throne.

Between them runs the asymmetry these studies exist to expose. What was done on the Algerian coast — the conquest, the seizure of the treasury and then of the land, the war of pacification that would run for decades and kill on a scale later scholars would weigh against the word genocide — was one thing. What was said about it in France was another, and the distance between them was not an accident of the record but the working principle of the enterprise: a floor operating raw in the colony, a robe cut carefully for the audience at home, and a permanent labour of interpretation to keep the second from having to look squarely at the first. The fly-whisk that furnished the insult, the debt that furnished the silence, the blockade that punished French merchants, the glory that toppled the king who sought it — every one of these belongs to the metropolitan landscape, not the Algerian one, because that is where the belief that mattered was formed and where the story had to be sold.

The modules that follow will build each of these out in turn — the floor of the conquest and the violence its founding legend covers; the settlement of seized land and the makhzen apparatus France reconstituted to hold it; the twin robes, the one worn toward the conquered and the utterly different one worn toward Paris; the formation of the French soldier who would obey the order to embark; the extraction and the suppression; and, with the sharpest attention the study has to give, the open problem inside the conquering elite and the plurality or foreclosure that decided how much the metropolitan conscience was ever allowed to see. What the landscape has established is the ground they stand on: two shores, two audiences, and a conquest whose real theatre was never the coast it fell on but the country that sent it.

A note on sources. The reconstruction of the Regency draws on the standard accounts of Ottoman Algiers — the Cambridge* History of Algeria* (McDougall) and the survey literature on the deylik, the Odjak and the *ta'ifa*, the makhzen/raya system and the beyliks, and the Sufi orders and maraboutic authority (the Rahmaniyya, Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya and Darqawa) — with the demographic range (a population most often put between three and five million), the post-1816 collapse of corsairing, and the moderate character of Ottoman extraction taken from the same body of work. The reconstruction of Restoration France draws on the standard scholarship on the Bourbon Restoration, the Charter of 1814 and its *octroyée* fiction, the Polignac ministry, and the July Revolution, together with the specialist work on the 1830 expedition as a domestic diversion (notably the *Historical Journal* treatment of the Congress system and the invasion, and Jennifer Sessions on the conquest and French political culture). Contested or approximate figures — the size of the Bacri-Busnach debt, the strength of the expeditionary force, the seized treasury, the Algerian death toll of the conquest to come — are given as ranges or as the standard estimates, to be tightened in the modules with dated, sourced specifics. Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

THE THREE WEEKS AND THE SEVENTEEN YEARS

Module 1 · The Floor of Force — the founding conquest: how a three-week triumph announced at home covered a seventeen-year war of famine on the ground, and how a colonial floor over a mobile people is laid not by the fortress but by the burnt granary

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The founding was two foundings

The first thing to fix about the floor of French Algeria is that it was laid twice, on two entirely different clocks, and the gap between them is the whole colonial problem in miniature. There was the conquest of 1830 — a three-week operation that toppled the Turkish floor of the Regency, entered Algiers, and was announced in Paris as a finished triumph. And there was the conquest of the country, which took seventeen more years, consumed a third of the French army, and killed on a scale later scholarship would set beside the word genocide, and which was not a war against a state at all but a war against a population, laid down village by burnt village until submission was the only alternative to starvation. The first founding was the one the metropole was shown. The second was the one that actually built the floor, and the metropole was shown as little of it as its managers could arrange. Reconstructing Module 1 for this case therefore means reconstructing two things the standard narrative runs together: the swift defeat of the dey, which was real and easy, and the slow destruction of Algerian society, which was neither, and on which the colony was in fact founded.

This is the founding instance of the colonial bend the landscape set out. The floor operated in Algeria; the story was managed in France. And because the story managed in France had, at its core, the claim that this was a limited, lawful, civilised undertaking against pirates, the distance between that claim and what the floor was actually doing on the ground had to be policed — which is why the founding of this order includes, from the very first months, a legal fiction promising respect and a war of famine breaking every clause of it, running side by side.

The force that came

The instrument of the first founding was one of the largest amphibious operations mounted anywhere to that date, and its scale is the measure of how little the operation had to do with the grievance it named. To punish a fly-whisk and a thirty-year-old debt, France assembled at Toulon a fleet of something over six hundred vessels — the standard reconstruction gives a hundred and three warships and four hundred and sixty-four transports — carrying an army of close to thirty-seven thousand men with its artillery, its horses, and its siege train. The naval command was Admiral Guy-Victor Duperré, who had thought the whole venture too dangerous and advised against it, and been given the fleet anyway; the land command was Louis-

Auguste-Victor de Ghaisne, comte de Bourmont, an ultra-royalist and Charles X's war minister, a man whose defection from Napoleon on the eve of Waterloo made him a fitting emblem of the dynasty he served. The ground had been surveyed a generation earlier: an engineer named Boutin, sent secretly by Napoleon in 1808, had fixed the peninsula of Sidi Ferruch as the landing place and traced the route to Algiers by way of Staouéli and the Fort de l'Empereur, and had recommended a force of thirty-five to forty thousand men. The expedition of 1830 executed a plan drawn up twenty-two years before it sailed.

The force it faced was the assembled levy of a corsair-state whose corsairing had ended, and the mismatch was total. The dey Hussein could put perhaps ten thousand men in the field before Algiers — by one reckoning a thousand janissaries, five thousand Moors of the city, and three thousand irregulars from the provinces — and could call in provincial contingents from Constantine, Oran and Kabylia that raised the notional total toward forty thousand, but these were tribal cavalry and the remnants of a foreign garrison, not a coordinated army, and they had nothing to answer French artillery and French organisation. The troops landed at Sidi Ferruch on 14 June 1830 against almost no opposition. The dey's forces gave battle on the plateau of Staouéli on 19 June and were broken by disciplined infantry and the bayonet. The great fortress the French called the Fort de l'Empereur — Sultan Kalessi, built long before against Charles V — fell on 4 July, and the next day, 5 July 1830, the dey signed the capitulation of Algiers. The whole conquest of the Regency's centre had taken three weeks and cost the French a few hundred dead. Bourmont, surveying it, reported home that the entire kingdom would submit within a fortnight without another shot fired.

He was as wrong as it is possible to be, and the wrongness is the hinge of the case. The three weeks had defeated a floor — the Turkish garrison-republic whose thin robe over the population the landscape has already reckoned. They had not touched the thing that actually held the country, which was never the dey, and which did not surrender when he did.

The founding instrument, and the breach that began at once

Before the war of the interior, look hard at the document that ended the first founding, because in the framework's terms it is the floor's primary fiction — the robe in its plainest legal form, a stationary bandit's truce written down — and it is also the founding charter of the colonial lie. The capitulation of 5 July 1830 was not a bare surrender. It bound the French commander, in exchange for the city and the treasury and the departure of the Turks, to respect the liberty, the property, and above all the religion of the inhabitants of every class: Muslims to remain under Islamic law, Jews under the law of Moses, the mosques and the faith inviolate. This clause did real work, and it is worth asking for whom. It was not, in any deep sense, a promise to the Algerians, who had no power to enforce it and would learn its worth soon enough. It was a promise cut for the conqueror's own audience — a demonstration, filed at the moment of victory, that France made war as a civilised and Christian power that kept its word to the vanquished, took cities lawfully, and did not sack what it seized. The capitulation is the founding document of the metropolitan robe: the written assurance that the thing being done was the lawful, limited, honourable thing the home public had been told it was.

The breach began within weeks, and it began precisely where the promise had been loudest. The treasury of the Casbah — some forty-eight million francs — was carried off almost at once, a plunder that the framework would note is the ordinary first act of a floor and the first silent contradiction of a robe promising respect for property. On 8 September 1830, barely two months after the surrender, a decree created the *Domaine*, the colonial state-property administration, and swept into it not only the lands of the departed Turkish state — which conquest might arguably claim — but the *waqf* endowments, the inalienable religious trusts whose revenues sustained the mosques, the schools, the shrines and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. General Clauzel reinforced the seizure with a further decree in December. And in 1831 the Ketchaoua mosque, the great mosque at the foot of the Casbah built two centuries before, was emptied of its worshippers and handed to the Catholic Church, consecrated in 1832 as the cathedral of Saint-Philippe under the duc de Rovigo, a governor who ruled, in the phrase of the French record, by the right of the conqueror and open contempt for the conquered.

The most eloquent evidence that the capitulation had been a fiction comes from the people it was made to. The notables of Algiers understood exactly what had been promised and exactly what was being taken, and they said so, in the conqueror's own terms. A memorandum of August 1831 reminded the French that assurances had been given covering everything to do with their religion, and demanded the return of the endowments of the holy cities and the other waqf properties; a petition of eighteen articles reached the Minister of War in June 1833 cataloguing the abuses — the seizure of the Mecca and Medina endowments, the destruction of religious institutions, the exile of the qa'id and the mufti, the conversion of the Ketchaoua mosque into a church. The dispossessed were quoting the founding instrument back at the men who had signed it, and getting the answer a floor always gives a robe it has finished with. This is the founding version of the asymmetry the whole study tracks: a legal fiction produced at the moment of conquest to satisfy the home conscience, and a floor that voided every clause of it the moment the conscience looked away.

The floor that had to be laid: the razzia and the mechanics of a colonial capturability

The founding of the actual floor — the one the order rested on — did not happen at Algiers in 1830. It happened across the interior between 1830 and 1847, and it happened because Bourmont's fortnight never came. As soon as the news of the capital's fall spread, the tribes rose; the religious leaders called for jihad within three weeks of the landing; and the defeat of the dey turned out to have removed only the overlord the population had never loved, leaving intact the thing that could actually mobilise them — the marabouts, the brotherhoods, and after 1832 the young emir Abd al-Qadir, whose authority ran through his father's Qadiriyya zawiya and who raised western and central Algeria in a holy war that would take seventeen years to break. France had defeated a state and inherited a country, and the country would not be held by the methods that had taken the city.

Here the case forces a refinement on the Module 1 template, and it is worth stating as a finding rather than smuggling in as description. The framework's ordinary account of capturability — how the governed are made unable to disperse or resist — reaches for geography, fortress

control, and the monopoly of weapons: the settled peasant is fixed to his land and fenced by the garrison, disarmed and unable to flee. None of that fits a mobile, tribal, partly nomadic society whose wealth walks on the hoof and whose people can dissolve into a terrain the conqueror does not know. You cannot fence a people who are already moving. The French answer, systematised by Thomas Bugeaud after he became governor-general at the end of 1840, was to make the floor out of hunger. The instrument was the *razzia* — the word and the practice borrowed from the Arabic *ghazwa*, the raid, and turned from a tribal custom into a doctrine of counter-insurgency. Fast, light columns, living off the land they wasted, drove into tribal territory not to fight the elusive fighters but to destroy what fed them: burning the standing crops and the granaries, cutting down the fruit trees and the olive groves that took generations to grow back, seizing or slaughtering the herds — one accounting has French columns taking a hundred and seventy thousand head of cattle between 1840 and 1843 alone. The point was not battle. The point was to remove the material base of a people's existence until submission was the only alternative to starvation, and flight itself became a road to famine because there was nothing left to flee to. This is the capturability mechanism of a colonial floor laid over nomads: not the fortress and the disarming, but the burnt field and the emptied byre — a floor made of induced hunger, which fixes a mobile people as effectively as any wall by destroying the mobility's whole point.

The human shape of this is in the reports the army filed on itself, and they should be read at the depth the framework demands, neither softened nor sensationalised. A single razzia by General Gentil against the Beni Zeroual in 1843 recorded a hundred and fifty killed and seven hundred and twelve prisoners — most of them, as the phrase in these documents so often is, women and children — against thirty-nine French casualties: the ratio itself tells you these were not battles. At the extreme edge of the method lay the *enfumades*, the smokings-out: where a tribe took refuge in the caves of a massif, fires were lit at the mouths and the people inside were asphyxiated where they hid. In the Dahra in 1842 the Ouled Riah were smoked to death in this way, some eight hundred of them; on 19 June 1845 Colonel Pélissier had roughly seven hundred and sixty people suffocated in the same fashion, refusing them the surrender they offered; on 12 August 1845 Saint-Arnaud did it again. And the aggregate of all of it — the razzias, the famines they induced, the cholera and the dislocation that followed hunger — shows in the demographic record as a fall in the Algerian population from something near three million in 1830 to roughly two and a half million by 1851. The floor of French Algeria was laid in those figures. It was not laid in three weeks in 1830; it was laid over seventeen years, and its foundations were metabolic — the systematic destruction of the means by which a society keeps itself alive. The full accounting of this belongs to Module 11 and the ongoing operation of the cost column to Module 5; what Module 1 must record is the plain structural fact that this destruction *was* the founding, the act by which organised violence actually established itself over the governed, however little it resembles the clean conquest the founding legend describes.

The founding legend beside the violence — and the seam that cracked

Set the legend now beside the floor, because the two were manufactured together and the study exists to hold them in one hand. The legend cut for France had three registers. It was, first,

anti-piracy and liberation: Charles X announced publicly that he went to eradicate the Barbary corsairs and free the Christian captives — a genuine grievance a century old, wheeled out to dignify an expedition launched for reasons that had nothing to do with it, and by 1830 largely obsolete, the corsair trade having been broken at Algiers in 1816. It was, second, honour: the insult of the fly-whisk to the king's consul and through him to the flag of France, the affront a great nation could not leave unavenged. And it became, across the July Monarchy that inherited the conquest, the civilising mission — France carrying order, cultivation, and light to a barbarous shore, an idea Bugeaud stamped onto the enterprise in his own motto, *ense et aratro*, by the sword and the plough, the soldier who fought the war and then settled the land he had emptied. That these registers did real legitimating work at home is not in doubt; the conquest was, from the first, enormously popular, popular enough that the liberal government which had opposed it kept it the moment it inherited it.

But the founding also produced the first instance of the thing that makes a colonial order structurally unstable in a way an ordinary one is not — the moment when the floor's raw operation broke through into the metropolitan field of vision, and the managers of the story had to fight to reseal it. The Dahra enfumades are that moment. Pélissier, with a soldier's fatal candour, wrote a precise report of what he had done in the caves, and the report travelled up the chain to the Minister of War. Marshal Soult tried to bury it. It leaked to the Paris press regardless, and the deputies and journalists seized on it, and public opinion was, for a season, genuinely appalled — the same public that had cheered the conquest recoiling from a documented account of what the conquest actually consisted of. The regime's answer to the exposure is itself part of the record: even as the smoke-out was being condemned, the state was employing Horace Vernet to fill the Salon with vast, heroic canvases of the African war, painting the conquest the public preferred to the one Pélissier had described. The founding thus contains, in compressed form, the entire dynamic Modules 7 and 9 will open out: a floor that operates in the colony in a register the metropole cannot be allowed to see plainly, a legal and pictorial and journalistic robe cut to keep it from seeing, and a permanent contest at the seam between the two — a contest the floor mostly wins, because the audience is far away and would rather be told the clean story, but which it does not always win cleanly, and never wins for good.

Reading the founding against the framework

The founding of French Algeria confirms the colonial bend the landscape predicted and sharpens it into two contributions the corpus should carry forward. The first is the two-clock floor: in a colony, the conquest that is *announced* and the floor that is *laid* come apart in time, sometimes by decades, because toppling the prior state is fast and cheap and makes the domestic triumph, while subjugating the population is slow and catastrophic and must be kept, as far as possible, out of the metropolitan eye. A study that reads the announced conquest as the founding will mistake the advertisement for the machine. The second is the metabolic capturability mechanism: against a mobile, tribal people the floor is laid not by fortress and disarmament but by the destruction of subsistence — the razzia as a doctrine for fixing the unfixable through hunger — which the Module 1 template should now name as a distinct family of capturability alongside

the settled-peasant case it was first built on.

Two disciplines hold at the close. The figures here are the standard reconstructions and some are contested — the size of the expeditionary force, the exact tolls of individual razzias, and above all the death toll of the conquest as a whole, which the literature places anywhere from several hundred thousand to beyond a million by the 1870s; these are given here as ranges and as the founding-level fact of catastrophic mortality, to be tightened with dated, sourced specifics in Module 11, where the grim accounting properly lives. And legibility is not pardon. To reconstruct the razzia as a rational answer to the position Bugeaud occupied — a mobile enemy, a hostile population, a home government that wanted the country held cheaply and the war won fast — is to make his choices legible, not to excuse the caves of the Dahra. The position lit the menu; the men chose the enfumade from it. What the framework insists on is that we see clearly what was chosen and why, precisely so that we do not mistake the founding legend — the pirates, the flag, the plough — for the founding fact, which was a floor laid in famine over seventeen years and dressed, for the people back home, as three clean weeks in the summer of 1830.

A note on sources. The reconstruction of the 1830 expedition — the fleet of some six hundred vessels, the force of roughly thirty-seven thousand under Bourmont and Duperré, the Boutin plan of 1808, the landing at Sidi Ferruch on 14 June, the battle of Staouéli on 19 June, the fall of the Fort de l'Empereur on 4 July and the capitulation of 5 July 1830 — follows the standard accounts of the invasion of Algiers and the French conquest of Algeria, with the dey's assembled forces given in their contested ranges. The terms of the capitulation (respect for the liberty, property and religion of the inhabitants) and the sequence of their breach — the seizure of the treasury, the *Domaine* decree of 8 September 1830, the seizure of the *waqf* endowments, the conversion of the Ketchaoua mosque in 1831–32, and the Algiers notables' petitions of 1831 and 1833 quoting the assurances back at the French — are drawn from the scholarship on early French land and religious policy in Algeria and from the French-language record of the conquest. The razzia system, its adoption and systematisation under Bugeaud (governor-general from December 1840), the Bureaux Arabes, the herd seizures, the Gentil razzia of 1843, the Dahra enfumades of 1842 and 1845 (Ouled Riah; Pélissier, 19 June 1845; Saint-Arnaud, 12 August 1845), the attempted suppression of the Dahra reports by Soult and their exposure in the Paris press, and the population decline to roughly 2.5 million by 1851, follow the standard military and demographic histories of the conquest and the specialist literature on the razzia as counter-insurgency doctrine (Rid, Porch, and the recent archival work on Bugeaud's campaigns). Bugeaud's motto *ense et aratro* and Bourmont's fortnight boast are given as reported in that record. Contested figures — force size, individual razzia tolls, and the overall death toll of the conquest — are flagged for tightening in Module 11. Every load-bearing specific is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

THE BOOK OF PERSONAL LAW

Module 2 · The Settlement — who got what: how a cascade of statutes converted the conquest into title, and how the boundary of the propertied settlement was drawn at the edge of a religion, so that to own and to rule you first had to leave Islam

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

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A settlement built out of law

Module 1 established the floor: a conquest announced in three weeks and a floor laid over seventeen years by famine. This module asks the next question the framework puts to any order — how the conquered wealth was divided, among whom, and by what marker the inside of the settlement was separated from the outside — and it finds, in French Algeria, a settlement with two features distinctive enough to be stated at the front, because everything else in the module is their working-out.

The first is that this settlement was built out of law. The great spoil of Algeria was land, and the land could not simply be seized the way the treasury had been seized in 1830, because the population that worked it was three million strong and not going anywhere, and because France had bound itself, in the capitulation and again in its own republican self-image, to respect property and to rule by the Code. So the transfer of land from Algerian to European hands was accomplished not mainly by the naked razzia — though that came first and cleared the ground — but by a cascade of statutes, each of which reconstructed the legal nature of Algerian land until it could be lawfully bought, and each of which carried a double face: to the metropolitan audience it read as the enlightened extension of French civil law, individual property, and modern title to a land held back by collective backwardness; on the ground it functioned as the machinery of mass dispossession. The instruments *are* the settlement's primary fiction — the floor's truce written down, law-as-robe — and the Field Manual asks that they be named as such before Module 3 goes hunting the doctrine built on top of them. Naming them is most of this module's work.

The second feature is the marker of inside and outside, and it is the sharper finding. In most orders the boundary of the settlement is a bloodline, a manumission, a name in a tax-roll, a credential. In French Algeria it was a book of personal law. To cross from the outside of the settlement to the inside — from *indigène* to *citoyen*, from subject to owner-with-rights — an Algerian Muslim had to renounce his Islamic personal status, which is to say renounce the legal-religious order that formation had built into him. The boundary of the wealth-and-power settlement was thus drawn at the exact edge of the robe, so that in this order the wealth monopoly and the information-and-formation monopoly do not merely defend one another as the framework's

tripod predicts — they *fuse at the border*, and the thing you must surrender to enter the propertied settlement is your place inside the believed order. Hold both features; the rest follows from them.

The tenure that had to be dissolved

To see the land laws as a machine you have to see what they were built to dismantle, and the landscape has already supplied it. Pre-conquest Algerian land was held under a set of tenures designed, in their various ways, to keep land in the group and out of the market. The dominant rural form was *arch* — land held collectively by a tribe or a fraction of one, inalienable, transmitted only through the male line, periodically redistributed among its households, and reverting to the group if left unworked. Beside it ran *melk*, privately held land closer to the European idea of property; *waqf* (locally *habous*), the inalienable religious endowment whose revenues sustained the mosques, the schools, and the holy cities; and the *beylik* lands of the departed Turkish state. What mattered for the settlement is that the largest category, *arch*, was almost purpose-built to resist a land market: you could not buy a tribe's collective, redistributed, inalienable patrimony, because no individual owned a saleable parcel of it. A conqueror who wanted to plant European farmers on that soil faced not a shortage of force but a problem of law. The land existed; the willing sellers did not; and manufacturing them was a legislative task.

The cascade — sequestration, cultivation, the sénatus-consulte, the Warnier Law

The machine was assembled in stages across four decades, and each stage did a specific piece of the conversion.

It began, as Module 1 showed, with plunder dressed as domain: the decree of 8 September 1830 sweeping the beylik and *waqf* lands into the colonial *Domaine*, and the sequestrations that became formal policy from December 1840, stripping land from tribes classed as enemies and handing it to settlers as punishment and reward at once. By the standard reckonings something on the order of several hundred thousand hectares — a narrow count of "vacant" declarations gives fifty-two thousand for 1830 to 1851, a broader count of all sequestration and expropriation gives around three hundred and sixty-four thousand — had already changed hands by mid-century, before the subtler instruments even arrived.

Then came the manufacture of forfeiture through obligation. The ordinances of 1844 and 1846 required that land be cultivated and taxed uncultivated or untitled holdings, so that tribes who held vast semi-arid ranges under the old extensive pattern — grazing the poor parts, moving on, leaving ground fallow by design — found their customary practice redefined as neglect and their land declared forfeitable for want of a title deed they had never needed and did not possess. The demand for documentary proof of ownership, made of a society whose tenure had never run on documents, was itself a technology of dispossession, and it was understood as such.

The pivot was the *sénatus-consulte* of 22 April 1863, and its double life is the clearest single illustration of the colonial bend at the level of the settlement. Napoleon III's government presented it, and a strand of the historiography still reads it, as a measure of protection: it recognised the tribes as the owners of the land they lived on and purported to end further expropriation. But its

operative machinery was the opposite of protective. It divided tribal territory into *douars*, sorted the land into individual and collective portions, and set in motion the conversion of inalienable *arch* into private, surveyable, saleable parcels — creating, for the first time, the individual Muslim proprietor who *could* sell, and beside him a rural state domain. The reform recognised tribal ownership in the same motion that it began dissolving the collective form which had made that ownership unsaleable. Its own settler critics understood the point exactly and complained only that it had not gone far enough — Auguste Warnier attacked it for having "granted" Algerians seven hundred thousand hectares that should have been open to purchase.

Warnier got his completion in the law that bears his name, the *loi Warnier* of 26 July 1873, which applied French property law wholesale to Algerian land and swept away the remaining protections, so that individual sales could no longer be blocked by the claim that the land was collectively owned. With that, the machine was finished: a body of statute that had taken land held inalienably by a group and reconstituted it, parcel by titled parcel, as property a European could buy. Read against the framework's instruction to name the legal fiction as fiction, the whole cascade — sequestration, the cultivation ordinances, the 1863 *sénatus-consulte*, the Warnier Law — is the settlement's robe in its plainest legal form: a stationary conqueror's rearrangement of the rules of ownership, written in the language of civil law and individual right precisely so that it could be shown to Paris as progress while it operated in Algeria as expropriation. The same instrument, in the two audiences the colony always has, reads as the Code Napoléon extended to a backward shore and as the legal theft of a people's ground.

Who got what

Set the proportions beside the statutes, because the framework asks for the division of spoils in names and numbers, and here the numbers are stark. The European population that the land was being cleared for grew from perhaps fourteen thousand in 1836 to a hundred and nine thousand by 1847, to two hundred and eighty thousand by 1872, roughly doubling again by the turn of the century and passing a million by the late 1930s — settlers not only from France but from Spain, Italy, Malta, and beyond, three-quarters of them living in the towns even as their class engrossed the countryside. Against that inflow the land moved steadily one way. By 1900 Europeans held about thirty per cent of the colony's arable land, and not thirty per cent at random but the best of it — the fertile coastal plains, the irrigated zones, the ground that produced, by that same year, more than two-thirds of the value of Algeria's agricultural output. Across the full span of the colony Europeans took on the order of two and a half to three million hectares of cultivated land, and counting pasture and forest the colon domain reached some seven and a half million hectares by the 1930s — a figure one study sets at around two-fifths of all the land Algerian Muslims had held before the conquest.

And the spoil concentrated as it grew. The settlement policy that was supposed to plant a broad yeomanry of small European farmers largely failed at that; what succeeded was the land grab, and its fruit ran upward into the hands of the *grands colons* — the great settler proprietors and capitalist companies who came to control the bulk of the colony's agriculture, mining, and trade. By the last years of French Algeria a few thousand large owners held the overwhelming majority

of settler land, the wealth "concentrated," as one summary has it, in the hands of a tiny clutch of people, while most Europeans remained poor and most Muslims were pushed off the land entirely. The engine of that concentration was, above all, wine: when phylloxera devastated the vineyards of metropolitan France in the 1870s and 1880s, Algeria's climate and its newly alienable land turned the colony into one of the world's great wine exporters, and vineyards came to occupy something like half of European holdings by 1914 — a monoculture grown by dispossessed Muslim wage-labour, on Muslim land, to be drunk in a France whose own vines had failed, and forbidden by the faith of the people who tended it.

Two groups sat at the edges of this division in ways the framework should mark. The uprooted Muslim majority fell out of the settlement altogether into a new landless condition — tens of thousands driven in the 1870s alone into the towns or onto the colon farms as wage-labourers and sharecroppers, the raw material of an Algerian proletariat manufactured by expropriation. And a thin native stratum was drawn *into* the apparatus as its lowest tier of office-holders: the *caïds* and *aghas* whom France appointed over the tribes not by the tribe's own allegiance but by their loyalty to France, given office, tax-farming, and standing in exchange for service — the reconstituted "colonial makhzen" the landscape foresaw, the office-as-spoil branch of this settlement. Drawn into the European orbit and stripped of the credibility their position had once carried, they earned the derisive name *béni-oui-oui*, the sons of yes-yes. Their co-optation is where Module 2 hands off to Module 3 and Module 8, but the material fact belongs here: some Algerians got office inside the settlement, at the price of becoming its instrument against their own.

The marker of inside and outside: a book of personal law

Now the boundary itself, which is where this settlement is most distinctive and most worth the framework's attention. Algeria was not, in law, a mere colony held at arm's length. In 1848 its settled north was organised into three *départements* — Alger, Oran, Constantine — and declared an integral part of France, and the *sénatus-consulte* of 14 July 1865 completed the paradox by declaring that the *indigène*, Muslim and Jewish alike, *was French*: a French national, under French jurisdiction, owing French obligations. To the metropolitan and republican conscience this was assimilation, universalism, the Frenchness of the conquered affirmed. And in the same breath the same law voided it. The native was French, the *sénatus-consulte* held, but he was not a *citizen* — not unless he applied for citizenship and, as the price of it, renounced his personal status: gave up the right to be governed in marriage, divorce, and inheritance by Qur'anic law, and submitted those most intimate matters to the French civil code. Nationality without citizenship, the jurists' "juridical monstrosity": the Muslim was inside France and outside its citizenry at once, and the gate between the two was the surrender of the law of his religion.

The gate was, for a Muslim, very nearly a demand to apostatise, and the record of who walked through it is the measure of what the marker actually did. Fewer than two hundred requests had been registered by 1870; across the whole half-century from 1865 to 1915, on the order of two to three thousand Muslims in a population of millions took French citizenship, because the price was the renunciation of the legal-religious order into which every one of them had been

formed. The boundary held not because it was patrolled but because almost no one on the far side would pay to cross it — the revealed-preference logic of the framework run in reverse, the near-total absence of takers proving how high, in the currency that mattered to them, the toll stood.

Then watch the boundary get redrawn by fiat to serve the colony's needs, because the redrawing exposes the whole thing as an instrument rather than a principle. On 24 October 1870, with France at war and the Second Empire fallen, the Crémieux Decree naturalised the roughly thirty-five thousand indigenous Jews of Algeria *en masse* — lifting an entire population across the line into citizenship without the individual renunciation demanded of everyone else, on the calculation that Jews, with co-religionists in metropolitan France, would assimilate where Muslims would not. A companion decree the same day confirmed that the Muslims stayed outside. The confessional line that had been drawn as a matter of personal law was now, nakedly, a line drawn between two subject populations to split them — one lifted in, the other pressed further down, the fissure between them deliberately widened as an instrument of rule. And the pressing-down was codified the next decade in the *Code de l'indigénat*, formally enacted on 28 July 1881, which built for the Muslim *indigène* a separate and inferior penal order "exorbitant of the Code Civil" — summary fines imposed by administrators without trial, special taxes, collective punishment of whole communities, and a list of infractions that existed only for natives: leaving one's district without a permit, an unauthorised gathering, an "insolent" or disrespectful act, a renewed complaint to the authorities. Where the settlement's inside ran on the civil code and the vote, its outside ran on the *indigénat* and the administrator's whip.

The final move sealed the boundary as caste rather than creed. French courts and administrators, over the following decades, converted "Muslim" from a religious description into a hereditary legal category — "of Muslim origin" — so that even a convert could not escape the *indigénat*, and the naturalisation law of 1889, which granted automatic French citizenship by birth on Algerian soil to the children of European foreigners (Spaniards, Italians, Maltese), explicitly excepted the Muslims. Islam had become, in the colony's law, a race one was born into and could not leave, and the marker of the settlement was now fully drawn: European descent and Jewish naturalisation on the inside, "Muslim origin" on the outside, transmitted by blood, sealed by a book of personal law that the excluded could not renounce without ceasing, in the state's eyes, to be who they were. This is the framework's inside/outside marker in an unusually pure and unusually cruel form — a settlement whose boundary is the boundary of the robe, whose entry price is one's place in the believed order, and whose final logic makes even that price unpayable by turning a faith into a caste.

The seam inside the settlement

One complication keeps this from being a story of a single united conqueror carving up the spoil, and it matters both for honesty and for the modules to come: the settlement was contested *within* the colonial elite, and the contest was real. Two factions wanted two different Algerias. The army and its native-affairs administrators — the *Bureaux Arabes* — wanted, on the whole, to preserve Algerian society and rule it through its own co-opted chiefs, because a preserved

and pacified native order was cheaper to govern and was the army's own domain; this was the impulse behind the protective face of the 1863 *sénatus-consulte* and behind Napoleon III's vision of a *royaume arabe*, his declaration that Algeria was "not a French province but an Arab country, a European colony, and a French camp," and that France's first duty was to its three million Arabs. Against them stood the settlers, who wanted the land and the natives off it, and who regarded the army's protectiveness as theft of their birthright. The fall of the Empire in 1870 decided the contest: civilian settler power rose with the Third Republic, and the settler programme carried in a rush — the Crémieux Decree, the extension of civilian *colon* authority over the tribal reserves, the Warnier Law, and after the Kabyle rising of 1871 a fresh sequestration of more than five hundred thousand hectares, part of it handed to refugees from the Alsace and Lorraine that France had just lost to Germany, a hundred thousand hectares settled on some thousands of them in eighty new colonisation centres. The seam between soldier and settler is a genuine split in the wealth-settlement, not a mere administrative difference, and it resolved decisively for the settlers; Modules 8 and 9 will take it up as the case's clearest internal fracture line, but its origin is here, in the fight over who the land was for.

Reading the settlement against the framework

The wealth monopoly in French Algeria is, on the evidence, fused with the floor and the robe in a single settler-colonial coalition — the land taken by the army's violence, converted by the state's law, and justified by the civilising doctrine Module 3 will reconstruct — but fused with a real internal seam, the military-administrative and the civilian-settler factions, which the framework should track because its resolution after 1870 is what set the colony's final and most extractive shape. Two contributions the case makes to the framework's account of the settlement are worth stating plainly as findings.

The first is the settlement-as-legal-machine: where an order must dispossess a populous, settled people while professing to a distant audience that it rules by law, the transfer of wealth is accomplished through a cascade of statutes that reconstruct the legal nature of the property itself — here, converting inalienable collective tenure into alienable individual title — and those statutes are the settlement's primary fiction, carrying by design the double face of progress-for-the-metropole and expropriation-for-the-colonised. The second is the coincidence of the settlement's boundary with the robe's: an inside/outside marker set at personal-religious law, so that the wealth monopoly and the formation monopoly are not merely mutually defending but continuous at the border, and the price of entry to the propertied settlement is apostasy from the believed order — a price the record shows almost no one paid, and which the state finally made unpayable by converting the faith into a hereditary caste. Neither of these is contradicted by the framework; both sharpen its account of what a settlement can be when the settling power answers to an audience that must be told the conquest is lawful and universal.

Two disciplines close the module. The figures here are contested and are given as the standard ranges — the hectares expropriated at each stage, the settler population at each date, the share of arable in European hands, the count of Muslim naturalisations — and where the sources diverge the divergence is marked rather than resolved; the direction of every series, however, is

not in doubt. And legibility is not pardon. To reconstruct the land laws as a rational machine for accomplishing dispossession under the constraint of a metropolitan conscience that demanded the forms of legality is to explain how the thing was done and why it took the shape it did; it is not to grant that the *arch* was fairly bought or the *indigénat* justly imposed. The standing cost of this settlement — the impôts arabes and the extraction that ran on top of it, the famines that fell on a dispossessed people between 1866 and 1872 and cut the population by hundreds of thousands, the metabolic toll of turning a landholding society into a landless one — belongs to Modules 6 and 11, where it will be counted at full weight. What Module 2 records is the division itself: the land moved from a people held out of the market into the hands of a settler minority by a machine made of law, and the boundary between the two was a book of personal law that the dispossessed could not open without ceasing to be themselves.

A note on sources. The reconstruction of pre-conquest tenure (*arch*, *melk*, *waqf*/*habous*, *beylik*) and its dissolution follows the scholarship on French colonial land policy in Algeria and McDougall's *A History of Algeria*; the statutory cascade — the *Domaine* decree of 8 September 1830, the sequestration policy from 1840, the cultivation ordinances of 1844 and 1846, the *sénatus-consulte* of 22 April 1863 (with the Guignard debate over its protective versus revolutionary character), and the Warnier Law of 26 July 1873 — is drawn from that literature and the specialist studies of the 1863 measure and of *cantonnement*. The proportions (settler population from c. 14,000 in 1836 to 109,380 in 1847, 280,000 in 1872, and past a million by the 1930s; roughly 30 per cent of arable and the bulk of the best land in European hands by 1900; two and a half to three million hectares of cultivated land and some seven and a half million in all by the 1930s; the concentration into a few thousand *grands colons*; the wine monoculture after the phylloxera crisis) follow the standard economic and demographic histories, with contested figures given as ranges. The caste line — the *sénatus-consulte* of 14 July 1865 (Brett's "legislating for inequality"), the negligible Muslim naturalisation counts, the Crémieux Decree of 24 October 1870, the *Code de l'indigénat* of 28 July 1881, the "Muslim origin" jurisprudence, and the exclusion of Muslims from the 1889 *jus soli*) follows the legal-historical scholarship on citizenship, nationality, and the indigénat in colonial Algeria. The 1871 Mokrani rising, the sequestration that followed, and the Alsace-Lorraine resettlement are given as reported in that literature. The military–settler seam and Napoleon III's *royaume arabe* follow Britannica's synthesis and the standard accounts. Every load-bearing specific is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon; the standing extraction and the famine mortality are deferred to Modules 6 and 11. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

WITHOUT TERRIBLE POETRY

Module 3 · The Robe — the legitimating story cut not for the conquered, whose belief France did not need, but for the two audiences it could not do without: the metropole that funded and manned the war, and the soldiers who had to be freed in conscience to fight it

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

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The robe that faces away from the ruled

In the ordinary order the framework studies, the robe is laid over the floor and faces the ruled: a believed story, driven deep by formation, that makes the governed hold the order rightful and police it themselves, so the floor can withdraw to the margins. The colonial case inverts this, and the inversion is the whole of Module 3. Module 1 established that France did not need the Algerians to believe its rule was rightful, because the floor — conquest, razzia, famine — did the entire job of holding them; and force never pays for what it does not need. So toward the conquered, France built almost no robe at all. The legitimating effort went instead, and lavishly, toward two other audiences: the metropolitan public and political nation, whose belief supplied the credits, the recruits, and the moral permission the war ran on; and the army's own men, whose consciences had to be arranged so that they could operate the floor without breaking. The robe of French Algeria is a robe cut away from the ruled and toward the rulers' own base — and the seam that had to be policed, the one this whole study circles, is the seam between those two audiences, because the story told to the metropole and the story the army told itself could not be allowed to meet in the metropole's plain sight.

What makes this case unusually legible is that the men who ran the floor wrote down, in private and in public, both halves of the robe and the seam between them, in words that survive and can be quoted exactly. The method of this module is therefore to set those words side by side — the law and the letter, the parliamentary speech and the field despatch, the monument and the cemetery — and let the distance between them stand without commentary, because the distance is the finding. A great deal of organised harm is done this way: not by men who know themselves evil, but by formed men who believe the story told at home, operating a floor the home audience is kept from seeing clearly, in a vocabulary that makes the victims difficult to see as fully human. Formation makes this hard to perceive in one's own country and one's own time and comparatively easy to perceive in another country and another century; the case is offered in that spirit, the arithmetic laid out, the sum left to the reader.

The robe for the metropole, first coat: the law that promised, and was void

The first coat of the metropolitan robe is a legal instrument, and the framework's discipline is to name a legal instrument as the floor's primary fiction rather than treat it as neutral background.

The capitulation signed at Algiers on 5 July 1830 bound France, in exchange for the city and the treasury, to a specific promise: that it would not touch the inhabitants' liberty or their faith — *"ne pas porter atteinte à la liberté des habitants de toutes classes et à leur religion,"* the clause running on to cover their property, their commerce, and their worship. Read for its audience, this clause was never a promise to Algerians, who could not enforce it and would watch it dissolve within the year. It was a certificate filed for the metropolitan conscience: proof, at the moment of victory, that France had conquered *lawfully*, as a civilised Christian power that keeps its word to the vanquished and does not sack what it takes. And it was void almost at once — the treasury carried off, the *waqf* and beylik lands swept into the *Domaine* by the decree of 8 September 1830, the Ketchaoua mosque emptied of its worshippers and consecrated as a cathedral in 1832, the notables of Algiers reduced to quoting the broken clause back at the men who had signed it. The first coat of the robe was a written assurance of lawfulness that the floor had already made false, kept in circulation because the audience it reassured was across the sea and would rather read the certificate than the ledger.

Second coat: glory, and the war against barbarism

The second coat was *gloire* and the suppression of barbarism, and it is the coat that made the conquest popular. Charles X had launched the expedition publicly as a blow against the Barbary corsairs and a liberation of Christian captives — a grievance a century old and by 1830 largely obsolete, the corsair trade having been broken at Algiers in 1816, but one that dressed a war of domestic distraction in the robes of a crusade for civilisation against piracy and slavery. The coat outlasted the king who cut it. Its most revealing wearer is Alexis de Tocqueville, because Tocqueville is the canonical liberal, the celebrated friend of liberty and equality, and because he wrote both halves of the robe in his own hand. In his *Second Letter on Algeria* of 1837 he supplied the public face: France would, he wrote, be able to *"raise a great monument to our country's glory on the coast of Africa."* The monument is the robe for Paris — Algeria as the theatre where a defeated, softening France would recover its greatness. And Tocqueville, applauding Bugeaud, would call the thing a science: *"war in Africa is a science."*

Third coat: "the Muslim native is French"

The third and most audacious coat was the universalist one, the *mission civilisatrice* in its legal dress — the claim that France did not conquer Algeria so much as *extend itself* to it, carrying the Revolution's promise of civil equality to a backward shore, so that the conquered were not subjects to be held down but future Frenchmen to be raised up. This coat reached its purest statement in a single sentence of law, the opening article of the *sénatus-consulte* of 14 July 1865, and the sentence is worth quoting exactly, because its whole architecture of exclusion turns on one word:

> *"L'indigène musulman est français, néanmoins il continuera à être régi par la loi musulmane… Il peut, sur sa demande, être admis à jouir des droits de citoyen français ; dans ce cas, il est régi par les lois civiles et politiques de la France."*
>
> "The Muslim native is French; nevertheless he shall continue to be governed by Muslim law… He may, upon his application, be admitted to enjoy the rights of a French citizen; in that case,

he is governed by the civil and political laws of France."

L'indigène musulman est français — the native is French: read to the metropole, this is assimilation, universalism, the Revolution's equality carried across the Mediterranean, the supreme proof that France conquers only to redeem. And then *néanmoins* — nevertheless — and the redemption is voided in the same breath, for the native who is French remains governed by a law that denies him a citizen's rights, and the only gate out requires him to renounce his personal status, his Qur'anic law of marriage and inheritance and family, which for a formed Muslim was tantamount to apostasy. Module 2 counted who walked through that gate: on the order of two to three thousand Muslims in the half-century from 1865 to 1915, out of millions. The third coat of the robe announced to Paris that the native was French while the word *néanmoins* guaranteed he would never be a citizen — a robe of universal brotherhood over a floor of permanent caste, and the audience for the brotherhood was never the native but the metropolitan republican who needed to believe his empire was a moral project.

The robe for the army: fanatics, brigands, and dogs

Turn the robe over and look at the coat cut for the other audience, the men who actually worked the floor, because the same civilising claim that reassured Paris did a different and darker job in the field. The soldier could not be asked to believe that the Arab consented to French rule, because he plainly did not; he was told instead that the Arab was not the kind of being whose consent signified — a fanatic, a brigand, a savage, a beast — so that the floor's work required no more justification than the extermination of vermin. This is the robe cut for the apex's own coercive class, and it survives, undisguised, in the private letters the officers wrote home, where no metropolitan audience was watching and the men said plainly what the war was. Lieutenant-Colonel de Montagnac, writing from Philippeville on 15 March 1843, set down the method and the vocabulary together:

> *"Voilà comment il faut faire la guerre aux Arabes : tuer tous les hommes jusqu'à l'âge de quinze ans, prendre toutes les femmes et les enfants… En un mot, anéantir tout ce qui ne rampera pas à nos pieds comme des chiens."*
>
> "This is how one must make war on the Arabs: kill all the men down to the age of fifteen, take all the women and the children… In a word, annihilate everything that will not crawl at our feet like dogs."

The commander-in-chief spoke the same tongue. At Orléansville on 11 June 1845, a week before the most notorious of the smokings-out, Bugeaud advised his subordinates how to reduce the tribes who sheltered in the caves of the Chélif: *"Si ces gredins se retirent dans leurs cavernes, imitez Cavaignac aux Sbéhas ! Enfumez-les à outrance comme des renards"* — "If these scoundrels withdraw into their caves, imitate Cavaignac at the Sbéhas! Smoke them out to the utmost, like foxes." Scoundrels, foxes, dogs: the vocabulary is the robe. It does not claim the victims are wrong; it claims they are not the kind of thing a man need feel guilt for killing. And the proof that this coat was not cynical performance but genuinely believed — that formation had done its real, durable work — is that the officers used the identical vocabulary in private letters to their

own brothers as in their public despatches, and slept afterward. Saint-Arnaud, describing to his brother Adolphe in August 1845 how he had sealed some five hundred people of the Sbéah into their caves, wrote: *"Alors je fais hermétiquement boucher toutes les issues et je fais un vaste cimetière. La terre couvrira à jamais les cadavres de ces fanatiques"* — "Then I have all the exits hermetically sealed and I make a vast cemetery. The earth will cover forever the corpses of these fanatics." And a few lines on, the untroubled conscience of the formed man: *"ma conscience ne me reproche rien. J'ai fait mon devoir"* — my conscience reproaches me with nothing; I did my duty. This is the robe working exactly as the framework says a robe works — not as a trick re-played on a dupe each morning, but as a conviction installed so deep that a man can build a mass grave and call it duty and mean it.

The near-absence of a robe toward the conquered — and the thin redirect

Toward the Algerians themselves, set against these lavish coats, there is almost nothing — which is precisely what the framework predicts for a population whose belief the floor does not require. What little France built toward the conquered was not legitimacy but *redirect*: an attempt to turn the existing structures of Islamic authority against the resistance rather than to generate a new belief. The clearest instance is the fatwa-shopping. Against the jihad that Abd al-Qadir and the marabouts preached — the religious duty to fight or flee the rule of the infidel — France worked, through intermediaries and a convert-agent, to procure a countervailing fatwa authorising Algerian Muslims to live peaceably under French rule, a purchased ruling meant to unpick the religious obligation to resist. Beside it ran the co-optation of the native hierarchy Module 2 has already counted: the *caïds* and *aghas* installed over the tribes by their loyalty to France rather than the tribe's allegiance to them, drawn into the European orbit until they lost the credibility their office had carried and earned the name *béni-oui-oui*. In the framework's trichotomy of how the trusted-information leg is acquired — forged, redirected, inherited — the robe toward the conquered is a thin and instrumental *redirect*, a purchased fatwa and a co-opted chief, and it largely failed, which is why the floor and not the robe did the work of holding the Algerians down. The contrast is total and it is the module's spine: three heavy coats of robe for the metropole and the army, and for the ruled a purchased fatwa and the razzia.

The seam: "a confidential report... without terrible poetry"

The whole structure depends on one thing — that the metropolitan audience, which believes the coats of glory and civilisation and universal brotherhood, must never see plainly the coat cut for the army or the floor it licenses. And here the case is extraordinarily candid, because the men who worked the seam described their own information management in writing. Saint-Arnaud, in the same correspondence, records exactly how a massacre should travel to the metropole: *"Un rapport confidentiel a tout dit au maréchal, sans poésie terrible ni images"* — a confidential report told the marshal everything, without terrible poetry or images. Report the deed, but strip it of the vividness that would let the home audience *feel* it; keep it confidential; and, he instructs his brother, keep the letter private. He knew who the danger was. Writing on 27 June 1845, as the news of Pélissier's smoking-out of the Ouled Riah began to move, he named the enemy of the robe precisely — the press — with a soldier's contempt: *"Les journaux philanthropes ne vont*

pas manquer de s'emparer de ce fait pour attaquer encore l'armée d'Afrique… Je voudrais bien que vos journalistes de Paris fissent une campagne avec nous !" — the philanthropic newspapers will not fail to seize on this to attack the Army of Africa again; I do wish your Paris journalists would make a campaign with us. The floor's operators understood, better than anyone, that their enemy was not the Arab, whom they could smoke out of a cave, but the metropolitan reader, whom they could not, and who might — if the terrible poetry reached him — withdraw the belief the whole enterprise ran on.

Mostly the seam held, because the audience was far away and preferred the monument to the cemetery, and because the state helped it prefer so: the War Minister, Marshal Soult, tried to bury Pélissier's report, and the government kept Horace Vernet employed filling the Salon with heroic canvases of the African war even as the smoke-out was being whispered. But the seam did, for a moment, crack — and it cracked in the way the framework predicts a seam cracks, when a rival interpreter forces the chokepoint open. The rupture came through a newspaper published *inside the colony*, closer to the floor: *l'Akhbar* of Algiers printed an account of the Dahra. And on 11 July 1845, in the Chamber of Peers — the metropole's own institution, between a debate on Corsican ports and one on a railway law — the prince de la Moskowa, a soldier and the son of Marshal Ney, rose to force the government to look:

> *"Messieurs, un journal qui se publie en Algérie, l'Akhbar, contient le récit d'un fait inouï dans notre histoire militaire. Un colonel français se serait rendu coupable d'un acte de cruauté inexplicable, inqualifiable, à l'égard de malheureux Arabes prisonniers. Je viens demander au gouvernement français de s'expliquer sur ce fait."*
>
> "Gentlemen, a newspaper published in Algeria, the Akhbar, contains the account of a deed unheard-of in our military history. A French colonel is said to have made himself guilty of an act of cruelty inexplicable, unqualifiable, toward wretched Arab prisoners. I come to ask the French government to explain itself upon this fact."

For a moment the terrible poetry reached the metropole, and the robe was made to answer for the floor in the country's own senate. It is the founding instance of the interpretive battle Modules 7 and 9 will open out, and its resolution is instructive: the government defended the officer, the scandal was ridden out, the conquest continued, and the men of the Dahra kept their careers — Saint-Arnaud would end a Marshal of France and a Minister of War. The seam cracked and was resealed, because a robe cut for a distant audience can usually survive a single glimpse through the seam, so long as the glimpse fades and the monument stays up.

Provenance, testing, and sincerity

Three of the framework's disciplines close the module. On provenance — forged, redirected, or inherited — the robe splits by audience. Toward the metropole it was largely *forged*, cut new from French materials: the Revolution's universalism turned into the *mission civilisatrice*, the old currency of *gloire*, the Code's language of individual right and lawful title. Toward the conquered it was a thin *redirect* — a purchased fatwa, a co-opted marabout — and it failed. Nothing of consequence was *inherited* from the Turkish order France displaced, whose own robe toward the population had been thin to begin with.

On tested versus revealed, the civilising robe presents as a tested doctrine — it makes falsifiable promises, assimilation, elevation, *l'indigène est français* — and functions as a revealed one, because its repeated, visible failure is never allowed to refute it. When the native is not raised up but dispossessed, not enfranchised but smoked out of a cave, the failure is read not as evidence against the mission but as evidence of the native's unreadiness for it — the doctrine insulated from its own results, exactly the structure of a belief held as revealed. The promise of *français* survives every proof that the *néanmoins* was the operative word.

On sincerity the framework's rule is to bracket what cannot be recovered and read the function, and to note only the deviations. The striking thing here is that the private record does not read as cynicism. Tocqueville seems genuinely to have believed in the civilising mission *and* to have genuinely endorsed the burning of harvests and the seizure of women and children as *"unfortunate necessities"* — writing, in the same 1841 essay, that he had brought back from Africa the distressing notion that France waged war *"in a much more barbaric manner than the Arabs themselves,"* and endorsing it anyway. Saint-Arnaud seems genuinely to have believed he did his duty and was, as he told his brother, good by taste and nature. That the coats were believed even in private letters to family — that the vocabulary of fanatics and dogs was not merely a public alibi but the men's own inward speech — is the strongest evidence the framework recognises that the robe was real formation and not a performance. And that is the disquieting core of the case, the thing it is offered to make visible: the worst of the floor was worked not by men who knew themselves criminals but by men in whom the robe had done its work, who believed the monument, spoke the vocabulary of vermin without effort, and slept.

Reading the robe against the framework

French Algeria confirms the framework's account of the robe and bends it in one structural way worth carrying forward. The bend is the inversion of the robe's direction. The framework's default picture — robe over floor, facing the ruled, driven deep by formation until the governed police themselves — describes an order that needs its subjects' belief. A colonial order does not need the conquered's belief, because the floor holds them directly; so the robe is cut away from the ruled and redistributed onto the two audiences the conqueror *does* depend on: the metropolitan base that supplies legitimacy, money, and men, and the coercive class that must be freed in conscience to apply the floor. The framework's own audience-list already contains these — the apex's coordinating class, and a wider public whose recognition affects durability — but the colonial case redistributes the *weight* onto them entirely and empties the robe toward the governed, and it welds the two remaining coats into one garment with two faces: the *mission civilisatrice* that is glory-and-brotherhood to Paris is, turned inward, the doctrine that the resisting native is a fanatic and a brigand outside the human pale, so the same claim that ennobles the conquest for the home audience dehumanises its victims for the troops. Add the seam this creates — an information chokepoint between the two audiences whose whole maintenance is keeping the first from seeing what the second is told — and the colonial robe is a nameable structure the corpus should hold: *a robe reversed, cut for the home front and the firing line, joined at a seam that must be policed against the metropole's own eyes.*

Two disciplines to close. The quotations here are exact and from public-domain primary sources — the capitulation of 1830, the *sénatus-consulte* of 1865, Tocqueville's essay and letters, the field correspondence of Montagnac, Bugeaud, and Saint-Arnaud, the Chamber of Peers debate of 11 July 1845, and the account in *l'Akhbar* — reproduced as the record gives them; where a famous line's provenance is doubtful it has been left out. And legibility is not pardon. To reconstruct the robe as a rational instrument — the coat that raised the credits, the coat that freed the conscience, the seam that kept the two apart — is to explain how the harm was organised and believed, not to grant that the harvests were justly burned or the caves justly sealed. The point of setting the monument beside the cemetery in the perpetrators' own exact words is not to pronounce the verdict, which the words pronounce themselves, but to show the mechanism plainly enough that a reader formed in a later robe might recognise the shape of the thing — the war whose true audience is at home, the story that ennobles it for those who fund it and dehumanises its victims for those who wage it, and the seam of managed information that lets a decent public believe the monument while the cemetery fills — and, recognising the shape, do the arithmetic without being told the sum.

A note on sources. All primary quotations are from public-domain nineteenth-century sources and are given as the record reproduces them. The capitulation of 5 July 1830 (the pledge not to infringe the inhabitants' liberty, property, and religion) is quoted from the standard reproductions of the treaty. Tocqueville's *"great monument to our country's glory"* is from the *Second Letter on Algeria* (1837); the endorsement of burning harvests and seizing *"unarmed men, women and children"* as *"unfortunate necessities,"* the admission that France waged war *"in a much more barbaric manner than the Arabs themselves,"* and *"war in Africa is a science"* are from the *Essay/Travail sur l'Algérie* (1841). Montagnac's letter of 15 March 1843 is from *Lettres d'un soldat* (posthumously published 1885); Bugeaud's *"Enfumez-les… comme des renards"* (Orléansville, 11 June 1845) and Saint-Arnaud's letters to his brother of 27 June and August 1845 (*"un vaste cimetière," "sans poésie terrible ni images," "ma conscience ne me reproche rien"*) are from the published *Lettres du maréchal de Saint-Arnaud* (1858) and the standard accounts of the enfumades. The *sénatus-consulte du 14 juillet 1865*, article 1 (*"L'indigène musulman est français, néanmoins…"*) is quoted from the official text (Wikisource / Bull. off. 1315). The prince de la Moskowa's interpellation and the *l'Akhbar* account are from the Chamber of Peers debate of 11 July 1845 as reproduced in the historical literature (Maspero; Le Cour Grandmaison). Modern scholarship (McDougall, Sessions, Brett, Saada, Weil, Le Cour Grandmaison) is paraphrased and credited, not quoted at length. Soult's attempted suppression of the Dahra report and Vernet's official canvases are given as in Module 1's sourcing. Every load-bearing quotation has been checked against a source reproducing the primary text; the ongoing interpreter-class battle is deferred to Module 7 and the plurality question to Module 9. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

I VISITED THE CEMETERIES

Module 4 · Formation — the belief lavished on the citizen and the settler, deliberately withheld from the conquered, and the rival formation that, in the vacuum France left, made a nation

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

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Formation is where a colonial order decides not to last

In the framework's ordinary order, formation is the machinery that makes rule cheap and durable: through family, school, ritual, and faith the belief is installed so deep that the governed police the order themselves, the neighbours shame the deviant for free, and the floor withdraws to the margins because most people obey not from fear but because obeying is simply what a good person does. Where you find instead an order that must watch its own subjects closely — permits, informers, collective punishments, a special code of surveillance — you are looking, in the words of the framework's own statement of method, at a story that never took; surveillance is the tell of a belief that failed to become a conviction. Module 4 asks how French Algeria installed its belief, and the answer is the strangest thing about the whole order and the surest sign of how it would end: France installed its belief lavishly in some of the people it ruled and installed almost none of it in most of them, on purpose, because the settlement of Module 2 had made it impossible to do otherwise. It formed the citizen and the settler into ardent believers in the civilising monument. It left the Muslim majority un-formed — held by the floor and the *indigénat*'s surveillance rather than by conviction — because to form them into Frenchmen would have meant admitting them as citizens, and the caste line forbade that. And into the vacuum where the coloniser's formation was withheld, a rival formation moved and made, out of the un-formed majority, a nation.

This module therefore has to track three formations, not one: the deep formation of the French subject, the withheld formation toward the conquered, and the counter-formation that filled the vacuum. The framework asks in each case for the portrait of the good subject and the ritual calendar that rehearsed the order; here there are two good subjects and two calendars, running side by side across the same soil and never meeting, and the whole history of the order's end is written in the space between them.

The doctrine, in the words of the man who built the schools

Begin with the belief France installed at home and in the settler, because it was stated, exactly and without embarrassment, by the very man who founded the institution that installed it. Jules Ferry was the architect of the Third Republic's school — the *école laïque*, free, secular, and compulsory, the great formative engine of modern France — and Ferry also stood before the Chamber of Deputies on 28 July 1885 and gave the imperial doctrine its clearest public statement:

> *"Il faut dire ouvertement qu'en effet les races supérieures ont un droit vis-à-vis des races inférieures… Je répète qu'il y a pour les races supérieures un droit, parce qu'il y a un devoir pour elles. Elles ont le devoir de civiliser les races inférieures."*
>
> "It must be said openly that the superior races have a right over the inferior races... I repeat that there is for the superior races a right, because there is a duty for them. They have the duty of civilising the inferior races."

And he applied it to the exact ground of this study, challenging the Chamber to deny that there was *"plus de justice, d'ordre matériel et moral… en Afrique du Nord depuis que la France a fait sa conquête"* — more justice, more material and moral order in North Africa since France made its conquest. This is the *mission civilisatrice* in its purest form and from the most authoritative possible mouth: the man who built the school that formed generations of French children stating that the empire those children would inherit was a duty owed by a superior race. Six years earlier, on 14 May 1879, Ferry had named the school itself as the instrument of penetration, in the register of a crusade: *"Des écoles ! des écoles !… Que l'esprit de la France pénètre et imprègne ce pays !"* — Schools! Schools!... Let the spirit of France penetrate and impregnate this country. The good French subject was formed, in the *école* and the barracks and the press and the colonial pavilion, to hold the conquest not as a crime or even as an interest but as a vocation — France carrying justice and light to a lower people, the tricolour as a moral gift.

That the doctrine was a doctrine and not a mere fact of the age is proved by the fact that it was contested at the time, in the same chamber, in words equally exact. Georges Clemenceau rose to answer Ferry and refused the whole robe: *"n'essayons pas de revêtir la violence du nom hypocrite de civilisation… La conquête que vous préconisez, c'est l'abus pur et simple de la force… pour s'approprier l'homme, le torturer, en extraire toute la force qui est en lui au profit du prétendu civilisateur. Ce n'est pas le droit, c'en est la négation."* Let us not clothe violence in the hypocritical name of civilisation; the conquest you advocate is the pure and simple abuse of force, to appropriate a man, torture him, extract all the strength in him for the profit of the so-called civiliser. That a leading republican could see the robe for what it was, and name it, in 1885, is the measure of the thing: the civilising formation was a choice among available beliefs, not the only air men could breathe, and France chose it and taught it to its children.

The good subject France did form — including the colonised man who could not see his nation

The portrait of the good French subject is legible enough: the citizen-soldier formed in *gloire* and duty who could embark for Africa and, as Module 3 showed, build a mass grave and call it duty with an untroubled conscience; the settler formed to hold the seized land as his birthright and the Muslim as a lower order; the metropolitan schoolchild formed to see the map's pink expanses as France's gift to the world. What the framework's own statement of method warns is that this formation has a dark twin — that the same schooling which raises a citizen who keeps his word raises one *who cannot see the people his order was built on top of*, and teaches the takers' grandchildren that the taken land had always been theirs. French Algeria supplies the proof of that line in its most extreme and most tragic form, and it is a colonised man who supplies it.

Ferhat Abbas was the showpiece of French formation among the conquered — a pharmacist, a decorated veteran, the most polished of the *évolués*, the assimilated Muslim élite. And in February 1936, in his newspaper *L'Entente*, under the title *"La France, c'est moi,"* Abbas wrote the sentence that is this module's title and its darkest exhibit:

> *"Si j'avais découvert la nation algérienne, je serais nationaliste… Mais je ne mourrai pas pour la patrie algérienne parce que cette patrie n'existe pas. J'ai interrogé l'histoire, j'ai interrogé les vivants et les morts, j'ai visité les cimetières, personne ne m'en a parlé."*
>
> "If I had discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist… But I will not die for the Algerian fatherland because this fatherland does not exist. I have questioned history, I have questioned the living and the dead, I have visited the cemeteries, no one spoke to me of it."

Here is formation at its uttermost. France had formed a colonised man so completely that he walked among the graves of his own people and could not find his nation there — that the belief installed by the *école* had done to Ferhat Abbas exactly what the framework says formation does, made the arranged conviction indistinguishable from any other truth he held, until his own country was invisible to him and France was his fatherland. This is not a cynic performing loyalty. It is the good subject the civilising school was designed to produce, and the fact that the school could produce him out of a conquered Muslim is the strongest evidence in the whole case of how real, how load-bearing, formation is. Hold the line beside it: *the formation that raises a citizen who keeps his word is the same formation that raises one who cannot see the people his order was built on top of.* In Ferhat Abbas the two subjects of that sentence collapse into one man.

The formation withheld

Now the decisive and distinctive fact: toward the Muslim majority, France did not do this. It could not, because forming the Muslim into a Frenchman meant, by the logic of the 1865 *sénatus-consulte* and everything built on it, either admitting him to citizenship or exposing the civilising claim as a lie — and the settler caste of Module 2 could afford neither. So the formation the doctrine so loudly promised was, in practice, withheld, and the withholding is written in numbers that do not admit of misreading.

France began by destroying the formation that already existed. The traditional Qur'anic schooling of pre-conquest Algeria — the *kuttab* and the *médersa* — had been funded by the *hubus*, the inalienable religious endowments; and the seizure of the *waqf* into the colonial *Domaine*, which Module 2 counted as an act of dispossession, was by the same stroke an act of de-formation, cutting the financial root of the indigenous school. Then France declined to replace it. As late as 1936, after a century of rule, roughly two per cent of Algerian Muslim men could read and write in French; by 1954, on the eve of the war, about five per cent. Fewer than fifteen per cent of more than two million Muslim children of school age were in a French school in 1954; at independence in 1962, after a hundred and thirty years, some ninety per cent of Algerian Muslims were illiterate and only about one in ten literate — a level of educational exclusion one modern study summarises flatly: under French rule education was almost exclusively reserved to the European settlers. Compulsory schooling, the very principle Ferry had made the glory of the

metropolitan *école*, was not decreed for Algeria until November 1944.

And where schooling was offered to Muslims it was framed, by the men who ran it, not as enfranchisement but as an instrument of control. Colonel Louis Rinn, director of native affairs in the 1880s, wrote that teaching the natives French should be classed among the obligations France was *entitled to impose* on them, in the same breath as the *indigénat*'s "emergency measures like sequestration orders and collective sanctions." Schooling as a clause of the Native Code; the *médersa* reformed, in the administration's own stated aim, to *limit the political*. This is formation deliberately kept shallow — enough to produce a clerk or a *béni-oui-oui* caïd, never enough to produce a citizen. It is the exact inverse of the framework's normal picture, and the inversion is the finding: an order that installs belief in the population it needs and withholds it from the population it merely contains, and pays for the withholding with the surveillance-apparatus that is the standing confession that the belief never took. The *indigénat*'s permits and collective punishments and informers, which Module 5 will count as the cost column, are in Module 4's terms the receipt for a formation that was never attempted — force held high over a majority precisely because no conviction had been installed to let it fall.

The two calendars

The framework asks for the ritual year that rehearsed the order, and in this case there were two ritual years, one for each good subject, running over the same ground and never touching. The French year was the republican civic calendar the *école* taught: the fourteenth of July, the commemorations of the conquest and its heroes, the statues of Bugeaud, the whole liturgy of *la plus grande France* — and its supreme set-piece, the centenary of 1930, when France staged an immense celebration of a hundred years since the landing at Sidi Ferruch, a rehearsal of the conquest-order in monuments and pageants and exhibitions, addressed to the settler and the metropole and rehearsing for them that Algeria was, and had always been, France. The Muslim majority stood outside that calendar entirely; the centenary of the conquest was, for the conquered, the centenary of a catastrophe, and its very grandeur measured how completely the two good subjects inhabited different years.

For the Muslim majority kept its own year, and France did not control it: the fast of Ramadan and the two festivals of the Aïd, the Mawlid of the Prophet, and above all the local *moussems* and *ziyaras* — the pilgrimages and festivals at the tombs of the saints and the lodges of the brotherhoods, the *zawiyas* that the landscape identified as the true institutions of formation in pre-conquest Algeria. This calendar rehearsed a different order and a different belonging, one anchored not in Paris but in Islam and in the local sacred geography, and because France had withheld its own formation it left this rival calendar to do the forming unopposed. Two ritual years over one country is the visible sign of two formations, and the framework's expectation — that where formation is thin the order is held by force and the population's real belief runs elsewhere — is here simply the map of daily life.

The counter-formation: a nation made in the vacuum

The most important consequence of withheld formation is that the vacuum did not stay empty. A population is always being formed by someone; where the coloniser declined the work, others took it up, and the sharpest of them understood the stakes exactly. In 1931 Abdelhamid Ben Badis founded the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama, and gave the movement a slogan that is a formation-programme compressed to three clauses:

> *"L'islam est notre religion, l'arabe est notre langue, l'Algérie est notre patrie."*
>
> "Islam is our religion, Arabic is our language, Algeria is our fatherland."

Every clause answers a French claim. Against the *mission civilisatrice*'s offer of French identity: Islam is our religion. Against the *école*'s language of penetration: Arabic is our language. Against the annexation that made Algeria three French departments and the assimilationist who could not find his nation: Algeria is our fatherland. Ben Badis named his method precisely — *"Je combats la colonisation par le savoir,"* I fight colonisation with knowledge — and the Association built a network of free schools, *médersas*, teaching Arabic and Islam and Algerian history to the children the French school had turned away, doing with intent the formation France had withheld. And when Ferhat Abbas published his sentence about the cemeteries, Ben Badis answered it, in his review *Ach-Chihâb* in April 1936, with the counter-formation's founding assertion:

> *"Nous avons cherché dans l'histoire et dans le présent et nous avons constaté que la nation algérienne musulmane s'est formée et existe… elle a son unité religieuse et linguistique ; elle a sa culture, ses traditions et ses caractéristiques… Cette nation n'est pas la France, ne peut pas être la France, et ne veut pas être la France."*
>
> "We have searched in history and in the present and we have established that the Algerian Muslim nation has formed itself and exists… it has its religious and linguistic unity; it has its culture, its traditions and its characteristics… This nation is not France, cannot be France, and does not want to be France."

Where Abbas questioned the graves and found nothing, Ben Badis searched the same history and found a nation — because the two men had been formed by two different schools, and formation determines not only what a man values but, beneath that, *what he can see at all*. The Ulama's médersas were making, out of the majority France had left un-formed, precisely the nation Abbas had been formed unable to perceive. That the counter-formation had done its work is settled by the arc of Abbas himself: the man who wrote that the Algerian fatherland did not exist would, twenty-two years later, become the first president of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic — France's showpiece of successful assimilation, re-formed by history into the head of the state that fought France for independence. The formation France installed in its best pupil did not survive the test.

What the population did when the order was tested

The framework's strongest evidence about formation is not what a population is taught but what it *does* when the order's own legitimacy is put to the test — because a population merely

performing compliance under the floor behaves differently, when the floor weakens, from one for whom the belief is real. French Algeria offers two such tests, and both return the same verdict. The first is the standing referendum of naturalisation: across a hundred and thirty years, offered entry to full French citizenship at the price of renouncing Muslim personal status, fewer than seven thousand Algerian Muslims accepted — a near-total refusal, by the population, of the identity the civilising formation claimed to be conferring on them, and the clearest possible sign that the belief had not taken. The second is the war itself. When the floor finally cracked in 1954, the Muslim majority rose not as a leaderless jacquerie but as a formed nation with a language for itself, a history, and a claim — the nation the *zawiyas* and the médersas and Ben Badis had made in the vacuum, the nation Ferhat Abbas came home to. A population that had genuinely internalised the French order would not have produced that rising; a population held only by the floor, and formed all the while by a rival, did. The revealed behaviour confirms the numbers: French formation, withheld from the majority, never took, and the majority was a nation before France admitted it was even a people.

Reading formation against the framework

French Algeria bends the framework's account of formation in one deep, nameable way. The default picture is that an order installs belief in its core population to make itself cheap and self-policing, and that withholding formation from the population you depend on is close to suicidal. A settler-colonial order inverts this and pays the price knowingly. It cannot form its majority, because the caste settlement forbids admitting them, so it withholds formation from the very population that vastly outnumbers it — installing belief richly in the citizen and the settler, whose loyalty it needs, and holding the majority by the floor and the surveillance-code instead. The result is an order that is permanently expensive (garrison and *indigénat* standing in for the conviction that was never built) and structurally brittle (a rival formation left free to make the majority a nation), and whose characteristic ending is therefore not the gradual widening of the settlement but the war of national liberation — the floor cracking to reveal a people the order had refused to form and could not un-make. The contribution to the framework is this: *formation withheld is not a failure of a colonial order but a structural feature of it, forced by the caste line, and it is the mechanism by which such orders manufacture, in their own majorities, the counter-nation that ends them.*

Two disciplines to close. The quotations are exact and from the public record — Ferry and Clemenceau from the parliamentary debate of July 1885, Ferry's 1879 line on schools, Ferhat Abbas from *L'Entente* of February 1936 and Ben Badis from *Ach-Chihâb* of April 1936, the Ulama's slogan as the Association proclaimed it; the literacy and enrolment figures are the standard scholarly estimates (Colonna, Heggoy, and the modern quantitative literature), given as such. And legibility is not pardon. To see that withholding formation was a rational response to the caste line — cheaper and safer, for the settler order, than forming and admitting the majority — is to explain the ninety-per-cent illiteracy of 1962, not to excuse it; the withheld school is one of the quieter cruelties of the order, and it is counted here as a cruelty even as it is explained as a logic. What the module leaves in view is the shape the case makes plainest: an order that taught

its own children to see a vocation where a conquered people saw a catastrophe, that formed one colonised man so well he lost his own nation and left the rest so un-formed that a rival made them one, and that discovered, in 1954, that the population it had never troubled to convince had been convinced all along — of something else.

A note on sources. Ferry's *"les races supérieures… ont le devoir de civiliser les races inférieures"* and his North-Africa challenge are from his speech to the Chamber of Deputies of 28 July 1885 (*Journal officiel*); *"Des écoles ! des écoles !…"* from his address of 14 May 1879; Clemenceau's reply (*"le nom hypocrite de civilisation"*) from the same 1885 debate — all public-domain parliamentary record. Ferhat Abbas's *"j'ai visité les cimetières, personne ne m'en a parlé"* is from *"La France, c'est moi," L'Entente*, 23 February 1936; Ben Badis's reply (*"la nation algérienne musulmane s'est formée et existe… n'est pas la France…"*) from *Ach-Chihâb*, April 1936; the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama's slogan (1931) and Ben Badis's *"Je combats la colonisation par le savoir"* as proclaimed and reproduced in the movement's record. Louis Rinn's remark on French-teaching as an imposition (1880) is quoted from the scholarship on colonial schooling. The literacy and enrolment figures (c. 2 % of Muslim men literate in French in 1936, c. 5 % in 1954, under 15 % of Muslim school-age children enrolled in 1954, c. 90 % illiteracy at independence) follow Colonna, Heggoy, Benrabah and the modern quantitative literature; the seizure of the *hubus/waqf* and the 1944 compulsory-schooling decree follow the standard educational histories; the count of under 7,000 Muslim naturalisations across the colonial period is as given in Module 2's sourcing. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited; the 1930 centenary and the two ritual calendars are given at the level the argument requires. The cost column of surveillance is developed in Module 5, the plurality question in Module 9, and the war of 1954–62 in Module 10. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

THE PERMIT TO LEAVE

Module 5 · The Cost Column — the surveillance-code that priced a Muslim's every step because the belief was never installed, and the three walls — no land, no permit, no door — that made the order a trap and not a contract

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

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A cost column held high, and what that tells you

The framework's test for how an order holds its ordinary subjects is a ledger and two dials. The ledger is the subject's own: does the benefit of compliance, minus the cost of defection, come out against revolt? And two dials set the terms — how credible the enforcing force is (can it reach him, and does he know it), and whether there is any exit (can he simply leave). Where the belief is thick, the force sits at the margins and the ledger is kept by conviction; where the belief is thin, the cost column is held high by visible force and by surveillance — and, in the words of the framework's own statement of method, surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took. Module 4 established that toward the Muslim majority the belief was never installed. Module 5 shows the consequence exactly where the framework predicts it: an order that could not make its majority believe held them instead by a special penal code that watched and priced their every ordinary act, renewed as a permanent "exception" for sixty years, over a people it had first made unable to leave. The cost column of French Algeria was full to the brim, and its fullness is the standing confession that Module 4 was right.

The apparatus, and where it came from

The code that priced Muslim compliance did not arrive from Paris as republican legislation; it grew straight out of the conquest's own field-discipline, which is the cleanest possible continuity between Module 1's floor and Module 5's cost column. From the first the Algerians were administered by military posts, replaced in 1844 by the *bureaux arabes*, military administrators invested with disciplinary power over the natives — a power reaching, the record notes drily, *"parfois jusqu'à l'exécution sommaire,"* sometimes as far as summary execution. And it was Bugeaud himself, the razzia-general turned governor, who in 1844 issued the first written regulation of that power, listing the punishable acts and the penalties to be applied — an instruction that, in the assessment of the standard history, *"inspirera très largement le code de l'indigénat."* The apparatus that held the Muslim down for a century was the codified afterlife of the conqueror's whip.

Its administrative shape was fixed by a royal ordinance of 1845 that split Algeria into three kinds of territory, and the split is itself a map of the cost column. Where settlers were numerous the land became a *commune de plein exercice*, with an elected colon mayor and an ordinary *juge de paix*.

Where the population was overwhelmingly Muslim it became a *commune mixte*, run not by an elected body but by an appointed French *administrateur* — and from 1888 these administrators were made officers of the judicial police, holding personal disciplinary power over the indigènes in their charge. And the still-unpacified south was *territoire militaire*, what the sources call *"le régime du sabre,"* the rule of the sabre, under the *commandant de cercle*. The ordinary Muslim, then, lived under the discretionary punishing hand of a single French official who was at once his administrator, his policeman, and his judge.

The code, in its own words

The instrument these officials wielded is the *régime de l'indigénat*, and it should be read in its own exact language, because the language is the evidence. Its founding statute, promulgated on 28 June 1881, carries a title that is itself a masterpiece of the legal fiction the framework tells us to name as fiction — a bureaucratic euphemism laid over summary punishment without trial:

> *"Loi qui confère aux administrateurs des communes mixtes en territoire civil la répression, par voie disciplinaire, des infractions spéciales à l'indigénat."*
>
> "Law conferring on the administrators of the mixed communes in civil territory the repression, by disciplinary means, of the special infractions of the indigénat."

Répression par voie disciplinaire — repression by disciplinary means: the phrase does the work of hiding, from a metropolitan reader, that it means fining, jailing, interning, and deporting a man on one official's say-so. The code, as the scholarship summarises the primary text, permitted three penalties to be pronounced *"sans publicité, contradiction ni défense"* — without publicity, without the hearing of the other side, without defence — and without possible appeal: *l'internement*, covering imprisonment, deportation, or forced residence; *le séquestre* of property, which could be collective, reaching a tribe's very land; and *l'amende*, the fine, which could likewise be collective, and which from 1897 could be converted, along with internment, into *journées de travail forcé*, days of forced labour.

And the acts these penalties answered were not crimes in any ordinary sense. A list of twenty-seven special infractions was drawn up in 1874, expanded to forty-one by 1881, and it criminalised, for the Muslim alone, the ordinary motions of life and of dissent. The record preserves the enumerated offences, and they are worth quoting exactly:

> *"réunion sans autorisation ; départ du territoire de la commune sans permis de voyage ; acte irrespectueux ; propos offensant vis-à-vis d'un agent de l'autorité, même en dehors de ses fonctions ; plainte ou réclamation sciemment inexacte ou renouvelée auprès de la même autorité après solution régulière."*
>
> "meeting without authorisation; leaving the territory of the commune without a travel permit; a disrespectful act; an offensive remark to an agent of authority, even outside his functions; a complaint or claim knowingly inaccurate, or renewed to the same authority after a regular resolution."

Read the list for what it forbids. To gather, to move, to speak sharply to an official — *even off duty* — to complain twice: these are the acts of a person with a grievance and the will to voice it,

and every one of them was made punishable, without trial, for the members of one caste. The reach extended into the ritual year Module 4 described: among the enumerated offences was *"la réunion sans autorisation pour zerda, ziara ou autres fêtes religieuses"* — assembly without a permit for the *zerda*, the *ziara*, or other religious festivals — so that even the pilgrimages to the saints' tombs that formed the Muslim year now required the administrator's leave. The surveillance that is the tell of a failed belief reached all the way to the shrine.

The permanent exception

The framework asks whether an order's coercion is exceptional or routine, and the *indigénat* answers with the most telling structure of all: it was written as a temporary exception and kept in force, by deliberate renewal, for the better part of a century. The 1881 law was voted for seven years only; it was then renewed again and again — the laws of 27 June 1888, 25 June 1890, 25 June 1897, 21 December 1904, 24 December 1907, 5 July 1914, 4 August 1920, 11 July 1922, 30 December 1922, and onward, not fully abolished until 1944. An "exception" renewed for sixty-odd years is not an exception; it is the order's permanent penal constitution for its majority, dressed each decade in the language of a passing necessity. And the fiction that it was passing was cut, like every coat in Module 3, for the metropole — for a republic that could not comfortably admit that on soil it had declared three departments of France, governed in the name of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, most of the population lived under a régime the Civil Code explicitly did not reach.

The gap between the two registers is exact and can be set in two lines of the state's own law. In 1865 the *sénatus-consulte* had declared, in the sentence Module 3 quoted, *"L'indigène musulman est français."* In 1881 the same state conferred on an administrator the *"répression, par voie disciplinaire,"* of that same Frenchman for leaving his commune without a permit. *Français*, and punishable without trial for travelling: the two laws describe one person, and the distance between them is the whole colonial information-asymmetry compressed into the statute book — the universal-brotherhood robe of Module 3 laid precisely over the surveillance-floor of Module 5, the word said to Paris and the code applied on the ground.

The two dials: a credible force, and the closing of every exit

Turn to the dials. The force was entirely credible and the subject knew it, because its credibility had been established at the founding and was renewed by a mechanism that made every community a hostage for its members: collective punishment. The *amende collective* and the *séquestre collectif* meant that a tribe or a *douar* could be fined or stripped of its land for the act of individuals — so that revolt was priced not merely in the rebel's own internment or deportation but in the confiscation of his whole group's patrimony. The demonstration case stood in living memory: after the Kabyle rising of 1871, France sequestered more than five hundred thousand hectares of tribal land, levied a crushing collective indemnity, and placed Kabylia under a *régime d'exception* — pricing, in one act, every future revolt in the land of everyone related to a rebel. Behind the code stood the Army of Africa; behind the army stood the memory of the razzia and the sealed caves of the Dahra; and the whole of it was recalled, when needed, in naked form — as it would be again at Sétif in May 1945, whose mass reprisal Module 10 will count. The punishing power could reach the subject, and he knew it.

The other dial — exit — was closed by three walls, and their combination is the specific fact the framework asks a study to close on, the fact that makes this an order a man is trapped in rather than one he consents to. The first wall was economic: the dispossession of Module 2 had made the Muslim majority landless on its own soil, labourers and sharecroppers on ground taken from them, with no independent holding to retreat to, because the cultivable Tell was now settlement or squeezed tribal remnant. A man cannot withdraw from an order into a self-sufficiency that has been legally abolished. The second wall was the one this module is named for: the *permis de voyage*. To leave the territory of his own commune, the Muslim needed a travel permit, and to go without one was a punishable infraction — the law against flight that the framework tells us to look for, here written in plain administrative French. The subject was fixed to his commune the way a settled peasant is fixed to his land, not by geography alone but by a document he had to be granted.

The third wall was the closing of the one legal door out. In principle a Muslim could escape the *indigénat* by naturalisation — but Module 2 counted how few passed through that gate, and Module 5 can now show that the gate was held shut from the far side, by the very administrators who ran the cost column. Jules Ferry, visiting Algiers in 1892 at the head of a senatorial delegation, noted plainly: *"Les administrateurs sont systématiquement opposés à la naturalisation"* — the administrators are systematically opposed to naturalisation. The deputy Albin Rozet described the mechanism to the Chamber on 23 December 1913: an Algerian comes to the administrator or the village mayor and says, *"Je veux me faire naturaliser,"* I want to be naturalised — and the official talks him out of it, warning of the trouble it will bring him. The men who could punish the Muslim without trial were also the men who made sure he could not cease to be punishable. Landless, permit-bound, and barred from the exit even when he sought it — that is a trap, and the word *contract* has no purchase on it. There remained, it is true, one real if partial valve: emigration across the borders, to Tunisia, to Morocco, to the Ottoman east, which some thousands took; but for the mass of a dispossessed and permit-bound peasantry it was closed, and the order rested, as thin-robe orders do, on the plain fact that the ledger came out against revolt because there was nowhere to go and everything to lose.

Reading the cost column against the framework

French Algeria sits at the thin-robe pole of the framework's gradient, and Module 5 is the demonstration. The cost column is held high, visibly, by a special penal code and a standing army rather than by conviction — the exact signature the framework assigns to a belief that failed to become one, and the confirmation, from the coercion side, of Module 4's finding that formation toward the majority was withheld. Two things the case adds to the framework's account of the cost column are worth stating as findings. The first is the *penal caste-code* itself: where an order rules a majority it has chosen not to form and cannot admit, it holds the cost column not with ordinary criminal law but with a parallel, discretionary, summary code applied to one caste alone — criminalising that caste's ordinary movement, assembly, speech, and complaint — and it keeps this code in force under the permanent fiction of a temporary "exception," because the metropolitan audience it must satisfy could not accept the code as its settled law. The second is

the *hostage mechanism*: collective sequestration and collective fines price the individual's defection in the group's whole patrimony, converting the tribe into a standing surety for each of its members and lowering the force needed to hold them all. And the trap-fact the module closes on is the sharpest the corpus has yet met: an order that dispossesses its majority of the land and then criminalises their leaving has built a cage with economic bars and a legal lock, in which "why does he not simply leave" is answered by a permit he cannot get to cross a commune he cannot afford to abandon on soil that is no longer his.

Two disciplines to close. The quotations are exact and from the public record — the 1881 law's title and the enumerated infractions from the reproduced statutory text, Ferry's 1892 note and Rozet's 1913 testimony from the parliamentary and delegation record; the renewal dates and the administrative structure follow the standard legal histories, and modern scholarship (Weil, and the historians of the *indigénat*) is paraphrased. And legibility is not pardon. To reconstruct the cost column as a rational solution to the order's own problem — hold a majority you have refused to form, at the least force compatible with keeping it from citizenship — is to explain why the *permis de voyage* and the collective fine existed, not to grant that a people should have needed a permit to bury their dead within the week or to walk to the next town. The standing extraction that ran on top of this coercion — the *impôts arabes*, the labour days — belongs to Module 6, and the moment the cost column finally failed to Module 10. What Module 5 records is the plain machinery of the trap: a code that watched, a force that could reach, and three walls that meant the ledger, for the ordinary subject, came out where the order needed it — against the rising it had given him every reason to want.

A note on sources. The title and provisions of the *loi du 28 juin 1881* (*"la répression, par voie disciplinaire, des infractions spéciales à l'indigénat"*), the three penalties (*internement, séquestre, amende*, collective and — from 1897 — convertible to forced labour), the summary procedure *"sans publicité, contradiction ni défense"* and without appeal, and the enumerated special infractions (meeting without authorisation; departure without a *permis de voyage*; *acte irrespectueux*; offensive remarks to an agent of authority even off duty; the knowingly inaccurate or renewed complaint; assembly without permit for *zerda*, *ziara* or other religious festivals) are quoted from the reproduced statutory and regulatory text (the *arrêté* of 9 February 1875 and the 1881 law, via the standard reproductions and the *Indigénat* legal-historical literature). The origin in military discipline and Bugeaud's 1844 instruction, the 1845 tripartite administrative division, the disciplinary powers of the *administrateurs des communes mixtes* (officers of judicial police from 1888), and the schedule of renewals to 1944 follow the standard histories. Ferry's *"Les administrateurs sont systématiquement opposés à la naturalisation"* (Algiers, 1892) and Albin Rozet's testimony to the Chamber of Deputies of 23 December 1913 are quoted as reproduced in that literature. The 1871 collective sequestration figure is as given in Module 2's sourcing; the count of fewer than 7,000 Muslim naturalisations and the emigration valve are likewise as previously sourced. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited. The *impôts arabes* and forced-labour extraction are developed in Module 6; Sétif (May 1945) and the failure of the cost column in Module 10. *Part*

of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

THE FIFTH

Module 6 · Extraction — the sharecropper who kept a fifth where a European kept a half, the tax that vanished the moment a Muslim's field passed to a settler, and a surplus pushed to the bone because every exit had already been shut

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

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Extraction sits where the two dials put it

The framework reads extraction through one governing idea: the stable rate is not set by the extractor's greed or restraint but by the revolt threshold, and the threshold is set by two dials. The first is the credibility of the punishing force — the surer the punishment, the lower the share the extractor can leave and still be obeyed, because terror buys extraction. The second is the availability of exit — where the subject can walk away, the rate must stay bearable to keep him; where every door is shut, the floor sinks toward the biological bone, the rate of the plantation and the mine, held down only by the point past which the worker starves and cannot work. Module 5 established that for the Algerian Muslim both dials were turned to their stops: a credible force backed by collective punishment, and an exit closed by three walls. The framework therefore predicts, before a single figure is gathered, where the extraction rate in French Algeria should sit — at the bone. Module 6 gathers the figures, and they confirm the prediction with a precision that is itself the finding: a dual, racially split régime of rent, tax, and labour, pushed as low as the closed exits allowed, legitimated as tradition and as development, drained outward to the settler and the metropole, and tipping into open famine whenever a shock struck a population the extraction had already stripped to subsistence.

The rent: a fifth where a European kept a half

Start with the land, because the land is where the dispossession of Module 2 turns into a standing income. The Muslim stripped of his field did not vanish; he stayed and worked it for its new owner, and the dominant form of that work was the *khammès*. The word is its own indictment. A European sharecropper was a *métayer* — from the Greek *meta*, half — and kept, as the name says, half the crop. The Maghribi sharecropper was a *khammès* — from the Arabic *khamsé*, five — and kept a fifth. A nineteenth-century description of the arrangement in the Mitidja states the contrast in a single sentence:

> *"De même que l'expression de métayer (du mot grec meta, moitié) signifie cultivateur à moitié du produit de la terre, le mot arabe khammas (du mot khamsé, cinq) signifie cultivateur au cinquième."*
>
> "Just as the word *métayer* (from the Greek *meta*, half) means one who cultivates for half the produce of the land, the Arabic word *khammas* (from the word *khamsé*, five) means one who cultivates for a fifth."

Four-fifths to the owner, one-fifth to the man who did the work: this is extraction near the bone by the plain arithmetic of the fraction. And it was held there by a debt. The owner advanced the *khammès* a *sarmia* — money and goods to keep him and his family alive from sowing to harvest, because a man kept on a fifth cannot survive the year on his own — and the *khammès* could not leave for another master until the *sarmia* was repaid; if he moved, the new master reimbursed the old and inherited the debt. The individual laborer was thus bound to the estate by exactly the mechanism Module 5 named at the level of the whole population: the closed exit, here written as a debt he entered simply by needing to eat. Modern scholarship (Bourdieu, Nouschi) traces the consequence: as the dispossession of the land-law cascade advanced, the ranks of the *khammès* and the landless day-labourers swelled, so that on the eve of the First World War a growing share of the rural Muslim population lived on a fifth of what it grew or on the day-wage of the colon estate — the vineyard wage, on ground that had been theirs, to raise a crop they were forbidden by their faith to drink.

The tax: a levy on being Muslim

Beside the rent stood the tax, and the tax was where the racial split was written most nakedly into law. France inherited from the Turkish regime a set of levies on the Muslim population — the *achour* on crops, the *zekkat* on herds, and the regional *hockor*, *lezma*, *el-gherama*, *eussa*, *hak-el-chabir*, and *hak-el-burnous* — and, rather than fold them into a single tax on all inhabitants, it kept them as the *impôts arabes*, the "Arab taxes," levied on the natives alone. The administration knew the system was bad on its own terms; the scholarship records its assessment that the *impôts arabes* were unproductive, fell unequally on the taxpayers, and even discouraged cultivation — and it kept them anyway, reforming their collection in the ordinances of 1839 and 1845 only to make them yield more reliably, because their vice, that they fell on the Muslim, was from the settlement's point of view their virtue.

The clearest proof that these were a tax on the person and not on the property is the behaviour of the *achour* when the land changed hands, described exactly in a survey of the Algerian fiscal regime from the turn of the twentieth century:

> *"S'il la vend à un Européen, l'impôt s'évanouit ; mais… si plus tard un Européen revend la même terre à un indigène, l'impôt reste [dû]."*
>
> "If he [the native] sells it [the land] to a European, the tax vanishes; but… if later a European sells the same land back to a native, the tax remains due."

The identical field, the identical soil, was taxed in Muslim hands and untaxed in European hands. The *achour* did not attach to the land; it attached to the Muslim who held it, and evaporated the instant the land passed to a settler. A clearer statement that the fiscal system was a levy on caste rather than on wealth could not be written, and it was written by the colony's own administration.

The disproportion this produced is legible in the figures the financial statistics allow to be reconstructed. In the Constantinois of the 1920s and 1930s, the *impôts arabes* with their surcharges formed the single largest block of local direct taxation — on the order of six and a half million

francs — while the direct contributions of the European population (property tax and the like) came to something under a million; the Muslims paid the great majority of the *prestation* labour-tax and a heavy share of the market dues, and bore besides the regressive indirect taxes on the sugar and tea that were the staples of the poor. When in 1934 the colonial Financial Delegations voted to raise the duties on sugar and tea, deputies in the Chamber said plainly what was happening: *"on sacrifiait les Indigènes aux Européens"* — the natives were being sacrificed to the Europeans. The extraction's shape was known and named, at the time, in the metropole's own parliament.

And it was legitimated, as extraction always is, by a story cut for whoever would hear it. Toward the metropole and toward the Muslim alike, the *impôts arabes* wore the robe of tradition: the *achour* was the Quranic *ushr*, the *zekkat* the Quranic *zakat*, and so the colony could present its racial tax as merely the continuation of the levies Islam itself imposed — a tax the Muslim "had always paid," dressed in the vocabulary of his own faith even as its yield funded a settler colony and its incidence fell on him alone.

The labour, and the drain outward

The third mechanism was labour taken directly. The *prestation* obliged the native to a set of days' work on the roads, or their monetary equivalent, and the *indigénat* of Module 5 supplied a further stream, converting from 1897 its fines and internments into *journées de travail forcé* — days of forced labour extracted as punishment for the caste-offences of moving, meeting, or complaining. The Muslim owed his body's labour to the order in a way the settler did not.

And the surplus that rent, tax, and labour pulled from the Muslim majority did not stay to enrich the country it was taken from; it drained outward and upward, which is the mark of a colonial extraction as against a merely exploitative domestic one. It flowed up to the *grands colons* — the few thousand great proprietors who, Module 2 counted, held the overwhelming majority of settler land and controlled the colony's agriculture, mining, and trade — and it flowed out to metropolitan France, for which Algeria was market and supplier both. Its emblem was the wine: the vineyards that by 1914 occupied something like half the European holdings and produced the largest share of the colony's agricultural value, worked by *khammès* and day-labourers on ground taken from Muslims, to be shipped to and drunk in a France whose own vines the phylloxera had killed. The fifth stayed in Algeria, in the labourer's hut; the four-fifths went to the *grand colon*'s cellar and the Marseille quay.

Just enough — and the bone beneath it

Now read the whole against the framework's "just enough," and the case does something sharper than illustrate the rule: it shows the rule's lower limit, the point where "just enough" becomes "not enough," written in the demographic record. Because both dials were at their stops — a credible force with collective punishment, and an exit closed by dispossession, permit, and barred naturalisation — the extraction could be, and was, pushed to the bone: a fifth of the crop, a caste tax on the dispossessed, a regressive duty on the poor's sugar. A population held permanently at the edge of subsistence has no reserve, and so when a shock

arrived the extraction had already spent the margin that might have absorbed it. The shock came in the late 1860s — drought, locusts, and a failed harvest — and fell on a rural society the conquest, the sequestrations, and the *impôts arabes* had already stripped of its cushion, and the result was catastrophe: the famine and epidemics of 1866 to 1868 are reckoned to have killed on the order of three hundred thousand to half a million people, and the Muslim population, some three million at the conquest, stood around two and a half million by the early 1870s. The famine is not a departure from the extraction régime; it is the extraction régime meeting a bad year with no margin left, the signature of an order that had turned both dials to the stop and left its subjects living on the fifth. This is the framework's "just enough" seen at its floor — the point past which just-enough tips into the mass death that the plantation logic always risks when it prices the worker at the bone and a drought does the rest.

Reading extraction against the framework

French Algeria confirms the framework's account of extraction with unusual exactness and bends it in the colonial direction. The confirmation is the two-dial mechanism working as predicted: both dials at their stops, extraction consequently at the bone, and famine as the demographic proof that the dials were indeed maxed — terror and closed exits buying an extraction so deep that a single bad harvest became mass death. The bend is threefold, and worth naming as the shape of a colonial extraction. First, it is racially split: not one rate on all subjects but a heavy régime for the conquered — the *khammès*'s fifth, the *impôts arabes*, the *prestation* — beside a light one for the settler, the split written into the tax law so plainly that the same field is taxed in one man's hands and untaxed in another's. Second, it is drained outward: the surplus does not recycle within the colony as a domestic elite's spending might, but flows up to the *grands colons* and out to the metropole, so that the "development" the home audience is shown — the vineyards, the roads, the ports, all of them real — is funded by an extraction that keeps the producers at subsistence, and the colony's balance sheet reads as prosperity precisely because the cost is borne by a population the balance sheet does not count. Third, it is legitimated by a doubled story — tradition toward the tax (the Quranic *ushr* and *zakat* reworn as the *impôts arabes*) and development toward the whole (the *mise en valeur*) — which lets the metropole read an export ledger where the ground held a fifth and a famine.

Two disciplines close the module. The quotations are exact and from the public record — the nineteenth-century definition of the *khammès*, the turn-of-the-century survey's account of the *achour* that *"s'évanouit,"* the 1934 Chamber's *"on sacrifiait les Indigènes aux Européens"* — and the fiscal figures and famine mortality are the standard scholarly reconstructions (the financial-statistics literature, Nouschi, Kateb), given as such and marked where approximate. And legibility is not pardon, and here the discipline has a specific name: the case tempts the conqueror's syllogism — *the colony was developed, therefore the extraction was justified* — and the refusal is to credit the development at full weight (the vineyards and roads and ports were real, and Module 11 will count them) while insisting in the same breath that they were built on an extraction that held the builders at a fifth and let a drought kill half a million. The famine dead belong to that later accounting; the moment the extraction finally helped crack the floor belongs to Module 10.

What Module 6 records is the rate itself and where it sat: at the bone, because every exit had been shut first, drained outward to a metropole shown a ledger of prosperity it was never asked to reconcile with the fifth.

A note on sources. The definition of the *khammès* as cultivator for a fifth, against the *métayer*'s half, and the *sarmia* advance that bound him, are quoted and drawn from the nineteenth-century descriptions of the arrangement in the Mitidja and the standard scholarship on Algerian sharecropping (Bourdieu, *Sociologie de l'Algérie*; Nouschi, *Enquête sur le niveau de vie des populations rurales constantinoises*). The *impôts arabes* and their components (*achour*, *zekkat*, *hockor*, *lezma*, and the rest), the retention and reform of the Turkish fiscal legacy (ordinances of 1839 and 1845), and the *achour* that *"s'évanouit"* when land passed to a European are from the period fiscal literature (Vialatte, *Des impôts directs en Algérie*, 1879; *Le Régime de l'Algérie au début du XXe siècle*) and the legal-historical work on the *impôts arabes* (Dumoulin). The Constantinois fiscal figures of the 1920s–30s and the 1934 deputies' *"on sacrifiait les Indigènes aux Européens"* follow the specialist study of French taxation and Muslim contributors in the Constantinois; the *prestation* and the *indigénat*'s forced-labour conversion are as in Module 5's sourcing. The drain to the *grands colons* and the wine-export economy is as sourced in Module 2; the famine of 1866–68 (roughly 300,000–500,000 dead; the Muslim population falling from about three million toward two and a half million) follows the demographic literature (Kateb; Nouschi) and is developed further in Module 11. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited; the standing coercion that held this extraction in place is Module 5, and the collapse it fed is Module 10. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

WRITTEN AND CORRECTED IN ALGIERS

Module 7 · Information and Suppression — the interpreter's chokepoint held twice over: the pulpit that preached what Algiers wrote, and the news that Paris was allowed to read — two ends of one seam, and the order's central task of keeping them from meeting

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

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One seam, split in two by a sea

The framework calls the trusted-information leg the seam — the chokepoint where a population depends for its picture of reality on an interpreter it cannot check — and names it the leg the other two monopolies exist partly to defend, because a rival voice at the seam can undo with a sentence what the floor and the settlement hold by force and wealth. In an ordinary order the seam is single: one interpreter class, one population, one story to police. The colonial order splits the seam in two and sets the halves on opposite shores of a sea, and Module 7's whole argument is that this split is the defining feature of colonial information-management and that keeping the two halves from meeting is the order's central task. On the near shore is the chokepoint over the conquered — the mosque, the imam, the sermon, the school, the native press — which France worked to capture so that the Muslim would hear only what consolidated the order. On the far shore is the chokepoint over the metropole — the despatch, the newspaper, the photograph, the parliamentary answer — which France worked to manage so that the Frenchman would see only the monument and never the cemetery. And the two halves are not separate problems; they are the same reality seen from the two sides of the sea. What was suppressed toward Paris — the razzia, the smoking-out, the massacre, the torture — was exactly what the conquered knew from their own lives. What was suppressed among the conquered — the doctrine of human equality, the existence of a nation, the injustice of the caste — was exactly what Paris was kept from hearing in the conquered's own voice. Let the two ends of the seam meet, and the robe of Modules 3 and 4 cracks. The order's deepest information task, for a hundred and thirty years, was to hold them apart.

The near shore: capturing the pulpit

France did not need the Muslim to believe the order rightful, as Module 4 established, but it did need the mosque not to preach against it — and better still, to preach for it. So it took the chokepoint. The principal mosques were classed into the domain of the State; a commission for the administration of the mosques, created in 1870, took the monopoly of appointing the cult's personnel and managing its finances; and the imams who served the urban mosques were made, in effect, paid officials of the colony — some four hundred of them, in the estimate of the scholarship on French religious policy, holding the status of quasi-*fonctionnaires* with one crucial

condition attached, that they could be dismissed *"à la moindre incartade,"* at the slightest misstep. A salaried interpreter dismissible at will is an interpreter who preaches what the paymaster wishes, and the paymaster did not leave the wish to chance. The single most telling detail in the whole apparatus is that the Friday sermons of these mosques were, as the same scholarship records, *"écrits et corrigés à Alger"* — written and corrected in Algiers — so that the word the believer heard from the pulpit as the word of his faith was in its substance the word of the colonial administration. This is the inflow valve of the framework in its purest recorded form: not merely a captured interpreter but a scripted one, the state composing the sermon and the imam reading it, until, in the phrase of the historians, the mosque-Islam of the colony became *"un formidable moyen de propagande à même de consolider l'ordre colonial"* — a formidable means of propaganda fit to consolidate the colonial order.

The capture wore, in the twentieth century, the mask of its opposite. When France separated Church and State in 1905, the great law of *laïcité* was extended to Algeria by a decree whose conditions — full French citizenship required of the officers of any cult association — excluded the non-citizen Muslims from its benefit while leaving the administration's grip on the Muslim cult in place, so that the state kept its salaried imams and its domanial mosques in the very act of professing to withdraw from religion. The historian Raberh Achi has shown the sharpest turn of the screw: in colonial Algeria the administrative category "separation of Church and State" was constituted as *"une rubrique informative de contrôle"* — a heading under which the intelligence service of the government-general filed its surveillance of Islam. *Laïcité*, the metropole's principle of the state's neutrality toward belief, became in the colony an instrument for watching and steering belief. The same word meant withdrawal at home and control abroad, which is the seam's signature: one vocabulary, two audiences, opposite functions.

The near shore: starving the rival

The inflow valve feeds the authorised reading; the outflow valve starves the rival, and France worked it hard, because a captured pulpit is only as safe as the absence of an uncaptured one. The brotherhoods — the *zawiyas* and Sufi orders that Module 1's landscape identified as the true formative institutions of Algerian Islam — were the first rival, and after the great confrérie-led rising of 1871 they were placed, in the words of the religious-policy literature, under *"une extrême surveillance"* of the administration. The surveillance was made scientific: Louis Rinn, chief of the native-affairs service, published in 1884 his *Marabouts et Khouan*, a detailed mapping of the Sufi networks of Algeria whose administrative purpose was to know them in order to divide them, setting order against order — Qadiriyya against Tijaniyya — so that no unified religious authority could form across them. To surveil the interpreter, and to keep the interpreters divided, is to hold the outflow valve shut by knowledge.

But the seam, the framework insists, cannot be emptied: suppress one occupant and the choke-point does not close, it clears for another, often a more oppositional one — and French Algeria demonstrates the law across a century. The co-opted marabout and the scripted imam produced, in reaction, the reformist *ulama* of Module 4 — Ben Badis and his Association, founded in 1931 — whose message was precisely the one the order could least afford to have preached, for the

ulama taught not only the brotherhood of Muslims but, in their own words, *"le respect pour tout le genre humain… l'égalité absolue au point de vue de la dignité humaine et des droits humains entre tous les hommes, sans distinction de race ni de couleur"* — the absolute equality in human dignity and rights of all men, without distinction of race or colour. In a colony built on a caste line, a pulpit preaching racial equality was a fire to be put out, and France reached for the outflow valve. In 1930 it created departmental advisory committees of the cult to counter the *ulama*'s influence; and on 16 February 1933 the prefecture of Algiers issued the circular that bears the name of its author, Michel, ordering the close surveillance of the reformers and forbidding the reformist *ulama* to preach in the domanial mosques, reserving the pulpits for the *"clergé officiel"* — the official clergy — the ban aimed above all at the eloquent Cheikh el-Oqbi. When preaching was closed to them, the *ulama* answered with the *médersas* and the press of Module 4; and when the press became dangerous, the reformist review *al-Shihâb* was ended, like so much else, by the wartime censorship of 1939. Each closure of the valve bred a more determined occupant of the seam — marabout to reformer to, in the end, the men of 1954 — exactly as the framework says it must.

The far shore: the founding management of the metropole's eyes

Cross now to the other end of the seam, the chokepoint over what the metropole was permitted to see, and begin where Module 3 began, because the founding instance is the template for everything after. The floor of the conquest operated in a candour the field officers set down in their own letters — Montagnac's dogs, Bugeaud's foxes, Saint-Arnaud's *"vaste cimetière"* — and the management of the seam was set down in the same hand. Saint-Arnaud instructed his brother exactly how a massacre should travel to Paris: in *"un rapport confidentiel… sans poésie terrible ni images,"* a confidential report stripped of the vividness that would let the home reader feel it; and he named the enemy of the seam with a soldier's clarity — not the Arab, but *"vos journalistes de Paris,"* the Paris journalists who might let the metropole see. Behind him the machinery moved to hold the seam: the War Minister, Marshal Soult, tried to bury Pélissier's report of the Dahra; the government kept Horace Vernet painting the heroic canvases that were the authorised image of the African war. When the seam cracked — through *l'Akhbar* of Algiers and the prince de la Moskowa's interpellation of 11 July 1845 — it was resealed: the government defended the officers, the scandal faded, and the men of the Dahra kept their careers, Saint-Arnaud rising to Marshal of France and Minister of War. The template is complete in that first episode: the floor operates raw, the metropole is fed the monument, and when a rival account forces the seam briefly open, the other two monopolies move in to reseal it — the defence of the officers by the state, the survival of the careers, the fading of the news.

The far shore: the same date, two realities

The template held, and its most terrible demonstration came a century later, on a single date that is the whole of Module 7 in one image. On 8 May 1945 — the very day the metropole celebrated the victory over Nazi barbarism, the defeat of the racial order France had just helped to destroy in Europe — the floor in Algeria opened fire. At Sétif a march of some ten thousand celebrating the same victory turned, when a young Muslim scout raised the forbidden Algerian

flag, into a repression that spread to Guelma and Kherrata and ran until late June, the aircraft strafing the *douars* from the air; the reckonings of the dead range from several thousand to tens of thousands of Algerians against a hundred and two Europeans, and there was no trial to fix the number or the fault. And the seam held. The handling of the massacre was, in the assessment of the historians, facilitated by the censorship regime still in force in May 1945 over everything touching the army and national defence, so that the metropole which was dancing for the fall of one racial tyranny was not shown the mass killing its own army was carrying out under another. Sétif is remembered on its two shores as two different days — in France a day of victory, in Algeria a day of massacre — and the fact that one date could be two days is the seam's work made visible: the reality the conquered lived in their own streets, and the reality the metropole was permitted to hold, kept from meeting by a wartime blackout, on the same afternoon.

The far shore: the war for the seam

By 1954 the men the closed seam had bred understood the seam better than their rulers did, and the war that began that year was, as much as a war for territory, a war to force the seam open — to make the floor of French Algeria visible to the metropole whose belief the robe required and to a watching world. The state answered with an information war of its own, and its instruments are the outflow valve at full extension. A censorship commission decided what the press might print; newspapers were seized — the first seizure, in August 1955, fell on a report that the artillery-razed hamlets of the Constantinois were still inhabited, carried with a photograph of the Philippeville killing, and the journalist was expelled from Algeria — and where an article was cut the paper appeared with the space left white, the *éditions blanches* that printed a blank where the suppressed truth had been, advertising by their emptiness that something was being kept from the reader. During the Battle of Algiers of 1957, General Massu's paratroopers, holding police powers, practised torture and summary execution on a scale one of their own officials, Paul Teitgen, measured at more than three thousand disappearances in a single year. The tortured man's testimony was itself suppressed: Henri Alleg's account of his own torture, written from prison, was seized and banned by the authorities — the state reaching in to close the valve on the victim's own words. And the seam was resealed, where it could be, by violence: Maurice Audin, the young mathematician arrested in the same operation, was tortured to death and then declared by the army to have escaped — the witness killed and the record falsified in one motion — and when, decades on, the lie was undone, it was the amnesty of 1962 that had by then protected the men who did it.

But the war for the seam is where the framework's law that a seam cannot be emptied finally broke the order, because the suppression backfired. The frenzy of censorship, the historians of the period judge, amplified the very awareness it was meant to smother; the blank pages and the banned books and the disappeared witnesses told the metropole, more loudly than any article, that there was something its state did not want it to see. The exposure came not through the captured channels but around them — through Pierre Vidal-Naquet's dossier on the Audin affair, through the mathematicians who staged Audin's doctoral defence in absentia and made

his death an intellectual scandal, through the smuggled and reprinted testimony, through the FLN's carrying of the question to the United Nations and the world's press. The conquered had forced the two ends of the seam to meet at last: the reality they had lived under the floor — the massacre, the torture, the disappearance — reached, past the pulpit and the censor, the metropolitan and world audience whose belief the whole robe depended on. And once the two ends met, neither the floor nor the settlement could reseal the seam, because the thing that had been kept apart for a hundred and thirty years — what was done in the colony, and what was believed at home — was apart no longer.

Reading the seam against the framework

French Algeria confirms both of the framework's hardest claims about the seam and adds the colonial structure to them. It confirms that the seam is the leg the other two monopolies exist to defend: every time the seam was forced — at the Dahra, at Sétif, in the war — violence and wealth moved to reseal it, defending the officers, burying the reports, expelling the journalists, torturing the witnesses, amnestying the torturers, keeping the painter at his heroic canvases. And it confirms that the seam cannot be emptied: each suppression of an interpreter cleared the chokepoint for a more oppositional one — the divided marabout for the co-opted, the reformist *alim* for the marabout, the fighter of 1954 for the *alim* — so that the order manufactured, at its own chokepoint, the successive rival voices that ended it. The contribution the case makes is the colonial double-seam itself: a seam split by geography into two chokepoints, one over the conquered and one over the metropole, which are not two seams but the two ends of one, because the reality suppressed at each end is the reality the other end already holds — the massacre Paris is not shown is the massacre Algeria has survived, the equality the pulpit may not preach is the equality Paris is not told the colonised demand. The order's central and defining information task is to keep those two ends from meeting; and the case's deepest finding, the one that carries into Module 10, is that such an order ends not when its floor is beaten — the unarmed never beat an intact army — but when the seam is forced open, when the conquered's own testimony finally reaches, in the conquered's own voice, the far audience whose belief the robe was cut to hold.

Two disciplines to close. The primary quotations are exact and public-domain — Saint-Arnaud and the prince de la Moskowa from the Dahra record, the *ulama*'s own words on human equality — while the mechanisms of cult-control (the domanial mosques, the salaried and dismissible imams, the sermons *"écrits et corrigés à Alger,"* the circular of 16 February 1933 reserving the pulpits to the *"clergé officiel"*), the Sétif toll, and the war-era censorship (the seizures, the *éditions blanches*, the Alleg and Audin affairs) are the standard scholarly reconstructions (Rinn as period source; Achi, Ageron, Vidal-Naquet, and the historians of 1945 and of the war paraphrased and briefly quoted), the twentieth-century testimony being handled by paraphrase as recent and copyrighted. And legibility is not pardon. To lay out the machinery of the seam — the written sermon, the buried report, the blank page, the killed witness — is to show how the order kept its two realities from meeting, not to grant that they should have been kept apart; and the method of the showing is the method of the whole study, to set the two ends side by side in their own

words — the victory in Paris and the massacre in Algeria on the one date, the sermon written in Algiers and the *alim* forbidden the pulpit, the monument and the cemetery — and to leave the reader to close a distance the order spent a century holding open. The full course of the forcing-open, and the war that carried it, belong to Module 10. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

A note on sources. On the near shore: the classing of the principal mosques into the State domain, the 1870 commission for the administration of the mosques, the roughly four hundred salaried imams dismissible *"à la moindre incartade,"* the sermons *"écrits et corrigés à Alger,"* and Islam as *"un formidable moyen de propagande…"* follow the scholarship on French religious policy in colonial Algeria (the *Genèses* and *Année du Maghreb* literature, the areion24 synthesis) and are briefly quoted from it; the *laïcité*-as-control point and the 1905 law's colonial application follow Raberh Achi. Louis Rinn's *Marabouts et Khouan* (1884) is the period source for the mapping-to-divide of the brotherhoods, placed under *"extrême surveillance"* after 1871. The *ulama*'s words on racial equality, the departmental cult-committees of 1930, the circulaire Michel of 16 February 1933 reserving the domanial pulpits to the *"clergé officiel"* and aimed at el-Oqbi, and the ending of *al-Shihâb* by wartime censorship in 1939 follow the literature on the Association of Algerian Muslim *Ulama* and Module 4's sourcing. On the far shore: the Dahra material (Saint-Arnaud's *"rapport confidentiel… sans poésie terrible ni images"* and *"vos journalistes de Paris,"* Soult's suppression, the Moskowa interpellation of 11 July 1845) is as sourced in Modules 1 and 3. Sétif–Guelma–Kherrata (8 May–late June 1945; several thousand to tens of thousands of Algerian dead against 102 Europeans; the facilitation by the standing military censorship) follows the historians of the massacre (Rey-Goldzeiguer, Planche, Peyroulou, Vétillard, Mekhaled) and the "day of victory / day of massacre" framing of that literature. The war-era censorship (the censorship commission, the 1955 seizure and the *éditions blanches*, the Battle of Algiers, Teitgen's disappearance count, the seizure of Alleg's *La Question*, and the Audin affair with Vidal-Naquet's dossier) follows the standard histories and is paraphrased as recent and largely copyrighted material. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited; the full course of the war is Module 10. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

THE EMPEROR OF THE ARABS

Module 8 · Elite Coordination and the Default — the seam inside the colonial elite between the soldiers who would preserve the natives in order to rule them and the settlers who would dispossess them, the settler victory of 1870 that set the order's shape, and the Menu family a colony draws

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

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The open problem, in a colony

Everything to this point has engineered the solved problem. Modules 1 through 7 reconstructed how French Algeria held its Muslim majority down — the floor, the settlement, the reversed robe, the withheld formation, the surveillance-code, the extraction at the bone, the managed seam — and the framework's central claim about that whole apparatus is that it is, however costly, reliable: a floor credible enough and a population penned enough will be held, and the rising of the unarmed against an intact army loses with the regularity of a law. The surprises do not live there. They live one level up, inside the hierarchy, where the framework locates the problem with no reliable solution: a centre needs capable men to exist, and the capacity that makes a man useful is the capacity that would let him replace the centre. Modules 8 and 9 run that problem, and the Field Manual asks for the sharpest attention here, because this is where a case stops explaining itself and starts to surprise.

A colony bends the open problem into an unusual shape, and naming the shape is the first task. The hierarchy of French Algeria was not a single court with a single succession to manage; it was a dual apex split across a sea. At one end stood the metropolitan state — the government, the ministries, the army command in Paris — which held the ultimate floor and for which Algeria was, among other things, a place to send men. At the other stood the colonial elite on the ground, itself divided into rival blocs: the army and its native-affairs officers, the *Bureaux Arabes*; the settlers, ranging from the great proprietors to the poor whites; the civilian administration of governor-general, prefects, and *administrateurs*; and beneath them the co-opted native intermediaries, the *caïds* and *béni-oui-oui* of Module 2. The open problem in such a structure is not mainly the classic one of a capable subordinate seizing the throne. It is the contest between elite factions over *what kind of colony to run* — and, running beneath that, the question of whether the settlers on the ground would remain the instrument of the metropole or become a power that could defy it. Module 8's argument is that the colonial elite cohered by the ordinary default, drew a nameable blend from the Menu, and carried one real internal seam whose resolution set the order's entire shape — and that the deeper fracture lines the resolution left unhealed are what Module 10 will watch crack.

The default, and why the settler meant it

Begin with the framework's first question: does the order reproduce *by default* — each beneficiary defending the whole simply by defending his own position, with no cabal required? In French Algeria the default ran with unusual force, because the positions were unusually total. The settler's land, his citizenship, his standing above the Muslim, and his physical safety as a member of a minority all rested on the colonial order entire; to defend his farm was to defend the floor, the settlement, the caste line, and the army in one motion, and he needed to coordinate with no one to do it. The officer's career and honour were staked on the conquest he had made; the administrator's power ran through the very *indigénat* he enforced; the *caïd*'s office was a spoil of the order that appointed him. Each defended the whole by defending his own place, which is the quiet engine the framework says drives every durable hierarchy — no conspiracy, only positions doing what positions do.

And the framework's companion point, from its account of how a built order becomes a believed one, applies here with a sharpness the twentieth century would make lethal: the settler's defence was not cynical, it was sincere. French Algeria is young enough that its architecture is fully documented — we hold the land-laws, the parliamentary debates, the officers' letters, the receipts of intentional design that Modules 1 through 7 quoted — and yet formation had, across three or four settler generations, converted that built order into the settler's genuine world. The *pied-noir* did not experience Algeria as a conquest he benefited from; he experienced it as his country, made by his grandparents' sweat out of a land he was taught had been empty or barbarous, and he would in the end defend that sincere conviction against France itself, to the point of terror against his own mother-country. This is the framework's architect-and-inheritor logic in a compressed, visible form: the order was built by deliberate men, became real to those formed inside it, and was defended by them by default and in good faith — all three true at once, which is exactly what made the bloc so hard, later, to move.

The seam: the Emperor of the Arabs against the settlers

The default holds a bloc together; it does not tell you which of two programmes the bloc will pursue when its factions want different things. And the colonial elite of Algeria wanted, for most of a century, two different colonies — the one genuine, load-bearing seam inside the apex, and the axis on which the whole order turned.

On one side stood the army and its *Bureaux Arabes*, and behind them, for a time, the throne. Their instinct was to preserve Algerian Muslim society and rule it through its own co-opted hierarchy, because a preserved and pacified native order was cheaper to govern, was the army's own domain of power against the encroaching civilians, and drew on a genuine Orientalist attachment among officers who had spent careers among "their" tribes. This instinct found its patron in Napoleon III, whose policy of the *royaume arabe* — inspired by the Saint-Simonian and convert-to-Islam Ismaÿl Urbain — set the paternalist programme at the summit of the state. The Emperor put it to his governor-general, Pélissier, in a letter of 6 February 1863, in words that are the charter of the losing faction:

> *"Les indigènes ont droit égal à ma protection comme les colons. Je suis aussi bien l'empereur des Arabes que des Français."*
>
> "The natives have an equal right to my protection as the colonists. I am as much the emperor of the Arabs as of the French."

From this stance came the protective face of the *sénatus-consulte* of 1863, which recognised the tribes as owners even as it began dissolving their tenure, and the nationality *sénatus-consulte* of 1865 with its offer, however hollow, that *"l'indigène musulman est français."* The paternalist faction would hold the natives *within* the order, as protected subjects ruled through their chiefs.

On the other side stood the settlers, and their programme was the opposite: the land, and the natives off it or under foot. They regarded the army's protectiveness as robbery of their birthright, and their spokesman Auguste Warnier attacked the 1863 measure precisely for having, as Module 2 recorded, "granted" the natives seven hundred thousand hectares that ought to have been open to purchase. The settlers wanted civilian control of the colony and its full assimilation to France as departments — so that they, not the soldiers, would run it — and they wanted the caste line drawn hard, not softened by an emperor styling himself the protector of Arabs.

The seam was cut, decisively and from outside, by a metropolitan shock. The defeat of 1870 destroyed the Second Empire, discredited the army, and removed the paternalist faction's patron at a stroke — and the settler programme carried in a rush under the new Third Republic. The Crémieux Decree naturalised the Jews *en masse* (a measure, the record notes, "décidée contre l'administration coloniale"); civilian *colon* authority was extended over the tribal reserves, helping trigger the Mokrani rising of 1871; the crushing of that rising brought the great sequestration and the settlement of the land on European hands; the Warnier Law of 1873 finished the legal machinery of dispossession; and the *indigénat* was codified in 1881, with civilian rule replacing military rule across the settled north. The Emperor of the Arabs was gone, and the settlers had their Algérie française. The seam had resolved for the settlers, and — this is the module's load-bearing finding — that resolution set the order's entire subsequent shape: the caste line hardened, the extraction deepened, and the thin co-optation of the native hierarchy the paternalists had favoured was abandoned for pure dispossession-and-caste. The road the colony did not take was the Emperor's; the road it took was Warnier's.

Classifying against the Menu

The Field Manual asks that the case be classified explicitly against the Menu of solutions to the open problem, with the evidence stated, and French Algeria draws a nameable blend that shifts across the seam just described.

For the **metropole**, Algeria was an instance of **Export**. France, like every order that forms more elite claimants than it can seat, generated a standing surplus of ambitious men — officers who could not rise fast enough at home, younger sons, surplus administrators, bankrupt notables, land-hungry cultivators from France and from Spain, Italy, and Malta — and the colony was one of the addresses to which that pressure was sent outward, the frontier where an ambition that might have festered at home was spent instead on a career, an estate, an administration overseas.

This is Export in the framework's exact sense: let the surplus form and send it outward, so the ambition is spent on someone other than the men who hold the land at home. The outlet worked, for France, for the better part of a hundred and thirty years.

For the **native potential-rival class**, the colony ran **Co-opt, by redirect** — binding the *caïds*, *aghas*, and *bachaghas* to the centre through office and patronage in the reconstituted "colonial makhzen," procuring the fatwa of Module 3 to blunt the jihad, and capturing the pulpit through the salaried imams and state-written sermons of Module 7. But this co-optation was structurally thin, and thin for a reason the framework can name: you cannot durably co-opt a class you refuse to admit, and the caste line forbade admitting the Muslim elite as equals. So the co-opted *caïd* lost his credibility and became the derided *béni-oui-oui*, and the redirect failed to hold, which is why a genuine rival interpreter — the reformist *ulama* — arose in the space the failed co-optation left (Modules 4 and 7).

For the **settler class** itself — a potential rival to metropolitan control, since a settler bloc can grow into a power that defies the mother-country — the metropole ran a co-optation by concession: it gave the settlers what they wanted, the land and local self-government through the *communes de plein exercice* and the Financial Delegations, binding them by satisfied interest rather than by force, atop the deeper binding of the default, since the settler minority's very survival depended on the metropolitan army.

The blend, then, is **Export (of the metropole's surplus) fused with Co-opt/redirect (of the native hierarchy) and co-optation-by-concession (of the settlers)** — and the Field Manual's instruction to track the *drift* is where the classification earns its keep, because the drift is the story. Across the 1870 seam the order drifted away from the paternalist Co-opt-and-preserve of the native hierarchy and toward the settler model of dispossession-and-caste, abandoning even the thin binding of the Muslim elite. And that drift, the framework warns, is very often the collapse's actual mechanism — as it was here, for abandoning the co-optation of the natives left the majority bound by nothing but the floor, ceded the seam to the rival interpreter, and manufactured, in the un-formed and un-co-opted majority, the counter-nation of Module 4 that would end the order.

One variable the Field Manual flags fits the case and refines it: the complexity of the administrative apparatus a conqueror inherits predicts whether he preserves it. The Turkish deylik France displaced was administratively thin — a garrison-state whose real coordination, as the landscape established, ran not through a deep bureaucracy but through Islam, the tribes, and the brotherhoods — so France lost little accumulated administrative information by clearing the Turkish state away, which lowered the cost of the dispossession model and helps explain why preservation lost. But the native *social* order that the paternalists wanted to keep — the tribal and religious networks — was itself a real coordination resource, and its abandonment was costly in exactly the way the drift describes: cheap to clear in the short run, ruinous in the long, because what replaced it was not French formation but a vacuum a rival nation filled.

Overproduction: the outlet that worked, and the one that did not

The framework insists that elite overproduction is not a separate crack but the standing pressure the open problem generates, discharging outward where an outlet exists and inward where it does not — and French Algeria ran both discharges at once, which is the key to its elite chaos. The metropole's overproduction discharged *outward*, into the colony, and the outlet held: for over a century Algeria absorbed France's surplus ambition without the pressure turning back on Paris, exactly the centuries-long carrying-capacity the framework says an open outlet buys.

But within the colony a second overproduction built with no outlet at all, and it is the one that mattered in the end. The settler wealth concentrated, as Module 2 counted, into a few thousand *grands colons* — some six thousand large owners holding the great majority of settler land by the 1950s — leaving a large population of poor whites, the *petits blancs*, who held settler status and citizenship but little property. Here was elite overproduction in the framework's precise sense: more men formed to the expectation of a European's place than the concentrated wealth could seat. And the caste line determined where that pressure went. A poor settler could not discharge his grievance downward into alliance with the far poorer Muslim, because the caste line kept him, however impoverished, *above* the entire Muslim majority — his whiteness and his citizenship were the one capital he could not lose, and their whole value depended on the caste line holding. So the *petits blancs* pressure discharged not into fracture with the natives but into the fiercest defence of the caste order itself: the poor settler became the hardest partisan of Algérie française, the future *ultra*, precisely because he had nothing but the caste to fall back on. Overproduction that a cross-race politics might have turned against the order was, by the caste line, converted into the order's most militant base.

The cracks that would eventually open the floor were therefore not the classic ones of succession or native revolt but the fracture lines this elite structure carried unhealed: the settler-versus-metropole seam, dormant after 1870 but never closed, which would reopen catastrophically when Paris's interest and the settlers' diverged; the metropole's exhaustion in a long war it might decide was not worth the cost; and the army's own capacity to fracture from the state that commanded it. Module 10 will show these crack in sequence — the settler *ultras* and a rebellious army turning against the metropole itself when de Gaulle moved toward Algerian independence — and will confirm the framework's rule that structural change is an elite event: the FLN's insurgency supplied the pressure and forced the seam open, but the proximate crack was the metropolitan elite concluding the colony was not worth its cost and the settler-army bloc fracturing from Paris in fury when it did. Module 8's task is to have named the fracture lines before they broke.

The code of the bloc

One further mechanism the framework asks after: does the coordinating class hold a recognised internal code whose visible enforcement is a precondition of the class's cohesion? The settler bloc did, and the code was the caste line itself — the solidarity of the European against the Muslim, the shared conviction of Algérie française — and its enforcement fell hardest on the breacher from within, the settler who "went native" or sided with reform, who was ostracised

as a traitor to his own. The visible policing of that line against defectors was the precondition of the bloc's belief in itself, and its final, murderous enforcement — the OAS's assassination of "traitors" in the war's last agony — belongs to Module 10; but the code was there from the start, holding the bloc by making apostasy from the caste the one unforgivable act.

Reading elite coordination against the framework

French Algeria confirms the framework's account of the open problem and bends it in the colonial direction. It confirms the default — a bloc each of whose members defended the whole by defending his own total position, sincerely, formation having made the built order their real world. It yields a clean Menu classification — Export of the metropole's surplus, blended with a Co-opt/redirect of the native hierarchy that the caste line kept thin, and a co-optation-by-concession of the settlers — and it demonstrates the Field Manual's warning about drift, the shift after 1870 from preserve-and-rule toward dispossess-and-settle being the very mechanism that would bring the order down. The contribution the case makes to the framework is the shape of the colonial open problem itself: a dual apex split across a sea, whose gravest internal question is not which capable man succeeds but which faction's *conception of the colony* prevails — and whose settler faction, once victorious, becomes a power that can turn on the metropole that made it, so that the order's final fracture runs not between rulers and ruled but between two parts of the ruling coalition, the settler bloc and the mother-country, over whether the colony is worth its price. And the case sharpens the framework's overproduction claim by showing two discharges at once: a metropolitan surplus safely exported into the colony for a century, and a settler surplus with no outlet that the caste line converted into ultra-loyalty rather than fracture — the poor white made the order's fiercest defender by the very line that kept him poor.

Two disciplines to close. Napoleon III's *"Je suis aussi bien l'empereur des Arabes que des Français"* and Warnier's complaint are exact and public-domain; the sequence of the settler victory (Crémieux, the 1871 sequestration, the Warnier Law, the *indigénat*) is as sourced in Modules 2 and 5, and the modern scholarship on the *Bureaux Arabes*, the *royaume arabe*, the settler blocs, and the *petits blancs* is paraphrased and credited. And legibility is not pardon: to reconstruct the settler bloc as a coalition cohering by rational default and sincere formation is to explain why it held and why it fought, not to grant that the land was fairly taken or the caste justly drawn. The actual cracking of the fracture lines named here — the settler-metropole rupture, the army's revolt, the war that carried them — belongs to Module 10, and the question of whether any genuine counterweight ever stood against this fused elite belongs to Module 9, which takes up next the variable on which liberty turns. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND VOTES

Module 9 · Plurality or Foreclosure — a genuinely free order for one caste and a wholly foreclosed one for the other on the same soil, and the settler liberty that was itself the instrument of the Muslim's foreclosure

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The variable on which liberty turns, doubled by a caste line

This is the module the Field Manual marks, with Module 8, for the sharpest attention, because it holds the variable on which liberty actually turns. Its question, stripped to the frame, is capture versus contestability at the scale of the whole realm: are violence, wealth, and trusted information held in one coalition's hand, or genuinely separated into hands that can check one another? Plurality is simply the name for the second condition — what a durable order looks like when the three monopolies are not all captured by the same coalition — and the Field Manual instructs the analyst to ask not only whether an order is plural but *plural where* and *foreclosed where*, since an order can be plural at its core and foreclosed at its periphery. French Algeria takes that instruction and sharpens it past anything the phrase "core and periphery" quite captures, because here the plurality and the foreclosure were not two places but two castes, interleaved on the same soil, in the same towns, under the same governor-general — a genuinely free order for the European and a wholly foreclosed one for the Muslim, running side by side. And the finding that makes the case instructive rather than merely stark is the relation between the two: the settlers' liberty was not incidental to the Muslim's foreclosure. It was its instrument. The counterweights the metropole did not own — the free settler press, the elected settler assemblies, the settler lobby in Paris — were real, and their reality was demonstrated by the one use to which the settlers put them: vetoing every attempt by the metropole to open the order to the Muslim.

The plural order — for the settler

Take the settler's Algeria first, and grant it its due, because the plurality was not a sham. The European of Algeria lived inside the full apparatus of a contestable order. He read a free and raucous press — a settler journalism vigorous enough to savage governors and denounce Paris. He voted: for the councils of the *communes de plein exercice* run by elected *colon* mayors, for the departmental *conseils généraux*, for the *Délégations financières* that from 1898 gave the settlers control of the colony's budget, and for the deputies and senators who carried the three Algerian departments' representation into the French Parliament. He went to independent courts under the Civil Code. He belonged to parties, associations, chambers, unions. And behind all of it stood the settler lobby in Paris, the *parti colonial* of Algerian deputies and their metropolitan

allies, powerful enough to make and break colonial policy. These were genuine counterweights in the framework's sense — instruments the apex did not fully own — and the proof of their genuineness is that the settlers used them not to flatter the metropole but to defy it. When the Government of National Defence naturalised the Jews of Algeria in 1870, the measure was, in the record's own words, *"décidée contre l'administration coloniale,"* and a part of the settler body, having first approved it, turned and opposed it. A bloc that can force a reversal on the government that rules it holds real contestability. The settlers held it.

The foreclosed order — for the Muslim

Now cross the caste line, on the same street, and every one of those counterweights vanishes. The Muslim had no free press: the reformist and nationalist Arabic papers were surveilled, seized, and finally silenced by the censorship of Module 7, *al-Shihâb* ending with the war in 1939. He had no genuine representation: where he voted at all it was in a separate and diluted college, so that in the councils the Muslims held a fifth of the seats until 1919 and a third thereafter — while being, across Algeria, the overwhelming majority of the population, some nine in ten. He had no independent court: his civil life ran through the *cadi* and his public life through the *indigénat* of Module 5, the administrator's summary justice *"sans publicité, contradiction ni défense"* and without appeal. His associations — the nationalist Étoile Nord-Africaine, later the Parti du Peuple Algérien — were harried and dissolved. His faith, the one interpreter that might have stood outside the state, was captured where it was loyal and suppressed where it was not, the pulpits written in Algiers and the reformers banned from them. For the Muslim, in short, the three monopolies were fused in the single settler-colonial-state coalition, and there was no counterweight the apex did not own. Capture, total, on the identical ground where the settler enjoyed contestability, total.

Liberty as the instrument of foreclosure

The relation between the two orders is the module's core, and it inverts the hope that usually attaches to plurality. In the ordinary liberal picture, counterweights widen liberty: a free press, an independent court, an elected assembly check the apex and pry the order open. In French Algeria the settler counterweights did the opposite — they were the mechanism by which liberty was kept *from* the excluded — because the counterweights belonged to the caste, not to the colony's people at large. Every genuine capacity the settlers had to check the metropole was aimed, when the question of the Muslim arose, at foreclosure. The local administrators, the settlers' own men, blocked the one legal door out of the *indigénat*: Jules Ferry, visiting in 1892, recorded that *"les administrateurs sont systématiquement opposés à la naturalisation,"* and the deputy Albin Rozet described to the Chamber in 1913 how the official simply talked the applicant out of it. The settler assemblies and the settler lobby stood ready to break any governor or ministry that moved toward Muslim rights. The plurality was real and it ran one way: it checked Paris on behalf of the caste, and it never once checked the caste on behalf of the excluded. A genuine counterweight, wholly captured to the purpose of foreclosure, is a structure the framework should hold, and French Algeria is its clean instance — contestability at the top of the order serving capture at the bottom, the freedom of the settlers functioning as the lock on the Muslim's

cage.

The excluded turn the language back — and are refused

The framework asks the decisive behavioural question: do the excluded turn the order's own legitimating language back on it, and does the apex concede or repress? The Muslim reform movements did exactly the first, in every register the order offered. The assimilationists asked to be admitted as the Frenchmen the Republic said they already were: the Fédération des élus indigènes that Ferhat Abbas and Dr Bendjelloul built in 1927 pressed the *évolués*' demand for equal rights, and Abbas himself, in his notorious article of February 1936, took the Republic at its literal word — he had searched for the Algerian nation, *"j'ai interrogé les vivants et les morts, j'ai visité les cimetières, personne ne m'en a parlé,"* and finding none, claimed France as his fatherland and asked only to belong to it. The reformists asked instead for recognition of what they were: the *ulama* preached both the existence of the Algerian Muslim nation and, in their own words, *"l'égalité absolue au point de vue de la dignité humaine et des droits humains entre tous les hommes, sans distinction de race ni de couleur,"* and Ben Badis answered Abbas that the nation *"s'est formée et existe… n'est pas la France."* Assimilation and nation were opposite demands, but both were made in the order's own currency — the Republic's equality, the rights of man, the promise that the native *was* French — and both were laid before Paris, in 1936, through the united Congrès Musulman Algérien.

And the order's answer is written in the fate of the most modest concession ever offered them: the Blum-Viollette project. In 1936 the Popular Front government of Léon Blum, prompted by the former governor-general Maurice Viollette, proposed to admit to the vote a small élite of Algerian Muslims — some twenty-four thousand of them, the veterans and graduates and officials — alongside the roughly two hundred thousand European electors, and, crucially, to admit them *without requiring them to renounce their Muslim personal status*, the very toll that Module 3 showed had kept the gate shut since 1865. It was the assimilationist dream in its smallest possible form: twenty-four thousand votes, for a Muslim population of millions, on the Republic's own terms. It was so modest that in Algeria only the *ulama* and Ferhat Abbas's *évolués* supported it. And the settlers killed it. The counterweights that made the settler order plural — the mayors, the assemblies, the lobby — mobilised against the bill, and it never reached a vote; it died, unenacted, by 1938. Twenty-four thousand votes were more than the free institutions of the settler order could tolerate being extended to the caste below, and the refusal of that vanishing concession is the exact answer to the framework's question. The apex, offered the chance to concede almost nothing, repressed instead.

Stored, not released — and the caveat on who ruptures

The framework poses the last alternative: does pressure from below release as reform, liberty widening by increments, or store until it ruptures? In French Algeria it never released. Every increment was blocked or gutted — the tiny opening of the Jonnart reforms after 1919, the Blum-Viollette bill in 1938, and, when at last a Statute of Algeria in 1947 conceded an Algerian Assembly, the elections to it were falsified by the administration so thoroughly that even the token representation was a fraud, the nationalists kept out by the counting. The pressure stored.

And then it ruptured, in the war that began in 1954 — but here the framework's caveat is exact and must be held against the sentimental reading: a foreclosed order ruptures not because the excluded finally rise, but because the floor cracks from above, when the elite fractures, exhausts, is conquered, or overbreeds. The Muslim insurgency of 1954 supplied the pressure that would force that crack, but the crack itself, as Module 8 named and Module 10 will trace, ran through the elite — the metropole exhausting of a war it came to judge not worth its cost, the settler and army *ultras* fracturing from a Paris that would let the colony go. The excluded did not, in the framework's strict sense, break the floor; they raised the cost until the coalition that held it broke apart. The foreclosure stored the charge; the elite fracture lit it.

One further question the Field Manual sets, whose full answer belongs to Modules 10 and 12: where a foreclosed order ruptures, does the rupture install plurality or reload the same shape under new names? The order that succeeded French Algeria was a single-party state, and on the framework's own terms that is a reload rather than a widening — the foreclosed shape surviving the change of masters, the three monopolies re-fused in a new coalition. That is stated here structurally, not as a verdict on the people who made the new state, and it is developed where it belongs, in the reckoning of Modules 10 and 12.

Reading plurality and foreclosure against the framework

French Algeria confirms the framework's account of the liberty variable and contributes a structure to it. It confirms the plural-at-core, foreclosed-at-periphery pattern, transposed from geography to caste — plurality and foreclosure not in separate provinces but interleaved on one soil, divided by the line between citizen and subject. It confirms, in the killing of Blum-Viollette, the pattern by which the excluded turn the order's own language back on it and a foreclosed apex represses rather than concedes — and it shows that repression working not through the raw floor alone but through the settlers' *free* institutions, which is the contribution. The colonial case names a structure the liberal hope overlooks: a genuine plurality that forecloses — real counterweights, real contestability, a press and assemblies and a lobby the apex did not own, all of it captured to the single purpose of keeping liberty from the caste below, so that the freedom of the few was the precise mechanism of the unfreedom of the many. And it confirms, finally, the hardest lesson the framework carries about contestability, the one *Above Warlordism* fixes in the case of the Cherokee whose Supreme Court victory a president let fall "still-born": that contestability runs exactly as far as the floor consents to be bound, and no further. The Muslim of Algeria was shown the forms — the 1865 declaration that he *was* French, the reforms proposed in his name — and the forms were contestable only to the edge of what the settler-held floor would consent to honour, which was nothing. Twenty-four thousand votes were offered on paper and refused in fact, and the distance between the offer and the refusal is the width of the whole colonial lie.

Two disciplines close the module, and one caveat about its making. The primary quotations are exact and public-domain — Ferry's 1892 note and Rozet's 1913 testimony, Ferhat Abbas's 1936 article, the *ulama*'s words and Ben Badis's reply, the *"décidée contre l'administration coloniale"* of the Crémieux measure, the electoral-college proportions — and the terms of the Blum-Viollette

project (its roughly twenty-four thousand new Muslim voters, its retention of personal status, its narrow support) are as reproduced in the scholarship; the settler mobilisation that killed it, and the falsification of the 1947 elections, are given in paraphrase from the standard histories, as the search tools available for this drafting returned no verifiable reproduction of a settler leader's exact words on the bill, and the discipline of this project forbids inventing one — a doubtful line is dropped, not guessed, and the exact settler-veto wording is left to be added when it can be verified. And legibility is not pardon: to reconstruct the settler plurality as a rational instrument of foreclosure is to explain how a free people kept another unfree, not to grant that they were right to. The rupture that this foreclosure stored, and the elite fracture that finally released it, belong to Module 10; the question of whether the successor order reloaded the same shape belongs to Module 12; and the method here is the method throughout — to set the demand beside the refusal, the *évolué* asking to be the Frenchman the Republic had called him against the settler veto of his twenty-four thousand votes, and to leave the reader to measure the gap. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

A HANDFUL OF RETIRED GENERALS

Module 10 · Change and Collapse — how an order that was winning the military war lost the colony, because the crack was never military but ran through the elite: the metropole's will exhausted, the settler and army ultras fractured from the Paris that would let Algeria go

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

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The crack was never military

The framework's ninth claim is the one a collapse most tempts a writer to break: that structural change is an elite event, that an order ends when the floor cracks from *within* the hierarchy — fracture, exhaustion, conquest, an unabsorbed surplus of claimants — and never simply because the ruled at last rise, who are present at every ending as soldier, crowd, and body count but never as the proximate agent. The Field Manual's instruction is blunt: find the crack, and do not write "the people rose." French Algeria obeys the claim so exactly that it can be stated as a paradox and the whole module is its resolution: France *won* the military war and *lost* the colony. The floor never lost its reach. It cracked from above.

Take the military fact first, because everything turns on it. The insurgency that began on 1 November 1954 — the Front de Libération Nationale rising to demand national independence and the restoration of a sovereign Algerian state — was, by the standard of arms, defeated inside Algeria before the colony was lost. The Battle of Algiers of 1957 broke the FLN's urban network through the torture and mass arrest Module 7 recorded. The border barrages sealed the frontiers. And the sweeps that General Maurice Challe ran from 1959, in the description of the record, swept Algeria from west to east, *"cassant" toutes les unités de l'ALN* — breaking all the units of the Armée de Libération Nationale. By 1960 the guerrilla was militarily broken in the field, the frontiers were shut, and the credible reach of the French floor over any individual Algerian who took up arms was intact. On the subject's own ledger — the cost column of Module 5 — nothing had emptied; the punishing force could still reach him and he knew it. If collapse required the floor to be beaten, French Algeria would not have fallen in 1962. The crack was somewhere else.

The cost column that emptied was the metropole's

Here the colonial case refines the framework's account of the emptying cost column, and the refinement is the module's first finding. In an ordinary order the cost column that matters is the subject's: does the credible expectation of force against a defector still hold? In a colonial order there is a second ledger above the first — the metropole's — and its question is not *can* the floor be held but *is it worth what holding it costs*. That second cost column is the one that emptied. The metropole did not lose the capacity to hold Algeria; it lost the will to pay for holding it. And it lost that will for reasons the framework files under exhaustion: the financial weight of a

conscript army of half a million men; the moral weight of the torture once the seam of Module 7 was forced open and the metropolitan conscience could no longer not-see; the international weight of a decolonising world and the United Nations arena the FLN had deliberately made its battlefield; and, beneath all of them, the demographic impossibility at the heart of Algérie française — that genuine integration meant millions of Muslim citizens the settler order existed to exclude, so the only honest forms of the colony were an integration the settlers would never accept or a domination the metropole would no longer pay for. This is exactly the outcome the FLN's strategy was designed to produce. Unable to beat the floor, it raised the *cost* of the floor — through attrition, through the exposure of the war's methods, through the internationalisation of the question — until the metropole's ledger came out against continuing. The cost column emptied, but it emptied on the far side of the sea, in the will of Paris, not on the near side, in the fear of the Algerian.

The fracture: the ultras against their own mother-country

The emptying of the metropole's will did not end the order by itself; it opened the fracture that Module 8 named and deferred, the seam between the settler-army bloc and the metropole, and the fracture's cracking is the collapse's proximate mechanism. The bloc that had brought de Gaulle to power turned on him when he spent that power to let the colony go.

The sequence is the framework's claim 9 in the open. In May 1958 the army and settlers of Algiers rose against the faltering Fourth Republic and brought it down, returning de Gaulle to power to save Algérie française; on 4 June 1958, before the crowd on the Forum of Algiers, he gave them the most studied ambiguity in modern French rhetoric — *"Je vous ai compris"*, I have understood you — and two days later at Mostaganem cried *"Vive l'Algérie française !"* The settlers and the officers believed they had installed a saviour. They had installed the man who would decide the colony was not worth its cost, and as he turned through self-determination toward independence they came to feel, in the record's word, *floués* — cheated — by the man they flattered themselves to have raised. The betrayed bloc fractured from the state in stages: the settlers' Week of the Barricades in January 1960; and then, in the night of 21–22 April 1961, the generals' putsch, four of the army's most decorated soldiers — Maurice Challe, André Zeller, Edmond Jouhaud, Raoul Salan — seizing Algiers with the paratroopers of the Foreign Legion to hold the colony against the head of state himself.

The floor had split. The army that was the ultimate instrument of the French monopoly of violence had, in part, turned that violence against the government it was sworn to. And the way the split was contained is itself the purest illustration the corpus has of structural change as an elite event decided within the hierarchy. On the evening of 23 April 1961, de Gaulle appeared on television in uniform and named the fracture:

> *"Un pouvoir insurrectionnel s'est installé en Algérie par un pronunciamento militaire. Ce pouvoir a une apparence : un quarteron de généraux en retraite. Il a une réalité : un groupe d'officiers partisans, ambitieux et fanatiques… Au nom de la France, j'ordonne que tous les moyens, je dis tous les moyens, soient employés pour barrer la route à ces hommes-là… J'interdis à tout Français et, d'abord, à tout soldat d'exécuter aucun de leurs ordres."*

> "An insurrectional power has installed itself in Algeria by a military pronunciamento. This power has an appearance: a handful of retired generals. It has a reality: a group of partisan, ambitious, and fanatical officers... In the name of France, I order that every means, I say every means, be employed to bar the road to these men... I forbid every Frenchman, and first of all every soldier, to carry out any of their orders."

He ended: *"Françaises, Français, aidez-moi !"* — Frenchwomen, Frenchmen, help me. And the thing that broke the putsch was not the crowd and not the FLN but the weight of one part of the elite's own instrument swung against another: the conscripts, the *"cinq cent mille gaillards munis de transistors,"* the five hundred thousand lads with transistor radios, who heard the head of state forbid them to obey the generals and did not obey the generals. The putsch collapsed in four days. The floor had cracked from within and been re-welded from within, entirely above the heads of the ruled — a fracture in the hierarchy opened by ambitious insiders and closed by the loyalty of the hierarchy's own conscripts to the state over the rebels. The ruled were not the agent. The army was, on both sides of the crack.

What remained of the fractured bloc went underground into the Organisation Armée Secrète, and the OAS is the fracture in its terminal form: settlers and officers of the losing faction waging terror against the FLN, against Muslim civilians, against the French state, against de Gaulle himself, in a final scorched-earth fury as the colony was lost. It is worth registering, against any reading that the people rose and won, that the last and bloodiest violence of French Algeria was not the colonised rising against the coloniser but one part of the colonial elite making war on the metropole that had decided to let go.

The people's true role

Give the ruled, then, their real part, which the framework asks be neither inflated nor erased. The Algerians were the soldier — the ALN fighters who, though broken in the field, kept the war alive at a cost the metropole would not indefinitely pay. They were the crowd — most decisively in the great Muslim demonstrations of December 1960, when the streets of Algiers filled for the FLN and showed de Gaulle and the watching world the depth of the nationalist tide, a crowd whose weight helped settle which way the metropole would jump. And a portion of them were the tragic instrument of the order's own side — the *harkis*, the Muslim auxiliaries who fought for France, the co-opted betting their lives on the order's endurance. But the counter-elite that led was not the crowd; it was the FLN, and the FLN was made of the disappointed insiders Modules 4 and 9 traced — the *évolués* whom the order had formed toward a Frenchness it then refused them, Ferhat Abbas who had written *"La France, c'est moi"* in 1936 and who would serve as the first president of the provisional government of the Republic the FLN proclaimed. The order manufactured, in the un-formed and un-admitted majority and its rejected élite, the counter-nation and the counter-elite that raised the cost until the French elite fractured over paying it. The people supplied the pressure and the numbers and the dead. The elite supplied the crack.

Reform or reload, and the drift that did it

Was the change reform that released pressure or rupture that reloaded the same shape? It was rupture, and it reloaded. The Évian Accords of March 1962 and the independence of 5 July 1962 — precisely a hundred and thirty-two years, to the day, after the French fleet took Algiers on 5 July 1830 — transferred the three monopolies from one coalition to another; the order that succeeded was a single-party FLN state, the foreclosed shape of Module 9 surviving the change of masters rather than opening into the plurality the excluded had once, in the assimilationist moment, demanded on France's own terms. And the mechanism of the whole collapse was the drift the Field Manual warns is so often the real cause: the drift Module 8 dated to 1870, away from the paternalists' thin co-optation of the native hierarchy and toward the settlers' pure dispossession-and-caste, which abandoned any binding of the majority whatsoever, ceded the seam to the rival interpreter, and so manufactured across three generations the counter-nation that ended the order. The order did not fall because the wrong men lost a battle. It fell because a century earlier it had chosen the settlement that guaranteed it would never bind the people it ruled.

The metabolic-death test, and the filter's verdict

Apply, finally, the two disciplines the Field Manual reserves for an ending. The metabolic-death test asks how much genuine, life-sustaining coordination the order was performing, because the mass death a collapse collects is proportional to that: catastrophic where the order *was* the population's subsistence metabolism, far lighter where it was only governance, extraction, and a settler economy laid over a population that fed itself. French Algeria was the second kind. It did not run the Algerians' irrigation or their granaries; it taxed them, policed them, and took their land. So its collapse, though drenched in blood, did not collect the metabolic famine that the fall of a hydraulic empire collects — and the distinction is exactly the one Module 6 drew, for the true metabolic mass death of this history, the three to five hundred thousand of 1866–68, was the *extraction régime's* toll in a bad year, not the *collapse's*. The collapse's own dead were the dead of eight years of war and reprisal — the scholarly estimates of the Algerian toll range widely, from the lower figures of French official accounts to the far higher figures of Algerian national memory, and the honest statement is a range of several hundred thousand rather than a point — concentrated combat, counter-insurgency, and massacre rather than starvation. And its most characteristic deaths were the two populations that had bet on the order: the *harkis*, abandoned at the end and killed in reprisal in the tens of thousands, and — though by flight far more than by death — the roughly one million *pieds-noirs* who chose, in the phrase that haunts their memory, the suitcase over the coffin, and left in a summer the country their great-grandparents had settled. The order was not the metabolism, so its end starved no one; it was a war and a caste, so its end killed soldiers and settled accounts.

Read the outcome, at the last, as the filter's verdict on this specific attempt, and hold the discipline the framework insists on: it is a finding about structural fit under the pressures this order met, not a moral verdict on the people who ran it and not proof the design was doomed from the first day. The configuration that failed was a nameable one — a floor laid abroad and a robe

cut for home, a caste line that withheld formation from the majority so the order never became that majority's world, and a settler settlement that drifted into binding no one it ruled — and it met a nameable test: a formed counter-nation, a decolonising century, and a metropole that finally judged the cost too high. It did not bear the test. That is the filter, which has no foresight and no preference and selects only for whether a configuration can carry the weight its position was always going to have to carry. And French Algeria is, in the corpus's terms, a control case as much as a casualty — the engine of Modules 1 through 9 caught at a hundred and thirty-two years, before formation had the undisturbed generations to compound it into anything resembling destiny, and caught *because* the caste line had withheld from the majority the very formation that might have made the order theirs. The wound the whole collection names is here at its plainest: the apparatus that lifted France above the warlord — the army, the law, the school, the administered peace — was the same apparatus that, captured for the colony, laid the razzia, wrote the *indigénat*, and sealed the seam, and did harm at a scale no warlord could reach. The order's fall is the filter's verdict on that attempt. It is not the verdict of History, which has no voice, and it is not the last word on the men and women of any side, whose reckoning — the full grim accounting of what the order cost and what, in its own terms, it built — belongs to Module 11.

Reading collapse against the framework

French Algeria confirms the framework's ninth claim with a clarity few cases match, precisely because it separates so cleanly the two things a careless account conflates: the order was militarily unbeaten and it fell, which is possible only if the crack ran through the elite and not up from the ruled. It confirms that the crack was exhaustion and fracture — the metropole's will emptied of a cost it could still bear but chose not to, and the settler-army bloc fractured from the state over the choice — with the ruled supplying the pressure, the soldiers, the crowd of December 1960, and the dead, but never the proximate agency. It confirms that the drift of the Menu classification was the collapse's true mechanism. And it contributes to the framework the colonial refinement of the emptying cost column: that in an order held for a metropole, the ledger that empties at the end is not the subject's fear but the metropole's will, so that the decisive question of a colonial collapse is never *can the floor be held* but *is it still worth what holding it costs* — and the insurgency that cannot beat the floor wins by making the answer no. Two disciplines close, as ever. The primary quotations — de Gaulle's *"Je vous ai compris,"* his *"quarteron de généraux en retraite"* address, Challe's breaking of the ALN units — are exact and drawn from the public record; the terms of the FLN's proclamation of 1 November 1954, the war's mortality range, and the fates of the *harkis* and *pieds-noirs* are given in paraphrase from the standard histories, the proclamation's exact wording and the precise toll left to be fixed against a verified primary text rather than asserted from memory. And legibility is not pardon: to explain that the order fell from an elite fracture and not a popular rising is a structural finding about how orders end, not a diminishment of the people who died raising the cost until the fracture came. The full accounting — of that cost, and of what the order genuinely built beneath its crimes — is Module 11. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

THE ROADS AND THE RAZZIA

Module 11 · The Grim Accounting — what the order cost while it stood, at its founding, and in its fall, set at equal weight beside what it genuinely built, refusing in the same breath the conqueror's syllogism and the sentimental mirror

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

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Both columns, in the same breath

This is the module that tests whether a study can hold its nerve. The framework's central discipline, stated in its shortest form in *Above Warlordism*, is to hold two truths at once without letting either swallow the other: that the order was real, valuable, hard-won — *and* that it was, underneath, brigandage that survived long enough to be taught in schools as the shape of the world. Module 11 makes that discipline a ledger. It asks for the cost the order collected — while it stood, at its founding, and in its fall — quantified where the record allows and with the combat dead separated from the metabolic dead; and it asks, at *equal* weight and in the same breath, for the genuine coordination the order performed, the roads and the storehouses and the peace and the medicine credited fully rather than sneered away. And it asks the analyst to refuse two opposite errors: the conqueror's syllogism, that because *some* order is necessary *this* order was justified, and the sentimental mirror, that because the price was terrible the works were worthless. French Algeria tempts both errors more than most cases, because its works were substantial and its cost was enormous, and the honest account is the one that writes them on the facing pages of a single ledger and declines to tear either page out.

The standing cost

Count first what the order cost while it merely stood, in the years when no war was on — the cost that leaves no battlefield and so is easiest to forget. Module 2 counted the land: some seven and a half million hectares in European hands by the 1930s, roughly two-fifths of what Algerian Muslims had held before the conquest, the best of the arable, taken by a machine made of law. Module 5 counted the liberty: a majority governed for sixty years under a permanent "exceptional" penal code, punishable without trial for travelling, gathering, or complaining, penned by a permit and a dispossession into a country they could not leave. Module 6 counted the bread: a sharecropper kept on a fifth where a European kept a half, a tax levied on the Muslim that vanished the moment his field passed to a settler, a surplus drained outward while the producer was held at the bone. And Module 4 counted the mind: a population brought, after a hundred and thirty years of rule, to roughly ninety per cent illiteracy, its own schooling defunded when the *hubus* was seized and almost nothing put in its place, its formation withheld by the caste line. These are not deaths, and they belong in the ledger all the same, because the

framework's question is not only who was killed but who was held at subsistence, foreclosed, and un-made — and the standing answer, for the Muslim majority, was: nearly all of them, for the life of the order.

The founding cost, and the metabolic dead

Count next the founding. The conquest and its "pacification" — the seventeen-year war, the razzia that burned the crops and seized the herds, the *enfumades* — were reckoned by the scholarship to have cost, by 1875, on the order of eight hundred thousand Algerian lives, against a population of perhaps three million at the landing; some historians reach for the word *genocide* and others contest it, and the contest is itself part of the record. And here the Field Manual's instruction to separate the combat dead from the metabolic dead does real work, because the razzia blurs the line on purpose: it was a military method whose mechanism was the destruction of subsistence, so its dead are combat dead and metabolic dead at once, killed by a strategy that chose famine as its weapon. The purest metabolic event came a generation later and was counted in Module 6: the famine of 1866 to 1868, when drought and locust fell on a rural society the extraction had already stripped of its margin, and three to five hundred thousand died — not of French bullets but of the French fiscal floor meeting a bad year with nothing left. That is the metabolic column, and it is the extraction régime's toll, not the war's; the distinction matters, because it locates the death not in a battle but in a tax.

The collapse cost, and the contested count

Count last the fall, and here the record's own thinness becomes a finding. The war of 1954 to 1962 cost, on the French historians' reckoning, some four hundred thousand dead on all sides; on the Algerian national reckoning, one and a half million Algerian dead — and the gulf between four hundred thousand and a million and a half is not a rounding error but a battlefield of memory, the two nations counting their way to two different wars. Around the war's own dead cluster the collapse's characteristic tolls, each contested: twenty-five thousand six hundred French soldiers; some six thousand Europeans; over eight thousand villages destroyed and more than two million Algerians displaced into resettlement camps; and, in the reprisals that followed independence, the *harkis*, the Muslim auxiliaries who had bet their lives on the order and were disarmed and abandoned at its end — killed, by estimates that range from ten thousand to a hundred and fifty thousand, the width of the range itself a measure of how little the counting was done. And the roughly nine hundred thousand *pieds-noirs* who fled in a single summer — few of them killed, but a whole settler world evacuated, the largest migration post-war Europe had seen. The Algerian state has since put the toll of the entire hundred and thirty-two years at five and a half million and more; a French president has called the Algerian official history a discourse of hatred; the figures are wielded as weapons because they were never neutrally kept.

That un-neutral keeping is itself the point the Field Manual asks a study to notice: where the record is thin, the thinness is a symptom, not an accident. The Algerian dead are contested because the order that made them did not carefully count them — the colonial state kept meticulous cadastral registers of the land it took and left the mortality of the conquered to estimate

and polemic, exactly as an order whose seam (Module 7) suppressed the conquered's testimony toward the metropole would leave its victims uncounted. The divergence between four hundred thousand and one and a half million is the last residue of the information asymmetry this whole study has traced: the floor did not number the dead it made, and so the dead are numbered now by their heirs and their enemies, in figures that will not meet.

The works, at full weight

Now turn the page, and credit — at equal weight, in the same breath, without the sneer that would be its own dishonesty — what the order genuinely built. France laid across Algeria a real infrastructure of coordination: roads and railways where there had been none, the ports of Algiers and Oran, dams and irrigation works, a modern administered peace that ended the tribal warfare and the corsairing of the deylik. It built a medical order whose effect is written in the plainest possible datum — the Muslim population, which the conquest and the famine had driven down toward two and a half million by the 1870s, rose under colonial public health to some nine million by 1954, a near-quadrupling that no amount of poverty can argue away, because dead people do not multiply. It built a settler agriculture of real productive weight — the vineyards, the citrus, the wheat that made Algeria an exporting economy — and it built institutions of genuine learning, the University of Algiers among them, and in the Sahara it found the oil and gas that made the colony, at the very end, a tangible prize. These were not nothing. To pretend they were nothing, to write the whole hundred and thirty-two years as unbroken theft and cruelty with no coordination in it, is the sentimental mirror the framework names and refuses — a falsehood that flatters the writer's indignation and insults the reader's intelligence, because the roads were real and the population that quadrupled was real and the man who denies it is lying in the other direction.

But credit the works precisely, which means crediting also their distribution, because the ledger's honesty lives in the details. The roads and railways and ports were built, above all, to carry the settler economy's wine and grain outward to the metropole — the infrastructure of the drain Module 6 traced, not of the Muslim's prosperity. The hospitals and medical services reached the Muslim enough to quadruple him and not enough to school or enrich him, so that the order's most genuine gift to the conquered, the fall in his death rate, produced a vast, young, landless, illiterate population whose very growth made the caste settlement demographically impossible and helped detonate the order (Module 10). The schools, as Module 4 counted, mostly did not reach him at all; France drew up its first plan for mass Muslim schooling — the Le Gorgeu Commission's target of eight hundred thousand Muslim children — only in 1955, with the war already begun, a century and a quarter too late. The works were real, and they were a settler's and a metropole's works, dispensed to the Muslim, in Britannica's exact phrase, "to a limited extent." Credit them at full weight; count their caste-distribution at full weight; and let neither cancel the other.

Refusing the syllogism

The temptation this ledger sets is the conqueror's syllogism — *order is necessary, therefore this order was* — and French Algeria states it in the mouth of the man who built the Republic's schools.

Jules Ferry challenged the Chamber in 1885 to deny that there was *"plus de justice, d'ordre matériel et moral… en Afrique du Nord depuis que la France a fait sa conquête"* — more justice, more material and moral order in North Africa since France made its conquest. That is the syllogism entire: the works are real, therefore the conquest that brought them was justified. And the refusal is not to deny the works but to break the inference, because it smuggles in a false identity between *order* and *this order*. That some coordinating order is better for most lives than the warlord's chaos is the framework's own first principle, and true. That *this* order — the razzia, the *indigénat*, the fifth, the withheld school, the caste line drawn at a book of personal law — was the necessary price of that coordination is false, and the proof is that none of those specific cruelties was required to build a road or a hospital or an administered peace; they were required only to build a *settler-caste* order, which is a particular choice among possible orders, not the tax that civilisation levies. The roads did not need the razzia. The hospitals did not need the *indigénat*. The vineyards did not need the fifth. A France that had meant the *"l'indigène est français"* it wrote in 1865 could have built every one of the works and drawn none of the caste line, and the fact that it drew the caste line instead is a fact about what it chose, not about what order costs. Ferry's own contemporary, Clemenceau, made the refusal in 1885 in words this study has already quoted and will let stand as the answer: *"n'essayons pas de revêtir la violence du nom hypocrite de civilisation."* Let us not clothe violence in the hypocritical name of civilisation. The works were civilisation's; the caste line was violence's; and the syllogism's whole trick is to bill the second to the first.

Reading the accounting against the framework

French Algeria confirms the framework's demand that a study hold both columns and refuse both errors, and it sharpens the demand in one colonial particular. The standing cost fell almost wholly on one caste and the standing benefit almost wholly on another, so that the ordinary difficulty of a grim accounting — that the same people bear the cost and enjoy the coordination — is here split cleanly by the caste line: the Muslim majority bore the dispossession, the *indigénat*, the fifth, the withheld school, and the great mass of the dead, while the settler minority and the metropole took the land, the wine, the ports, and the peace. This is the contribution to the framework's accounting module: in a settler-caste colony the ledger does not merely balance cost against benefit, it *sorts* them by caste, and the honest reckoning must say not only how much the order cost and built but to whom it did each — the works to the settler and the metropole, the cost to the conquered, the medical gift to the Muslim a double-edged exception that grew the very population the order refused to seat. And the case confirms the filter's discipline that closed Module 10: this reckoning is a measure of what the specific configuration did and cost under the pressures it met, not a verdict of History for or against the people of any side, and the thinness of the death record is the filter's own signature, the residue of an order that counted its land and not its dead.

Two disciplines close, as ever. The quotations are exact and public-domain — Ferry's challenge and Clemenceau's refusal from the 1885 debate; the demographic, cadastral, and mortality figures are the standard scholarly reconstructions, given with their ranges and their live historio-

graphical dispute (the French and Algerian tolls of the war, the *genocide* contest over the conquest, the wide bands on Sétif and the *harkis*) marked as dispute rather than resolved, and the exact figures I could not verify against a primary reproduction are given as ranges from that literature rather than asserted as points. And legibility is not pardon, nor is pardon the same as denial: to credit the roads is not to pardon the razzia, and to count the razzia is not to deny the roads. The whole of Module 11 is the refusal to let either of those become the other — the discipline, in the framework's own words, of refusing to collapse the achievement into the theft or the theft into the achievement, which is not fence-sitting but the only stance from which the thing can be seen at all. What the case finally shares and diverges from across the corpus — the reversed robe, the withheld formation, the metropole's emptying cost column, the ledger sorted by caste — belongs to the last module, the reading of French Algeria against the collection it is part of. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

A note on sources. The standing costs are as quantified in Modules 2, 4, 5, and 6 (roughly 7.5 million hectares in European hands by the 1930s; the *indigénat*; the *khammès*'s fifth; c. 90 per cent Muslim illiteracy at independence). The conquest toll (on the order of 800,000 by 1875, against a population near three million; the *genocide* debate) and the famine of 1866–68 (300,000–500,000) follow the demographic literature (Kateb and others) as in Modules 1 and 6. The war's toll is given with its live dispute — c. 400,000 on the French historians' reckoning against c. 1.5 million on the Algerian, with 25,600 French soldiers and c. 6,000 Europeans, over 8,000 villages destroyed and more than 2 million displaced to camps — and the *harki* deaths (estimates from 10,000 to 150,000) and *pied-noir* exodus (c. 900,000) as in the standard histories (Stora, Ageron, Pervillé) and the current French and Algerian official positions; the Algerian state's figure of 5.6 million for the whole period is given as that state's claim, not as a settled count. The Sétif toll range (the French official Tubert figure of 1,020, Ageron's 5,000–6,000, the wider scholarly band, the Algerian and Radio Cairo maxima) is as in Module 7's sourcing. The works — the road, rail, and port infrastructure, the medical order and the population's rise toward 9 million by 1954, the settler export agriculture, the University of Algiers, the Saharan hydrocarbons, and the caste-limited distribution of all of them — follow the standard accounts (Britannica; Naylor; the demographic series) and are paraphrased and credited; the 1955 Le Gorgeu schooling plan is from that literature. Ferry's *"plus de justice, d'ordre matériel et moral…"* and Clemenceau's *"le nom hypocrite de civilisation"* are the exact 1885 parliamentary record, as in Module 4. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and briefly quoted; contested figures are given as ranges and never invented. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

THE DOOR ROME OPENED

Module 12 · Convergence and Divergence — reading French Algeria against the corpus: the ancient shape it shares with Caesar's Gaul, the one door it refused to open that Rome had opened, and the revisions a conquest-that-would-not-admit forces on the framework

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

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The case against the collection

The last module reads French Algeria back against the corpus it belongs to — asking what it shares with other orders and whether the sharing is position logic at scale rather than any hidden hand, where its people chose differently within the narrow menu their position offered, what it confirms and complicates and forces the framework to revise, and, at the end, what the strongest case against this whole reading would be, stated fully and answered without flinching. The natural partner for the reading is already in the collection, and this study has pointed to it since its landscape: *The Die and the Dignitas*, the case of Caesar in Gaul, because the colonial structure is not modern and French Algeria is not its first instance. Two thousand years earlier a Roman proconsul had run the same shape — a floor of raw force laid in a conquered province while the robe that would make the conquest lawful was fought over at the imperial centre — and the comparison of the two conquests, one that endured by opening a door and one that fell by keeping it shut, is the clearest single frame for what French Algeria adds to the framework.

The ancient convergence

Set the two conquests side by side and the convergence is structural, not stylistic, which is exactly what position logic at scale predicts. Caesar's floor in Gaul operated with the same rawness as France's floor in Algeria: the ancient figures Plutarch gives for the Gallic wars — a million dead, a million enslaved, flagged in *The Die and the Dignitas* as inflated but scale-setting — sit beside the roughly eight hundred thousand Algerian dead of the conquest that Module 11 counted, two floors laid by the destruction of a people who would not submit. And in both cases the robe that would legitimate the floor was contested not where the floor fell but at the metropolitan centre, among the coordinating class whose belief the whole enterprise required. In Rome, Cato moved that Caesar be handed over to the Germans for the atrocities of his conquest — the seam cracking in the Senate exactly as it cracked in the Chamber of Peers in 1845 when the prince de la Moskowa rose over the Dahra, and again in the metropolitan press over the torture of the 1950s. In both orders the load-bearing asset was the belief of the army, not the belief of the conquered: Caesar's soldiers wagered at the Rubicon on his rightfulness, and France's army carried a mission it believed in its own private letters (Module 3), and in both the coordinating class's belief was decisive at the end — the senators withdrawing it from Caesar with daggers, the

French army fracturing from de Gaulle in 1961 and the conscripts refusing to follow the generals (Module 10). Three or more unconnected conquerors across two millennia reaching moves of the same shape, because the position of the stationary conqueror poses the same problem and admits only a short menu of answers: that convergence is the framework's central evidence that no hidden hand is needed, only many men running the ordinary benefit-against-cost engine from the same seat.

The door: where the two conquests diverge

Now the divergence, and it is the whole of what French Algeria teaches the corpus. Rome conquered Gaul and, over the generations that followed, *opened the door*: it extended citizenship to the Gaulish notables, admitted them to the Senate, let the provincial become a Roman until the distinction dissolved — until Gaul produced Roman senators and, in time, Roman emperors, and the Constitutio Antoniniana of 212 made every free inhabitant of the empire a citizen. Gaul did not remain a conquered nation held under a floor; it *became Rome*, the formation compounding across centuries until the counter-nation had no separate existence to return to. France conquered Algeria and kept the door shut. The caste line of Module 2, drawn at a book of personal law, admitted fewer than seven thousand Muslims to citizenship in a hundred and thirty years; the *sénatus-consulte* of 1865 declared *"l'indigène musulman est français"* and the word *néanmoins* voided it; the Blum-Viollette bill's twenty-four thousand votes were more than the settler order could tolerate (Module 9). Algeria did not become France, because France would not let it, and so the formation that might have dissolved the counter-nation was withheld (Module 4), and the counter-nation formed instead, and the order ended not in assimilation but in a war of liberation. The variable that divides the two outcomes is a single one: whether the conqueror will, in the end, admit the conquered. Rome would; France would not; and everything the framework must revise to fit French Algeria flows from that refusal.

Why did France refuse where Rome admitted? Position logic answers with the contextual variables. Rome drew no racial or confessional bar across the door — the Gaul who took the toga and the language was a Roman, and nothing in the Roman order forbade it. France drew exactly such a bar, and drew it because two things its position supplied that Rome's had not: a settler population, dense and permanent, whose whole material interest was the caste line that kept the land and the vote European (Module 8), and a nineteenth-century racial ideology that made the bar respectable, stated in Ferry's own voice as the duty of *"les races supérieures"* toward *"les races inférieures"* (Module 4). Where Rome's conqueror could imagine the conquered becoming him, France's settler could not afford it and France's century would not think it. The door Rome opened, France bolted — and bolted it not from cruelty alone but from the rational interest of a settler caste and the formed conviction of a racial age.

The revisions the case forces

From that one refusal the framework's colonial revisions follow, and they are the case's contribution to the corpus. Each is a place where the default picture, drawn from orders that ruled a population whose belief they needed, must bend to fit an order that ruled a population whose belief it did not need and would not cultivate.

The **robe reverses**. The framework's default has the robe laid over the floor and facing the ruled, driven deep by formation until the governed police themselves. French Algeria shows the robe's direction is contingent on need: where the floor holds the conquered directly and the conqueror does not require their belief, the robe is cut away from them and toward the two audiences the conqueror cannot do without — the metropole that funds and mans the war, and the army that must be freed in conscience to fight it (Module 3). The robe faces home, not down. This is the first revision, and it reframes the robe as a garment whose orientation follows the order's actual dependence rather than a fixed canopy over the ruled.

The **floor can be laid metabolically**. Against a settled population the floor is laid by garrison and disarmament; against the mobile tribes of Algeria it was laid by destroying subsistence — the razzia that burned the crop and seized the herd, the *enfumade* (Module 1). The framework gains a mechanism: where a population cannot be pinned, its metabolism can be, and the floor is laid by making survival itself depend on submission.

Formation can be withheld as a structural choice. The default treats formation as the mechanism that makes rule cheap by making the ruled police themselves; French Algeria shows a caste order deliberately declining it, because to form the majority into citizens would be to admit them, which the caste line forbids — so the order holds the majority by the floor and the surveillance-code instead, stays permanently expensive and brittle, and leaves the formative field to a rival that makes the counter-nation (Module 4). This is the deepest revision, because it makes withheld formation not a failure but a feature, and identifies it as the mechanism by which such an order manufactures the nation that ends it.

The seam splits by a sea. The single interpreter-chokepoint of the ordinary order becomes, in a colony, two — one over the conquered and one over the metropole — which are two ends of one seam, because the reality suppressed at each end is the reality the other end already holds, and the order's core information task is keeping them from meeting (Module 7). The framework gains the colonial doubling of the seam.

The cost column that empties is the metropole's. In the ordinary collapse the subject's cost column empties when the floor loses its reach; in a colonial collapse the floor keeps its reach — France won the military war — and what empties is the second ledger above it, the metropole's will to keep paying, so that the insurgency which cannot beat the floor wins by making the metropole's answer to *is it worth the cost* turn to no (Module 10). The framework gains the colonial refinement of the emptying cost column.

The ledger sorts by caste. The grim accounting of the ordinary order balances a cost and a benefit borne largely by the same people; in the settler-caste colony it does not balance, it *sorts* — the works to the settler and the metropole, the cost to the conquered, the medical gift a double-edged exception (Module 11). The framework gains the caste-sorted ledger.

And the **Menu family gains a boundary condition**. Module 8 classified the case as Export of the metropole's surplus blended with Co-opt-by-redirect of the native hierarchy, and the redirect *failed* — the co-opted *caïd* became the derided *béni-oui-oui*, and the reformist *ulama* and then the

FLN rose in the space he left. The finding the case adds to the Co-opt family's evidentiary base is precisely a limit: you cannot durably co-opt a class you refuse to admit, so a Co-opt run across a caste line that bars admission is structurally thin and breeds the rival it was meant to prevent. The Co-opt family gains its failure condition.

What holds, and the control it provides

Against these revisions, the spine holds without a break, and honesty requires saying so plainly: French Algeria is a colonial *variant* of the framework, not a counterexample to it. The convergence with Caesar and with every other conquest-order is position logic at scale, no hidden hand required (No Hidden Hand). The object throughout is the three monopolies, fused for the beneficiary caste and foreclosed for the conquered (The Three Monopolies). The surprises lived, as the framework says they must, one level up in the elite and not in the rising of the ruled — the order fell from an elite fracture, the metropole exhausting and the settler-army bloc breaking from Paris, with the conquered supplying pressure, soldiers, crowd, and the mass of the dead but never the proximate crack (Above Warlordism, claim nine). The order reproduced by default, each settler defending the whole by defending his own total position, sincerely, formation having made the built order his real world (By Default). The extraction sat at the bone because both dials were turned to the stop (Just Enough). The seam was the leg the other two monopolies moved to defend each time it was forced. The case confirms all of this and refutes none of it.

And its very short life — a hundred and thirty-two years, brief against the millennia of the orders the corpus more often studies — makes it, in the framework's own terms, a control case for the filter, and a peculiarly clean one. It is the engine of Modules 1 through 9 caught *before* formation could compound it into anything resembling destiny — and caught in that state not by accident but *because the caste line withheld from the majority the very formation that compounds*. Gaul is the control run in the other direction: the same conqueror's engine, the door opened, formation permitted to compound across centuries until the province became the centre and no counter-nation remained to rise. The pair isolates the variable. Rome's Gaul and France's Algeria are the same conquest with the door open and the door shut, and the difference in their fates — Gaul dissolving into Rome, Algeria hardening into a nation that expelled France — is the framework's cleanest available demonstration that a conquest's durability turns on whether it will admit the conquered, that formation compounds an order only where the order lets the formed in, and that the caste line which looks like the order's protection is the timer on its collapse.

The strongest case against this reading

The framework is held as tested, not revealed, and the reading must end on the strongest case against it, stated fully and answered without flattening. It has three prongs, and each is serious.

The first is the developmental prong: that France genuinely modernised Algeria — the roads, the ports, the medicine that quadrupled the population, the University, the end of the deylik's corsairing and tribal war — that Algeria as a nation-state, with its borders and its institutions, is in large part a French creation, and that to read the whole enterprise as a caste seizure is

to sneer at a real and lasting transformation. The second is the no-worse-than-the-alternative prong: that the Turkish deylik it replaced was itself a foreign garrison-tyranny living off the *makhzen*'s extraction, that a continued Ottoman or a victorious Abd al-Qadir state would also have been extractive and unfree, and that the framework's own filter says survival is structural fit and not moral desert — so to single out French Algeria for special condemnation is to commit the sentimental error the framework forbids. The third is the counter-nation prong, aimed at this study's own claim: that Algerian and Islamic identity long pre-existed France, rooted in the faith, the tribes, and Abd al-Qadir's state, so that to say France *manufactured* the counter-nation overstates French agency and steals from the Algerians the nationhood that was theirs before the conquest — and Ben Badis said as much, that the nation *"s'est formée et existe,"* formed itself and exists.

Each prong lands, and each is answered by conceding what it gets right before showing what it misses. The developmental prong is factually correct and Module 11 already granted it at full weight: the works were real, the population did quadruple, and the sentimental mirror that would deny it is its own dishonesty. What the prong misses is the syllogism inside it — that the works justify the order — and the answer is the one Rome supplies: modernisation did not require the caste line, because Rome modernised Gaul *and* admitted it, so the *indigénat* and the withheld school and the fifth were never the price of a road but the price of a *settler-caste* order, a particular choice and not a tax on civilisation. Credit the works; refuse the bill. The no-worse-than-the-alternative prong is right that the deylik was no idyll and right that the filter issues no moral verdict of History — and this study issues none; it explains rather than condemns, holding that legibility is not pardon. But the prong understates a real distinction the comparison exposes: the deylik was a thin garrison-tyranny that left the population's formation to Islam and the *zawiyas*, which ran freely; France seized the *hubus* that funded that formation and put almost nothing in its place, so the colonial order was distinctively de-forming in a way its predecessor was not — the comparison sharpens the charge rather than dissolving it. And the counter-nation prong is the one that most improves this study's own precision, and it is conceded: France did not invent Algerian identity, which pre-existed it in the faith and the tribes, and Ben Badis is right that the nation formed itself. The revision is therefore stated exactly: France did not manufacture the *identity*; it manufactured the counter-*nation* — the political form aimed at a sovereign state — by foreclosing the assimilationist alternative, turning a pre-existing people that might, behind an open door, have become French as the Gaul became Roman, into a nation that could only become free. The raw material was Algeria's; the path was France's choosing, and the path it chose was the one that led to 1962.

The double truth

What remains, when the counter-position has been given its full due, is the double truth the framework exists to hold without collapsing, and it is the same shape that closed the case of Caesar. Caesar really broke something worth breaking and was, underneath, a warlord in a Republican robe he could not make fit; French Algeria really built a modern administered order and quadrupled the people it ruled, *and* was, underneath, a settler-caste seizure that took two-

fifths of a country's land, held its majority at a fifth under a surveillance-code, withheld their schooling to ninety per cent illiteracy, killed them in the hundreds of thousands at its founding and again in the hundreds of thousands at its fall, and ended in the war of liberation its refusal had made inevitable. Neither truth may be collapsed into the other. The achievement is credited without swallowing the self-justification; the cost is named without denying the achievement; and the discipline of holding both at once, in the same breath, is not fence-sitting but the only stance from which the order can be seen at all.

And beneath the double truth lies the wound the whole collection is written to make visible, and French Algeria shows it as plainly as any case in the corpus. The apparatus that lifts a society above the warlord — the army, the law, the school, the administered peace, the medicine that quadruples a population — is the same apparatus that, captured and turned upon a conquered people it has decided not to admit, lays the razzia, writes the *indigénat*, seals the caves, and does harm at a scale no warlord could reach. The horror does not come from the absence of the civilising apparatus; it comes from its capture. That is why the case is offered, in the method this study has held throughout — the exact public words of the metropole set beside the exact private words of the men on the ground, the monument beside the cemetery, *l'indigène est français* beside the *répression par voie disciplinaire*, the door Rome opened beside the door France bolted — and the sum left, as it must be, for the reader to reach alone. The order's fall is the filter's verdict on this attempt: not the verdict of History, which has no voice, and not proof the design was damned from the first day, but a finding about what a conquest that would not open its door could bear when the pressure of a formed counter-nation and a decolonising century finally came. It could not bear it. It never could have, so long as the door stayed shut.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

A note on sources. The comparison with Caesar draws on the corpus study *The Die and the Dignitas* (the Gallic floor, Cato's motion, the army's belief as the load-bearing asset, the coordinating class's withdrawal of belief); the Gallic casualty and enslavement figures are Plutarch's, flagged there and here as ancient and inflated, used for scale. The Roman assimilation of Gaul — the extension of citizenship, the admission of Gaulish notables to the Senate, and the universalising of citizenship by the Constitutio Antoniniana of 212 — is given as the well-attested standard pattern and paraphrased, not quoted. The primary quotations carried into this module — the *sénatus-consulte* of 1865 (*"l'indigène musulman est français, néanmoins…"*), Ferry's *"races supérieures / races inférieures,"* and Ben Badis's *"s'est formée et existe"* — are the exact, public-domain texts as verified and sourced in Modules 3, 4, and 9. All quantitative claims (the land taken, the naturalisation count, the literacy rate, the death tolls) are as sourced, with their ranges and disputes, in the modules cited. The framework propositions are drawn from *Above Warlordism* and the *Patterns of Power Field Manual* (*v4.0*); the corpus studies referenced (No Hidden Hand, The Three Monopolies, By Default, Just Enough, The Filter Not the Hand, The Die and the Dignitas) are named where used. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited; nothing is quoted that has not been verified against a source reproducing the primary text, and where

a figure remains contested it is given as a range and marked. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*